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OK, I'll take the bait ... It's better to attack the argument than to attack the poster. I shouldn't have to defend my credentials to make a comment. I'm not a

OK, I'll take the bait ... It's better to attack the argument than to attack the poster. I shouldn't have to defend my credentials to make a comment. I'm not a virologist but I understand how viruses can be mutated and how they replicate. I understand the basics of the BU experiments. Knowledge of a specific set of experiments that were part of developing a specific vaccine does not equate to knowledge of the basics of virology. My point is that claiming the BU experiments on ePPP were not GOF because they didn't produce a more deadly pathogen is a somewhat nonsensical definition (whether NIAID promotes it or not) and an ineffective defense of the work. Derek Lowe can do much better, but he didn't. In the process, he misses addressing the real concerns of critics and fails to understand or acknowledge their fears (which have nothing to do with the precise definition of GOF as used by Derek Lowe).

DiogenesKynikos 4y ago
> Knowledge of a specific set of experiments that were part of developing a specific vaccine does not equate to knowledge of the basics of virology. In this case, it does, because those are some of the most famous experiments in the history of virology. Everyone who learns the basics of virology knows about those experiments. As I said, this is the equivalent of saying one knows the fundamentals of computer science, but not knowing about the Turing Machine. Or imagine someone expressing very strong opinions about programming, but then saying they've never heard of C. I raise this because I'm always shocked in these discussions on HN by how many people who don't seem to know the basics of virology weigh in with such strong opinions. Virology has come under significant attack, and most of it has been very poorly informed. About the experiments themselves, they do not look similar to the experiments that have historically been considered GOF, and which sparked the GOF debate (look up the debate from the 2010s over research into the 1918 pandemic flu strain, if you want to know what the original debate was about). Taking a spike protein from a variant and putting it onto wild-type SARS-CoV-2 is a fairly straightforward way to try to isolate the effect of the changes in the spike protein from other changes in the virus. The Omicron spike is already out there. Omicron is already out there. This isn't adding anything to SARS-CoV-2 that isn't already massively spreading in the real world, and there's no particular reason to think that this experiment will create a more deadly or transmissible virus.
- possiblydrunk 4y ago
  Effectively, you are posing a litmus test on whether someone can reasonably comment on an issue that involves virology. I think that's unfair and completely unnecessary. You don't really know anything about my background, so why are you making assumptions? I happen to have more than enough experience and knowledge in the area to make a comment. I'm not peer reviewing the work, I'm commenting on a line of argument espoused by Derek Lowe. Derek Lowe chose to focus on defining GOF in a rather narrow way - one that can only be applied retroactively if the outcome is critical to the definition -- and uses that definition to say that criticism of the BU experiments is overblown. The general fear around experiments involving ePPP doesn't care about the exact definition of GOF. Just saying that it doesn't qualify as GOF is not going to convince people that fear it. Derek Lowe should have focused more on the points you raise in your last paragraph. >The Omicron spike is already out there. Omicron is already out there. This isn't adding anything to SARS-CoV-2 that isn't already massively spreading in the real world, and there's no particular reason to think that this experiment will create a more deadly or transmissible virus. Nobody intends to create a more dangerous virus on purpose. But if the outcome were so fully understood and completely predictable, then it's a waste of time and money doing the experiment just to confirm a conclusion that everyone fully agrees on and understands. And if there's little to no risk, why take precautions? Why use BSL3? Why does NIAID feel it should have been alerted? That's what Derk Lowe should have addressed, not a definition!
  - DiogenesKynikos 4y ago
    > Effectively, you are posing a litmus test on whether someone can reasonably comment on an issue that involves virology. I think "understands the basics of virology" is a reasonable litmus test for who should be commenting on whether a given virology experiment is safe or not. > Nobody intends to create a more dangerous virus on purpose. This is not true. It's actually what the original GOF debate (focusing on influenza) was about in the 2010s. > And if there's little to no risk, why take precautions? Why use BSL3? Honestly? Partly to appease people like you. The scientists are being extraordinarily cautious, with a set of experiments that are highly unlikely to lead to anything particularly concerning in the first place. The danger posed by everyday people walking around with CoVID-19 is far greater than the danger posed by this experiment. Inside of labs, SARS-CoV-2 is treated like an incredibly dangerous substance. Outside of labs, people are walking into restaurants and bars and exhaling SARS-CoV-2 onto everyone around them.

