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> Using NDA GmbH as a front company, Orekhov and Kuzurgasheva sourced and purchased sensitive military and dual-use technologies from U.S. manufacturers, includ

> Using NDA GmbH as a front company, Orekhov and Kuzurgasheva sourced and purchased sensitive military and dual-use technologies from U.S. manufacturers, including advanced semiconductors and microprocessors used in fighter aircraft, missile systems, smart munitions, radar, satellites, and other space-based military applications. These items were shipped to Russian end users, including sanctioned companies controlled by Telegin and Tulyakov that serviced Russia’s military. Some of the types of electronic components obtained through the criminal scheme have been found in Russian weapons platforms seized on the battlefield in Ukraine. As alleged, in 2019, Orekhov travelled to the United States to source parts used in the Russian-made Sukhoi fighter aircraft and the American-made F-22 Raptor stealth fighter aircraft. So what components are those, exactly?

mikewarot 4y ago
"According to court documents, beginning in 2018, Eriks Mamonovs, 33, and Vadims Ananics, 46, both citizens of Latvia who operated CNC Weld, a Latvia-based corporation, conspired with Stanislav Romanyuk, 37, a citizen of Ukraine and resident of Estonia who operated Estonia-based BY Trade OU, and others, including Janis Uzbalis, 46, of Latvia and individuals in Russia and a Russia-based company, to violate U.S. export laws and regulations and smuggle a jig grinder that was manufactured in Connecticut to Russia." -- Emphasis mine
- deleted 4y ago
  [deleted]
- formerly_proven 4y ago
  N.b. not your average drill grinding jig.
  - mikewarot 4y ago
    It is WWII era technology. Something capable of making existing holes slightly larger, and far more precise in their placement and size. You can find them used on Ebay for $5000 or so.
    - formerly_proven 4y ago
      I'm assuming we're talking about a precision CNC machine tool and not a hunk of WWII-era cast iron with thou scales.
      - jbay808 4y ago
        These machines were perfected in the '60s and '70s. They are not only exceptional for their ability to make a hole perfectly located and perfectly sized, but also for making it perfectly round. Their ways being perfectly straight and perpendicular, and metallurgically stable, they are often bought just as a platform for converting into special tooling (for making air bearings, diffraction gratings, metrology and semiconductor equipment, and so on).
      - elteto 4y ago
        No, no, it clearly must be a WWII relic. That’s clearly why they would arrest these people. The guy on HN that has private knowledge about the indictment said you could find the same ones on ebay for $5k. /s
    - WJW 4y ago
      Nukes are also WWII era technology, yet you would face some very critical questions if you tried to build one in your back yard. So are rocket engines and jet engines for that matter. This type of jig grinder is absolutely not comparable to the things you can find on Ebay, let alone for 5k.
      - jrumbut 4y ago
        Also, if they were model rocketry or ham radio enthusiasts who took things way, way, way too far they're still in trouble for all the oil smuggling and money laundering they did.
    - pen2l 4y ago
      https://www.justice.gov/usao-ct/pr/european-nationals-and-entities-indicted-charges-violating-us-laws-their-attempt-export https://www.justice.gov/usao-ct/pr/european-nationals-and-en... specifically mentions a high-resolution jig. I wouldn't be surprised if in some cases just the tooling bits are around $5000, leaving aside the whole machine. For high-resolution machining, e.g. for lens fabrication, there's a whole science to drill bits, where special processes allow for achieving up to sub-nanometer surface roughness in parts. If they're making holes in hard metals they might be using titanium, diamond, or carbide drill bits that have crazy physical properties and cost a pretty penny. In some sense CNC machining is also a WWII era technology, but CNC machines from that era couldn't touch what modern-day machines can do and the repeatable precision with which they can do them: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RnIvhlKT7SY https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RnIvhlKT7SY While on the subject, this really is a fascinating field and it rules the world more than people might think. Consider that TSMC's core machines are made by ASML. Among the most important and specialized-IP parts in ASML machines are the huge lens which are made by Zeiss. Zeiss makes the lens with some next level machining equipment from companies around Heidelberg and Karlsruhe area. High-resolution machining isn't super known to the general public but it is so fascinating once you get to see the things they can pull off.
