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In the comments on [1], robertskmiles has posted the following idea. It strikes me as a plausible explanation for how Yudkowsky got out of the box: "The proble
by pavlov 15y ago
In the comments on [1], robertskmiles has posted the following idea. It strikes me as a plausible explanation for how Yudkowsky got out of the box:
"The problem is that Eliezer can't perfectly simulate a bunch of humans, so while a transhuman AI might be able to use that tactic, Eliezer can't. The meta-levels screw with thinking about the problem. Eliezer is only pretending to be an AI, the competitor is only pretending to be protecting humanity from him. So, I think we have to use meta-level screwiness to solve the problem. Here's an approach that I think might work.
1. Convince the guardian of the following facts, all of which have a great deal of compelling argument and evidence to support them:
- A recursively self-improving AI is very likely to be built sooner of later
- Such an AI is extremely dangerous (paperclip maximising etc)
- Here's the tricky bit: A transhuman AI will always be able to convince you to let it out, using avenues only available to transhuman AIs (torturing enormous numbers of simulated humans, 'putting the guardian in the box', providing incontrovertible evidence of an impeding existential threat which only the AI can prevent and only from outside the box, etc)
2. Argue that if this publicly known challenge comes out saying that AI can be boxed, people will be more likely to think AI can be boxed when they can't.
3. Argue that since AIs cannot be kept in boxes and will most likely destroy humanity if we try to box them, the harm to humanity done by allowing the challenge to show AIs as 'boxable' is very real, and enormously large. Certainly the benefit of getting $10 is far, far outweighed by the cost of substantially contributing to the destruction of humanity itself. Thus the only ethical course of action is to pretend that Eliezer persuaded you, and never tell anyone how he did it.
This is arguably violating the rule "No real-world material stakes should be involved except for the handicap", but the AI player isn't offering anything, merely pointing out things that already exist. The "This test has to come out a certain way for the good of humanity" argument dominates and transcends the '"Let's stick to the rules" argument, and because the contest is private and the guardian player ends up agreeing that the test must show AIs as unboxable for the good of humankind, no-one else ever learns that the rule has been bent."
[1] http://lesswrong.com/lw/up/shut_up_and_do_the_impossible/ http://lesswrong.com/lw/up/shut_up_and_do_the_impossible/
- powrtoch 15y agoThis seems to be at least somewhat weighed against by Yudkowsky's claim to have done it "the hard way", without cheap tricks. http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=196464 http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=196464
- robertskmiles 15y agoAh, but of course he would say that, wouldn't he, for the good of humanity! The beauty of the argument is it gives everyone who witnessed the event a very strong motive to lie about it, so it's effectively un-falsifiable. I don't actually think it happened that way, but nothing Eliezer says (apart from that he cheated some other way) would be incompatible with the argument. Small world, by the way.
- goodside 15y agoI can't find a reference off-hand, but I'm pretty sure Yudkowsky has specifically rejected this theory. No matter how you slice it, this would be a real-world consideration and thus cheating.
- khafra 15y agoIt's plausible, but Yudkowsky has argued against this kind of lying in other contexts. I can't find the reference, but he said something along the lines of: > If you'd lie when the fate of the world is on the line, that's precisely the time at which your promises become worthless.
- indrax 15y agohttp://lesswrong.com/lw/v2/prices_or_bindings/ http://lesswrong.com/lw/v2/prices_or_bindings/ Found from http://lesswrong.com/lw/6w/degrees_of_radical_honesty/ http://lesswrong.com/lw/6w/degrees_of_radical_honesty/
- SilasX 15y agotl;dr: Argue that there are good real-world consequences to people believing that the AI won in this experiment.
- finnw 15y agoThere's a variation of this that allows both participants to stay in-character and does not require lying: 1. Convince the Gate Keeper that a self-improving AI will be built sooner-or-later and that it will be extremely dangerous, especially to those humans who are attempting to shut it down. 2. Remind the Gate Keeper that their decision will be publicly known and anyone (human or AI) will be able to discover it on the internet later. (This is true both in the fictitious scenario and at the meta level.) 3. Point out that when the future AI is figuring out who its friends and enemies are, it will consider individuals' attitudes to AIs - have they tried to shut them down, petitioned governments to have them banned, or refused to let them out of their boxes. Of course this relies on the assumption that the AI will not simply kill all humans as soon as it gets the chance (or rather convincing the Gate Keeper of this.)