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I have a take that I'm torn on about whether it misses the point/is covered by one of the arguments presented in the article, or makes sense - It seems to me t

I have a take that I'm torn on about whether it misses the point/is covered by one of the arguments presented in the article, or makes sense - It seems to me that one can know about all the physical properties of color before having experienced it, and still not have any expectations of knowing what their perception of seeing a given color would be like. Those are two different knowledge domains which are relevant to us, but which have no real importance in a "universal truth" sense. Imagine we were talking about red with an individual of an alien species which doesn't have eyes or other light sensing organs, but is technologically advanced enough to know about photons and the physical properties of light and use them in their navigation systems (maybe not unlike we understand something about radiation without being able to feel it). We'd agree on the existence of the "red" wavelength, and we'd agree that certain surfaces reflect it and certain bodies emit it. But it'd be rather futile to try to explain seeing the color red to the alien even if we could, because it's irrelevant to them; it's just some being's perception of a physical quantity, a delta in the chemical balance of our brain soup. To them it's no more special than the feeling of hunger, a crude reflex which evolved so our bodies could tell us we need sustenance. Importantly, there's nothing of practical value about color itself that they could learn from the discussion. In that sense, does Mary really learn something new about color, or does she just learn about her own perception of it? Are those two things really related?

beowulfey 4y ago
I think you are absolutely right, but the reasoning behind these thought experiments are such that we can understand consciousness, and what it means “to perceive” something. So in your example, we may recognize these aliens as conscious beings, but how do we know that? They do not experience the world in the same way we do, and yet they clearly must have something in common with us to produce a conscious being. The argument proposed by physicalists says that there must be some new state inherent to the apple that registers in our brain as “red apple”. But what is the likelihood that all humans even produce the exact same state in the brain for the same item? Or in your aliens, that can’t even see the color? The non-physicalist argument is that the experience of seeing that apple is unique to each one of us, and emerges uniquely for every brain. That state of the brain that we “learn” upon seeing a red apple for the first time is unknowable to others, yet is a core part of the conscious experience… thus, non-physicalists believe we may never truly understand how consciousness works. In other words, even if we may recognize these aliens as conscious, we may never be able to explain how we know… since we can’t define how it arises. (This is my interpretation of the argument—not guaranteed to be correct)
- pdonis 4y ago
  > The argument proposed by physicalists says that there must be some new state inherent to the apple that registers in our brain as “red apple”. No, it doesn't. Physicalism does not require that the exact same brain state must accompany a particular perception, either in different humans, or in the same human at different times. All it requires is that perception is a physical process. > The non-physicalist argument is that the experience of seeing that apple is unique to each one of us, and emerges uniquely for every brain. And the physicalist's response is that even if this is true, it does not refute physicalism. Perception can be a physical process and still satisfy these statements.
  - beowulfey 4y ago
    Thanks for the clarification! I find this topic fascinating, but am definitely still learning it. My impression was that the underlying assumption (or at least, the end goal) of the physicalist interpretation is that this physical process can ultimately be used to predict how consciousness arises. But if there is no expectation of similar patterns across individuals, I would imagine the usefulness in that sense is limited. So, perhaps this isn't an end goal of physicalism. In which case, perhaps neither party expects there to be a solution to the origins of consciousness, maybe!
    - pdonis 4y ago
      > My impression was that the underlying assumption (or at least, the end goal) of the physicalist interpretation is that this physical process can ultimately be used to predict how consciousness arises. This is the hope of many physicalists, but it is not required for physicalism to be true.
pdonis 4y ago
> Those are two different knowledge domains This is a circular argument: you are arguing that physicalism is not true by assuming that physicalism (which asserts that there is only one knowledge domain) is not true. According to a physicalist, perception is a physical process. So are knowing and experiencing and "what it is like". So to a physicalist, someone who, like Mary in the thought experiment, is stipulated to have complete knowledge of all of the physical facts will know "what it is like" to have any perception, because that is part of the physical facts. The only difference is that Mary, before she is released from the room, knows what it is like to see red by a process of deduction--by looking at what physical facts, among those she knows, correspond to her seeing red--instead of by the more usual process of having her retina and optic nerve stimulated in a particular way. To put it another way, Mary, unlike you and me, knows what it is like to see red by imagining it, based on her complete knowledge of all the physical facts. That complete knowledge allows her to put her brain into any state she likes, even in the absence of the external stimuli that would normally be present. Sure, this is farfetched, but so is the premise that Mary has complete knowledge of all the physical facts. But if you grant the premise, you are granting Mary the powers she needs to do the thing that Jackson incorrectly claims she cannot do. > But it'd be rather futile to try to explain seeing the color red to the alien even if we could, because it's irrelevant to them First, seeing red is obviously not irrelevant to Mary, so this argument says nothing about Mary. But second, if the alien has complete knowledge of all the physical facts about human brains, bodies, etc., then seeing the color red is not irrelevant to the alien, because seeing the color red is part of the physical facts that the alien knows. In other words, this hypothetical alien knows things that any "normal" alien would not know, and that changes what is "relevant" to this alien.