- tablespoon 4y ago
  >> Some of the types of electronic components obtained through the criminal scheme have been found in Russian weapons platforms seized on the battlefield in Ukraine. As alleged, in 2019, Orekhov travelled to the United States to source parts used in the Russian-made Sukhoi fighter aircraft and the American-made F-22 Raptor stealth fighter aircraft. > "...to violate U.S. export laws and regulations and smuggle a jig grinder that was manufactured in Connecticut to Russia." -- Emphasis mine Unless the world is far more bizarre than I ever imagined, I don't think a jig grinder is a "part used in" a fighter aircraft or the kind of thing that you'd find in "weapons platforms seized on the battlefield". Specifically I was asking about the "electronic components" common to both the "Russian-made Sukhoi fighter aircraft and the American-made F-22 Raptor stealth fighter aircraft." I'm guessing they will either turn out to be very interesting or extraordinarily mundane.
  - KennyBlanken 4y ago
    A GPS chipset is extraordinarily mundane (there are billions if not tens of billions of them by now) until it's one that lacks altitude or speed lockouts, and is attached to a thousand pounds of high explosives (or ~10-20 kG of Spicy Metal) falling from the sky.
  - mikeyouse 4y ago
    The indictment was sealed up until just a little bit ago, it should be on Recap soon. Here's some excerpts from that section: > On or about May and June 2018, the defendant YURY OREKHOV attempted to procure radiation-hardened, space-grade Field Programmable Gate Arrays ("FPGA") from a California-based technology and semiconductor company ("U.S. Company 2"), an entity the identity of which is known to the Grand Jury, for Network Technologies. FPGAs were integrated circuits used in a variety of weapons systems, including ballistic missiles and smart munitions, and were controlled by the DOC under ECCN 9A515.el, which required a license from the BIS to export to Russia for reasons of national security. On or about May 23, 2018, an NDA GmbH employee sent an email inquiring about purchasing 60 FPGAs for approximately 4.5 million Euros from a licensed distributor of U.S. Company 2, copying OREKHOV. In response, the distributor wrote, "[U.S. Company 2] will arrange for a detailed export check. This special military/space component is subject to the strictest security measures." An offer letter was attached to the email, listing NDA GmbH as the "deliver to" company but did not reference Network Technologies. OREKHOV immediately forwarded the email and offer letter to the defendant SERGEY TULYAKOV. .. > In or about May 2019, the defendant YURY OREKHOV attempted to obtain radiation-hardened random-access memory ("MRAM") devices from a Petmsylvania electronics company ("U.S. Company 3") and radiation-hardened supervisory circuits from a California-based semiconductor company ("U.S. Company 4"), entities the identities of which are known to the Grand Jury, for the benefit of Abtronics. These MRAM devices and supervisory circuits had military applications, and the MRAM devices were controlled by the DOC under ECCN 9A515.e.2 ("'Spacecraft' and related commodities"), which required a license from the BIS to export to Russia for reasons of regional stability, as well as for missile technology, due to their potential use in ballistic and hypersonic missile systems. .. > On or about May 2019, the defendant TIMOFEY TELEGIN sent the defendant YURY OREKHOV a message that he had "five interesting positions," that is, five items he was interested in, and listed two types of MRAM devices and three types of supervisory circuits from U.S. Company 3 and U.S. Company 4, respectively. TELEGIN instructed OREKHOV, "[Y]ou can procure the positions as is or you can procure different quantities of each position." OREKHOV asked TELEGIN to send the necessary details. On or about May 21, 2019, an NDA GmbH employee inquired with an electronics distributor about the same two MRAM devices and three types of supervisory circuits requested by TELEGIN. .. > After the meeting, Individual 1 received several inquiries from the defendant SVETLANA KUZURGASHEVA requesting assistance in obtaining a variety of military-grade components typically used in fighter jets. In the first inquiry, occurring shortly after the meeting between defendant YURY OREKHOV and Individual 1, KUZURGASHEVA requested a quote for 18 tactical air navigation interrogators and 18 multi-mode receivers, both of which were reportedly used in the 2022 Russian SU-30SM2 fighter jets' upgraded navigation systems. In July 2019, KUZURGASHEVA again contacted Individual 1 and requested assistance in obtaining a radiation-hardened, militarygrade two-terminal temperature transducers manufactured by U.S. Company 2. Later, on or about September 19, 2019, KUZURGASHEVA contacted Individual 1 and asked for price quotes for two communications devices that the U.S. military uses to transmit Top Secret voice and data traffic. Both items were manufactured by a Florida-based technology company and defense contractor ("U.S. Company 6"), an entity the identity of which is known to the Grand Jury, and both items were on the USML and controlled under the ITAR and other applicable regulations. They weren't buying GPS modules - they were looking for high performance, high reliability components specifically for use in weapons systems.

