4 ms·

The research described in the pre-print aimed to understand the mechanism of action behind the decrease in pathogenicity observed with Omicron strains, and spec

by radus 4y ago

The research described in the pre-print aimed to understand the mechanism of action behind the decrease in pathogenicity observed with Omicron strains, and specifically, whether mutations in the Omicron spike protein can account for that decrease. The experiment they carried out is about the most straightforward one you could draw up to begin to answer that question, and I would never even think to characterize it as a "gain of function" experiment. If you want to classify this study as GOF then you might as well do the same with any study of a virus where even a point mutation is made - good luck doing any virology under those conditions.

salawat 4y ago
Changing genome is literally changing source code. You just copied a new function moreEffectiveImmuneDodge() into a viral substrate that was previously lessEffectiveImmuneDodge() This act of composition apparently created willStillTryToKillYou().withAMoreEffectiveImmuneDodge() Look, I get it, you've gotta run a trial. Do it in BSL4. Not BSL3. You are mixing snippets from two known, highly transmissable, highly pathogenic set of substrates. You should not be going into utilizing either of these ingredients as a chimera under the misguidedly optimistic thought you won't make something worse. The least you could do is demonstrate an elevated level of caution of your treatment of it until your experimental results prove the end result isn't as bad or worse than the originals. How is that so hard an assumption to work under? If we're locking GoF behind "I succesfully created a more dangerous pathogen" rather than "I'm adding a feature to a virus that wasn't there", then GoF is a useless term.
- cykros 4y ago
  They would have loved to, but BU's proposed BSL4 lab got blocked back in the early 2000's because, well, they wanted to put it in the heart of Roxbury. And considering that they've had at least one or two leaks from their existing BSL3 facilities in Boston, that struck folks nearby as...well, not the best place to put a BSL4 (especially a handful of years after the Anthrax releases traced as originating from Ft. Dietrich in the wake of 9/11). There are things that you COULD do with scientific procedure that would absolutely have some beneficial results where the potential human cost is simply too high to ethically justify (for example, see: a ton of science performed under the Third Reich). Perhaps some day we can do some of this work in a safe manner off-planet (ideally, without even needing humans on board the platforms where the virii are being manipulated). We're not there yet, and ethicists need to be willing to step in to keep things in check.
  - tsimionescu 4y ago
    > They would have loved to, but BU's proposed BSL4 lab got blocked back in the early 2000's because, well, they wanted to put it in the heart of Roxbury. By this logic, if they didn't gave a BSL3 lab they should have still done it in a BSL2 lab, and by the same logic, utlimately in their garage. If you don't have access to the proper facilities, don't do the research. Anything else should be a career-ending move.
StanislavPetrov 4y ago
>The research described in the pre-print aimed to understand The "aim" or the intention is entirely irrelevant. >If you want to classify this study as GOF then you might as well do the same with any study of a virus where even a point mutation is made - good luck doing any virology under those conditions. Good, let's stop mutating viruses in labs. Better to have no virology at all than to let these madmen continue to gamble with all of our lives.

by radus 4y ago

salawat 4y ago

Changing genome is literally changing source code. You just copied a new function moreEffectiveImmuneDodge() into a viral substrate that was previously lessEffectiveImmuneDodge() This act of composition apparently created willStillTryToKillYou().withAMoreEffectiveImmuneDodge() Look, I get it, you've gotta run a trial. Do it in BSL4. Not BSL3. You are mixing snippets from two known, highly transmissable, highly pathogenic set of substrates. You should not be going into utilizing either of these ingredients as a chimera under the misguidedly optimistic thought you won't make something worse. The least you could do is demonstrate an elevated level of caution of your treatment of it until your experimental results prove the end result isn't as bad or worse than the originals. How is that so hard an assumption to work under? If we're locking GoF behind "I succesfully created a more dangerous pathogen" rather than "I'm adding a feature to a virus that wasn't there", then GoF is a useless term.

cykros 4y ago
They would have loved to, but BU's proposed BSL4 lab got blocked back in the early 2000's because, well, they wanted to put it in the heart of Roxbury. And considering that they've had at least one or two leaks from their existing BSL3 facilities in Boston, that struck folks nearby as...well, not the best place to put a BSL4 (especially a handful of years after the Anthrax releases traced as originating from Ft. Dietrich in the wake of 9/11). There are things that you COULD do with scientific procedure that would absolutely have some beneficial results where the potential human cost is simply too high to ethically justify (for example, see: a ton of science performed under the Third Reich). Perhaps some day we can do some of this work in a safe manner off-planet (ideally, without even needing humans on board the platforms where the virii are being manipulated). We're not there yet, and ethicists need to be willing to step in to keep things in check.
- tsimionescu 4y ago
  > They would have loved to, but BU's proposed BSL4 lab got blocked back in the early 2000's because, well, they wanted to put it in the heart of Roxbury. By this logic, if they didn't gave a BSL3 lab they should have still done it in a BSL2 lab, and by the same logic, utlimately in their garage. If you don't have access to the proper facilities, don't do the research. Anything else should be a career-ending move.

StanislavPetrov 4y ago

>The research described in the pre-print aimed to understand The "aim" or the intention is entirely irrelevant. >If you want to classify this study as GOF then you might as well do the same with any study of a virus where even a point mutation is made - good luck doing any virology under those conditions. Good, let's stop mutating viruses in labs. Better to have no virology at all than to let these madmen continue to gamble with all of our lives.