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Derek Lowe expresses a narrow definition of GOF to make his point and defend the research. Interestingly, using his definition, no proposed experiment could be
by possiblydrunk 4y ago
Derek Lowe expresses a narrow definition of GOF to make his point and defend the research. Interestingly, using his definition, no proposed experiment could be classified as GOF because his definition depends on a successful outcome where a more pathogenic virus is produced which can only be determined after the fact. He misses the point that there are various definitions of GOF, and more importantly, that the people concerned about the experiments aren't concerned about the precise definition of GOF -- they are concerned with experiments that might reasonably generate successful GOF mutations.
"In other words, any selection process involving an alteration of genotypes and
their resulting phenotypes is considered a type of Gain-of-Function (GoF)
research, even if the U.S. policy is intended to apply to only a small subset
of such work." [0]
"...experiments that encompass all influenza viruses, SARS-CoV, and MERS-CoV
that can be reasonably anticipated to increase pathogenicity or transmissibility
in mammalian species" [1]
[0] https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK285579/#sec_28 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK285579/#sec_28
[1] https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK285579/#sec_30 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK285579/#sec_30
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- autokad 4y ago
- VectorLock 4y agoThey will then vehemently defend how important it was for them to make airborne hyper-HIV because it will then help us understand how to protect us from airborne hyper-HIV.
- gus_massa 4y agoDoes your definition include attenuated virus like the used in the oral polio vaccine?
- possiblydrunk 4y agoIt's not my definition. And I can't tell what experiments you're referring to, so it's not reasonable to comment. But the experiments done at BU had the potential to produce new viable virus sequences that could display a phenotype that included increased pathogenicity. The researchers had no way of knowing what the results would be in advance. They followed all safety protocols -- that's not being questioned. But their experiments would qualify as GOF experiments under a variety of definitions.
- DiogenesKynikos 4y ago> And I can't tell what experiments you're referring to, so it's not reasonable to comment. Not to be too harsh, but if you don't know about the experiments conducted by Sabin that led to the live attenuated oral polio vaccine, then you don't know enough about virology to comment on the gain-of-function debate. This is the equivalent of wading into a highly technical debate among computer scientists and then saying that you've never heard of the concept of a Turing Machine.
- gus_massa 4y agoMore details. From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polio_vaccine#Attenuated_2 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polio_vaccine#Attenuated_2 > Fifty-seven nucleotide substitutions distinguish the attenuated Sabin 1 strain from its virulent parent (the Mahoney serotype), two nucleotide substitutions attenuate the Sabin 2 strain, and 10 substitutions are involved in attenuating the Sabin 3 strain. > The attenuated poliovirus in the Sabin vaccine replicates very efficiently in the gut, the primary site of infection and replication, but is unable to replicate efficiently within nervous system tissue. [Note that the injectable polio vaccine uses inactivated ("dead") virus, that is safer but not effective to stop contagion.]
- DiogenesKynikos 4y agoThe are also efforts to develop a safer live attenuated vaccine, using more modern genetic methods. Sabin developed the original attenuated vaccine in the 1950s-60s, which is basically the stone ages, as far as genetics goes. We now know that the attenuated vaccine reverts to a more dangerous form of polio after it's administered, but that the time it takes to revert is long enough that the vast majority of people develop a robust immune response and don't develop paralysis. The problem is that there is an evolutionary path that the virus can take to revert, and that that path is heavily favored once the virus is actually inside a human gut. However, using modern genetic engineering techniques, it is possible to introduce a set of mutations into the polio virus that make it much more difficult for the virus to revert to a dangerous form. Scientists engineering viruses in a lab could sound scary to laypeople, but it's vital work that might lead to the final eradication of polio.
- spfzero 4y agoI noticed also that the defense of this research seemed to say "I tried to do something dangerous, but I failed, so retroactively it was OK."
- lliamander 4y agoNo, his defense is that there was not a reasonable expectation of danger, and that expectation was validated by the lack of dangerous outcomes.
- lliamander 4y agoI don't think you are interpreting his definition of GOF correctly. I think he would agree with the definition provided by the NIH that you quoted. Looking at Derek Lowe's quote here: > So this was not a gain-of-function experiment, and it did not appear to make a more dangerous virus. He seems to be making two separate claims: 1. This research is not GOF 2. This research did accidentally make a more dangerous strain. And that because of both reasons we should not be worried. The article up to this point was explaining why the research was unlikely to produce a more dangerous strain, and hence why he could describe it as "not GOF". This is not based on outcomes, but on a reasonable assessment of the risks ahead of time.