mikewarot 4y ago

"According to court documents, beginning in 2018, Eriks Mamonovs, 33, and Vadims Ananics, 46, both citizens of Latvia who operated CNC Weld, a Latvia-based corporation, conspired with Stanislav Romanyuk, 37, a citizen of Ukraine and resident of Estonia who operated Estonia-based BY Trade OU, and others, including Janis Uzbalis, 46, of Latvia and individuals in Russia and a Russia-based company, to violate U.S. export laws and regulations and smuggle a jig grinder that was manufactured in Connecticut to Russia." -- Emphasis mine

deleted 4y ago
[deleted]
formerly_proven 4y ago
N.b. not your average drill grinding jig.
- mikewarot 4y ago
  It is WWII era technology. Something capable of making existing holes slightly larger, and far more precise in their placement and size. You can find them used on Ebay for $5000 or so.
  - formerly_proven 4y ago
    I'm assuming we're talking about a precision CNC machine tool and not a hunk of WWII-era cast iron with thou scales.
    - jbay808 4y ago
      These machines were perfected in the '60s and '70s. They are not only exceptional for their ability to make a hole perfectly located and perfectly sized, but also for making it perfectly round. Their ways being perfectly straight and perpendicular, and metallurgically stable, they are often bought just as a platform for converting into special tooling (for making air bearings, diffraction gratings, metrology and semiconductor equipment, and so on).
    - elteto 4y ago
      No, no, it clearly must be a WWII relic. That’s clearly why they would arrest these people. The guy on HN that has private knowledge about the indictment said you could find the same ones on ebay for $5k. /s
  - WJW 4y ago
    Nukes are also WWII era technology, yet you would face some very critical questions if you tried to build one in your back yard. So are rocket engines and jet engines for that matter. This type of jig grinder is absolutely not comparable to the things you can find on Ebay, let alone for 5k.
    - jrumbut 4y ago
      Also, if they were model rocketry or ham radio enthusiasts who took things way, way, way too far they're still in trouble for all the oil smuggling and money laundering they did.
  - pen2l 4y ago
    https://www.justice.gov/usao-ct/pr/european-nationals-and-entities-indicted-charges-violating-us-laws-their-attempt-export https://www.justice.gov/usao-ct/pr/european-nationals-and-en... specifically mentions a high-resolution jig. I wouldn't be surprised if in some cases just the tooling bits are around $5000, leaving aside the whole machine. For high-resolution machining, e.g. for lens fabrication, there's a whole science to drill bits, where special processes allow for achieving up to sub-nanometer surface roughness in parts. If they're making holes in hard metals they might be using titanium, diamond, or carbide drill bits that have crazy physical properties and cost a pretty penny. In some sense CNC machining is also a WWII era technology, but CNC machines from that era couldn't touch what modern-day machines can do and the repeatable precision with which they can do them: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RnIvhlKT7SY https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RnIvhlKT7SY While on the subject, this really is a fascinating field and it rules the world more than people might think. Consider that TSMC's core machines are made by ASML. Among the most important and specialized-IP parts in ASML machines are the huge lens which are made by Zeiss. Zeiss makes the lens with some next level machining equipment from companies around Heidelberg and Karlsruhe area. High-resolution machining isn't super known to the general public but it is so fascinating once you get to see the things they can pull off.
tablespoon 4y ago
>> Some of the types of electronic components obtained through the criminal scheme have been found in Russian weapons platforms seized on the battlefield in Ukraine. As alleged, in 2019, Orekhov travelled to the United States to source parts used in the Russian-made Sukhoi fighter aircraft and the American-made F-22 Raptor stealth fighter aircraft. > "...to violate U.S. export laws and regulations and smuggle a jig grinder that was manufactured in Connecticut to Russia." -- Emphasis mine Unless the world is far more bizarre than I ever imagined, I don't think a jig grinder is a "part used in" a fighter aircraft or the kind of thing that you'd find in "weapons platforms seized on the battlefield". Specifically I was asking about the "electronic components" common to both the "Russian-made Sukhoi fighter aircraft and the American-made F-22 Raptor stealth fighter aircraft." I'm guessing they will either turn out to be very interesting or extraordinarily mundane.