DiogenesKynikos 4y ago

> Knowledge of a specific set of experiments that were part of developing a specific vaccine does not equate to knowledge of the basics of virology. In this case, it does, because those are some of the most famous experiments in the history of virology. Everyone who learns the basics of virology knows about those experiments. As I said, this is the equivalent of saying one knows the fundamentals of computer science, but not knowing about the Turing Machine. Or imagine someone expressing very strong opinions about programming, but then saying they've never heard of C. I raise this because I'm always shocked in these discussions on HN by how many people who don't seem to know the basics of virology weigh in with such strong opinions. Virology has come under significant attack, and most of it has been very poorly informed. About the experiments themselves, they do not look similar to the experiments that have historically been considered GOF, and which sparked the GOF debate (look up the debate from the 2010s over research into the 1918 pandemic flu strain, if you want to know what the original debate was about). Taking a spike protein from a variant and putting it onto wild-type SARS-CoV-2 is a fairly straightforward way to try to isolate the effect of the changes in the spike protein from other changes in the virus. The Omicron spike is already out there. Omicron is already out there. This isn't adding anything to SARS-CoV-2 that isn't already massively spreading in the real world, and there's no particular reason to think that this experiment will create a more deadly or transmissible virus.

possiblydrunk 4y ago
Effectively, you are posing a litmus test on whether someone can reasonably comment on an issue that involves virology. I think that's unfair and completely unnecessary. You don't really know anything about my background, so why are you making assumptions? I happen to have more than enough experience and knowledge in the area to make a comment. I'm not peer reviewing the work, I'm commenting on a line of argument espoused by Derek Lowe. Derek Lowe chose to focus on defining GOF in a rather narrow way - one that can only be applied retroactively if the outcome is critical to the definition -- and uses that definition to say that criticism of the BU experiments is overblown. The general fear around experiments involving ePPP doesn't care about the exact definition of GOF. Just saying that it doesn't qualify as GOF is not going to convince people that fear it. Derek Lowe should have focused more on the points you raise in your last paragraph. >The Omicron spike is already out there. Omicron is already out there. This isn't adding anything to SARS-CoV-2 that isn't already massively spreading in the real world, and there's no particular reason to think that this experiment will create a more deadly or transmissible virus. Nobody intends to create a more dangerous virus on purpose. But if the outcome were so fully understood and completely predictable, then it's a waste of time and money doing the experiment just to confirm a conclusion that everyone fully agrees on and understands. And if there's little to no risk, why take precautions? Why use BSL3? Why does NIAID feel it should have been alerted? That's what Derk Lowe should have addressed, not a definition!
- DiogenesKynikos 4y ago
  > Effectively, you are posing a litmus test on whether someone can reasonably comment on an issue that involves virology. I think "understands the basics of virology" is a reasonable litmus test for who should be commenting on whether a given virology experiment is safe or not. > Nobody intends to create a more dangerous virus on purpose. This is not true. It's actually what the original GOF debate (focusing on influenza) was about in the 2010s. > And if there's little to no risk, why take precautions? Why use BSL3? Honestly? Partly to appease people like you. The scientists are being extraordinarily cautious, with a set of experiments that are highly unlikely to lead to anything particularly concerning in the first place. The danger posed by everyday people walking around with CoVID-19 is far greater than the danger posed by this experiment. Inside of labs, SARS-CoV-2 is treated like an incredibly dangerous substance. Outside of labs, people are walking into restaurants and bars and exhaling SARS-CoV-2 onto everyone around them.