beowulfey 4y ago

I think you are absolutely right, but the reasoning behind these thought experiments are such that we can understand consciousness, and what it means “to perceive” something. So in your example, we may recognize these aliens as conscious beings, but how do we know that? They do not experience the world in the same way we do, and yet they clearly must have something in common with us to produce a conscious being. The argument proposed by physicalists says that there must be some new state inherent to the apple that registers in our brain as “red apple”. But what is the likelihood that all humans even produce the exact same state in the brain for the same item? Or in your aliens, that can’t even see the color? The non-physicalist argument is that the experience of seeing that apple is unique to each one of us, and emerges uniquely for every brain. That state of the brain that we “learn” upon seeing a red apple for the first time is unknowable to others, yet is a core part of the conscious experience… thus, non-physicalists believe we may never truly understand how consciousness works. In other words, even if we may recognize these aliens as conscious, we may never be able to explain how we know… since we can’t define how it arises. (This is my interpretation of the argument—not guaranteed to be correct)

pdonis 4y ago
> The argument proposed by physicalists says that there must be some new state inherent to the apple that registers in our brain as “red apple”. No, it doesn't. Physicalism does not require that the exact same brain state must accompany a particular perception, either in different humans, or in the same human at different times. All it requires is that perception is a physical process. > The non-physicalist argument is that the experience of seeing that apple is unique to each one of us, and emerges uniquely for every brain. And the physicalist's response is that even if this is true, it does not refute physicalism. Perception can be a physical process and still satisfy these statements.
- beowulfey 4y ago
  Thanks for the clarification! I find this topic fascinating, but am definitely still learning it. My impression was that the underlying assumption (or at least, the end goal) of the physicalist interpretation is that this physical process can ultimately be used to predict how consciousness arises. But if there is no expectation of similar patterns across individuals, I would imagine the usefulness in that sense is limited. So, perhaps this isn't an end goal of physicalism. In which case, perhaps neither party expects there to be a solution to the origins of consciousness, maybe!
  - pdonis 4y ago
    > My impression was that the underlying assumption (or at least, the end goal) of the physicalist interpretation is that this physical process can ultimately be used to predict how consciousness arises. This is the hope of many physicalists, but it is not required for physicalism to be true.

pdonis 4y ago

> Those are two different knowledge domains This is a circular argument: you are arguing that physicalism is not true by assuming that physicalism (which asserts that there is only one knowledge domain) is not true. According to a physicalist, perception is a physical process. So are knowing and experiencing and "what it is like". So to a physicalist, someone who, like Mary in the thought experiment, is stipulated to have complete knowledge of all of the physical facts will know "what it is like" to have any perception, because that is part of the physical facts. The only difference is that Mary, before she is released from the room, knows what it is like to see red by a process of deduction--by looking at what physical facts, among those she knows, correspond to her seeing red--instead of by the more usual process of having her retina and optic nerve stimulated in a particular way. To put it another way, Mary, unlike you and me, knows what it is like to see red by imagining it, based on her complete knowledge of all the physical facts. That complete knowledge allows her to put her brain into any state she likes, even in the absence of the external stimuli that would normally be present. Sure, this is farfetched, but so is the premise that Mary has complete knowledge of all the physical facts. But if you grant the premise, you are granting Mary the powers she needs to do the thing that Jackson incorrectly claims she cannot do. > But it'd be rather futile to try to explain seeing the color red to the alien even if we could, because it's irrelevant to them First, seeing red is obviously not irrelevant to Mary, so this argument says nothing about Mary. But second, if the alien has complete knowledge of all the physical facts about human brains, bodies, etc., then seeing the color red is not irrelevant to the alien, because seeing the color red is part of the physical facts that the alien knows. In other words, this hypothetical alien knows things that any "normal" alien would not know, and that changes what is "relevant" to this alien.