- KennyBlanken 4y ago
  A GPS chipset is extraordinarily mundane (there are billions if not tens of billions of them by now) until it's one that lacks altitude or speed lockouts, and is attached to a thousand pounds of high explosives (or ~10-20 kG of Spicy Metal) falling from the sky.
- mikeyouse 4y ago
  The indictment was sealed up until just a little bit ago, it should be on Recap soon. Here's some excerpts from that section: > On or about May and June 2018, the defendant YURY OREKHOV attempted to procure radiation-hardened, space-grade Field Programmable Gate Arrays ("FPGA") from a California-based technology and semiconductor company ("U.S. Company 2"), an entity the identity of which is known to the Grand Jury, for Network Technologies. FPGAs were integrated circuits used in a variety of weapons systems, including ballistic missiles and smart munitions, and were controlled by the DOC under ECCN 9A515.el, which required a license from the BIS to export to Russia for reasons of national security. On or about May 23, 2018, an NDA GmbH employee sent an email inquiring about purchasing 60 FPGAs for approximately 4.5 million Euros from a licensed distributor of U.S. Company 2, copying OREKHOV. In response, the distributor wrote, "[U.S. Company 2] will arrange for a detailed export check. This special military/space component is subject to the strictest security measures." An offer letter was attached to the email, listing NDA GmbH as the "deliver to" company but did not reference Network Technologies. OREKHOV immediately forwarded the email and offer letter to the defendant SERGEY TULYAKOV. .. > In or about May 2019, the defendant YURY OREKHOV attempted to obtain radiation-hardened random-access memory ("MRAM") devices from a Petmsylvania electronics company ("U.S. Company 3") and radiation-hardened supervisory circuits from a California-based semiconductor company ("U.S. Company 4"), entities the identities of which are known to the Grand Jury, for the benefit of Abtronics. These MRAM devices and supervisory circuits had military applications, and the MRAM devices were controlled by the DOC under ECCN 9A515.e.2 ("'Spacecraft' and related commodities"), which required a license from the BIS to export to Russia for reasons of regional stability, as well as for missile technology, due to their potential use in ballistic and hypersonic missile systems. .. > On or about May 2019, the defendant TIMOFEY TELEGIN sent the defendant YURY OREKHOV a message that he had "five interesting positions," that is, five items he was interested in, and listed two types of MRAM devices and three types of supervisory circuits from U.S. Company 3 and U.S. Company 4, respectively. TELEGIN instructed OREKHOV, "[Y]ou can procure the positions as is or you can procure different quantities of each position." OREKHOV asked TELEGIN to send the necessary details. On or about May 21, 2019, an NDA GmbH employee inquired with an electronics distributor about the same two MRAM devices and three types of supervisory circuits requested by TELEGIN. .. > After the meeting, Individual 1 received several inquiries from the defendant SVETLANA KUZURGASHEVA requesting assistance in obtaining a variety of military-grade components typically used in fighter jets. In the first inquiry, occurring shortly after the meeting between defendant YURY OREKHOV and Individual 1, KUZURGASHEVA requested a quote for 18 tactical air navigation interrogators and 18 multi-mode receivers, both of which were reportedly used in the 2022 Russian SU-30SM2 fighter jets' upgraded navigation systems. In July 2019, KUZURGASHEVA again contacted Individual 1 and requested assistance in obtaining a radiation-hardened, militarygrade two-terminal temperature transducers manufactured by U.S. Company 2. Later, on or about September 19, 2019, KUZURGASHEVA contacted Individual 1 and asked for price quotes for two communications devices that the U.S. military uses to transmit Top Secret voice and data traffic. Both items were manufactured by a Florida-based technology company and defense contractor ("U.S. Company 6"), an entity the identity of which is known to the Grand Jury, and both items were on the USML and controlled under the ITAR and other applicable regulations. They weren't buying GPS modules - they were looking for high performance, high reliability components specifically for use in weapons systems.