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I understand the experiment could be reframed to fix this "bug", but it's flawed: when Mary sees a red apple for the first time, some optical/neural pathways ge
by the_af 4y ago
I understand the experiment could be reframed to fix this "bug", but it's flawed: when Mary sees a red apple for the first time, some optical/neural pathways get excited that weren't before. She knew everything there was to know about the color red, but a specific physical experience was missing (physical, with observable physical changes that can be physically measured).
So this isn't about metaphysics or anything. Had Mary stimulated her optic nerve with an electric current to simulate a red apple, we'd be closer to the intended message of this thought experiment (and I'd argue in that case that a physical apple and a simulated one are indistinguishable).
- distcs 4y agoWhat is your point? The article puts forward this point too among many other counterpoints.
- the_af 4y agoI think I explained my point, why do you ask? But to summarize for you: it's not true that Mary "knew all" just by reading about the color red. The premise is false. She lacked one bit of information: to have her optic nerve stimulated by a red apple. Note this isn't metaphysical, it's physical; such stimulation can be physically measured and she lacked this experience, which -- to emphasize the point -- is entirely physical. Again, I think the thought experiment can be probably reframed in order to fix this flaw, but Mary and her red apple as currently stated are not convincing of any duality.
- distcs 4y agoI am trying to understand what point you are trying to express that is not already very well expressed in the article. Or are you repeating one of the several counterpoints mentioned in the article? If so why is this one counterpoint more important than the other counterpoints made in the article?
- PixyMisa 4y agoThe point here is that the argument is not internally consistent. If Mary knows everything there is to know about colour vision, that includes knowing the experience of seeing the colour red. If she doesn't know that, it simply contradicts the premise.
- PixyMisa 4y agoRight. It's very similar to Bishop Berkeley's argument for idealism, in that the thought experiment doesn't make sense unless you assume a priori that physicalism is false.
- pdonis 4y ago> when Mary sees a red apple for the first time, some optical/neural pathways get excited that weren't before Not necessarily. By hypothesis, Mary has complete knowledge of all the physical facts. That includes the knowledge of how to cause her optical/neural pathways to be excited in the particular way that corresponds to "seeing red" even without the corresponding external stimuli being present. So she could have caused herself to see red. (We might describe this in more conventional language as Mary imagining seeing red, and her complete knowledge of all physical facts giving her powers of imagination far in excess of those of ordinary humans.)
- the_af 4y ago> That includes the knowledge of how to cause her optical/neural pathways to be excited in the particular way that corresponds to "seeing red" even without the corresponding external stimuli being present. Having knowledge and actually doing it are trivially different things (try sex: knowledge of sex and doing the deed are vastly different things). Now, if she exercises her knowledge by stimulating her optic nerves, that's the same as seeing the apple. But that's not just "reading about it", it's a physical act of doing!
- pdonis 4y ago> Having knowledge and actually doing it are trivially different things This is a circular argument. You are arguing that Mary does not know what it is like to see red by assuming that she does not know what it is like to see red. > if she exercises her knowledge by stimulating her optic nerves Which, since she has complete knowledge of all physical facts, she can do. The thought experiment does not say she "reads about" color vision. It says she has complete knowledge of all physical facts. The article referenced here does not do a good job of describing Jackson's actual thought experiment, but Jackson's actual thought experiment is based on the (extremely strong and unrealistic) premise I have just stated. It has to be, because any weaker premise cannot possibly ground a conclusion that Mary learns something non-physical when she sees the apple. Just saying that Mary knows everything that can be learned by reading about things is not enough; there are many physical facts that cannot be learned by reading.