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I think you are absolutely right, but the reasoning behind these thought experiments are such that we can understand consciousness, and what it means “to percei

I think you are absolutely right, but the reasoning behind these thought experiments are such that we can understand consciousness, and what it means “to perceive” something. So in your example, we may recognize these aliens as conscious beings, but how do we know that? They do not experience the world in the same way we do, and yet they clearly must have something in common with us to produce a conscious being. The argument proposed by physicalists says that there must be some new state inherent to the apple that registers in our brain as “red apple”. But what is the likelihood that all humans even produce the exact same state in the brain for the same item? Or in your aliens, that can’t even see the color? The non-physicalist argument is that the experience of seeing that apple is unique to each one of us, and emerges uniquely for every brain. That state of the brain that we “learn” upon seeing a red apple for the first time is unknowable to others, yet is a core part of the conscious experience… thus, non-physicalists believe we may never truly understand how consciousness works. In other words, even if we may recognize these aliens as conscious, we may never be able to explain how we know… since we can’t define how it arises. (This is my interpretation of the argument—not guaranteed to be correct)

pdonis 4y ago
> The argument proposed by physicalists says that there must be some new state inherent to the apple that registers in our brain as “red apple”. No, it doesn't. Physicalism does not require that the exact same brain state must accompany a particular perception, either in different humans, or in the same human at different times. All it requires is that perception is a physical process. > The non-physicalist argument is that the experience of seeing that apple is unique to each one of us, and emerges uniquely for every brain. And the physicalist's response is that even if this is true, it does not refute physicalism. Perception can be a physical process and still satisfy these statements.
- beowulfey 4y ago
  Thanks for the clarification! I find this topic fascinating, but am definitely still learning it. My impression was that the underlying assumption (or at least, the end goal) of the physicalist interpretation is that this physical process can ultimately be used to predict how consciousness arises. But if there is no expectation of similar patterns across individuals, I would imagine the usefulness in that sense is limited. So, perhaps this isn't an end goal of physicalism. In which case, perhaps neither party expects there to be a solution to the origins of consciousness, maybe!
  - pdonis 4y ago
    > My impression was that the underlying assumption (or at least, the end goal) of the physicalist interpretation is that this physical process can ultimately be used to predict how consciousness arises. This is the hope of many physicalists, but it is not required for physicalism to be true.

pdonis 4y ago

> The argument proposed by physicalists says that there must be some new state inherent to the apple that registers in our brain as “red apple”. No, it doesn't. Physicalism does not require that the exact same brain state must accompany a particular perception, either in different humans, or in the same human at different times. All it requires is that perception is a physical process. > The non-physicalist argument is that the experience of seeing that apple is unique to each one of us, and emerges uniquely for every brain. And the physicalist's response is that even if this is true, it does not refute physicalism. Perception can be a physical process and still satisfy these statements.

beowulfey 4y ago
Thanks for the clarification! I find this topic fascinating, but am definitely still learning it. My impression was that the underlying assumption (or at least, the end goal) of the physicalist interpretation is that this physical process can ultimately be used to predict how consciousness arises. But if there is no expectation of similar patterns across individuals, I would imagine the usefulness in that sense is limited. So, perhaps this isn't an end goal of physicalism. In which case, perhaps neither party expects there to be a solution to the origins of consciousness, maybe!
- pdonis 4y ago
  > My impression was that the underlying assumption (or at least, the end goal) of the physicalist interpretation is that this physical process can ultimately be used to predict how consciousness arises. This is the hope of many physicalists, but it is not required for physicalism to be true.