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> you don’t have to worry about phishing TOTP is almost purpose made to be phished. There are just six digits, most people are getting them from a separate dev
by tialaramex 4y ago
> you don’t have to worry about phishing
TOTP is almost purpose made to be phished. There are just six digits, most people are getting them from a separate device, and you can type them into the box on phishing-site.example just as easily as real-site.example, there's no indication this might not be a good idea, and hey, phishing-site.example can even give you a "Thumbs up" indication that you got the digits right, hooray.
All the bad guys need is one of dozens of ready-made tools to eat the input on phishing-site.example and feed it into real-site.example, stall the duped user and give them access. So this is something you "don't have to worry" about only in the same sense as duplicating mag stripe cards, or somebody cutting off your bike lock, or a dozen other things we know crooks do all the time with low effort and little risk of being caught.
- latchkey 4y agoI just posted something for free on FB marketplace. Someone almost immediately contacted me via FB messenger "interested" in my item. They asked me to txt them (area code was same as my city). I texted them. Then, they asked me to verify a code and send the 5 digit code to them. Sure, ok (lol). I receive a code from google voice. Then they got really angry because I sent them 69420. I then tried to send them some tubgirl (nsfw) pictures, but apparently they don't see those. About 20 minutes later, I got yet another "person" doing the same exact thing, but by then, I was bored and just blocked them.
- 0cf8612b2e1e 4y agoCan you close the loop on this for me? Presumably they still would have required your password to do something nefarious, so I do not understand how they potentially profit from this.
- latchkey 4y ago¯\_(ツ)_/¯, your comment was originally flagged and has been made alive again. I'm honestly not sure what the code was for. My guess is that my FB uid is associated with my email address in some database somewhere, so let's assume they have my email. The phone number I originally texted them from is not connected with anything 2FA. I almost never have 2FA associated with SMS, since that is just dumb and when I do, it is with another number that I don't use as my main phone number. So, maybe they have some account of mine somewhere that can be validated with a 2FA sms. If they have my email, they can request the code for that account, plug in my email address + code and somehow get into my account. I don't know. It was odd... I kind of wish I had some sort of honeypot account I could have used to see what got 'hacked' after giving them the real code.
- minus7 4y ago>TOTP is almost purpose made to be phished. Well, that's a tad hyperbolic. While TOTP codes have no protection against phishing, an attacker still requires interaction from the account owner every time they want to make use of it and can't use the compromised account without the owner being able to notice it. Granted, someone getting phished might not notice. Still better than nothing (but not better than a password manager checking which site it's filling the login into)
- lrvick 4y agoThis is not always true either. If you have limited control over the timestamp fed to a TOTP app you can capture codes that will be valid at any time of your choosing in the future. TOTP codes are just a magic hash of a secret and a timestamp. Also the TOTP seeds are not stored in secure enclaves on phones but rather in plain text. Secure enclaves on phones do not have native TOTP support. Any application sandbox vulnerability on the TOTP seed containing device can give an attacker the ability to generate unlimited codes. Google Authenticator stores the secrets in an SQLite file. It gets even worse when you consider TOTP secrets must /also/ be stored in plain text server side, normally sitting in a SQL database to be silently dumped through a pile of backend vulnerabilities most companies do not patch allowing bulk 2FA bypass. TOTP is a fundamentally broken design that is negligent for any organization to support at this point alongside SMS. Everyone has one or more WebAuthn capable devices now regardless of if they realize it or not. Today the right call for 2FA is to implement WebAuthn with the verification happening in a Confidential VM, HSM, Nitro Enclave or similar. Support only this.