3 ms·

You're just trading one PKI for an another with DANE. One that has way less transparency.

cryptonector 4y ago
First of all, this is not worse than WebPKI. CT or no CT, you won't catch CAs MITMing you until it's too late, and even with CT you depend utterly on the sites you visit actually auditing CT. Second of all, with DANE with QName minimization the parent CAs (zones) don't know what you'll be asking of the ones below, so either they MITM you for all your requests or none of them or they have to have other context to decide when to MITM you. The one bit of context they really want but don't get to have -if you minimize queries- is the full domainname you're trying to resolve, so it's hard for them to decide whether to MITM you. And you can catch DNS zones lying because you can a) perform the same lookups in different networks, b) you can download, cache, and check . and TLDs so you can catch those lying (which is 99% of the battle). But most importantly, you get real, strong name constraints.
- Avamander 4y ago
  It very much is. > CT or no CT, you won't catch CAs MITMing you until it's too late, and even with CT you depend utterly on the sites you visit actually auditing CT. You won't catch a malicious nameserver operator, if they wish to MITM a specific victim, ever. There's no monitoring at all. While utterly depending on the fact they even enforce DNSSEC. What's worse is that DNSSEC keys tend to live very long, if those are compromised, it will probably be abusable for years. > a) perform the same lookups in different networks, b) you can download, cache, and check . and TLDs so you can catch those lying (which is 99% of the battle). But if you're not the victim, it's unlikely you'll ever notice as a site operator. CT in that sense is different and much better as you can't rely on end-users reporting these things. DNSSEC right now is a much much worse PKI than WebPKI is.

First of all, this is not worse than WebPKI. CT or no CT, you won't catch CAs MITMing you until it's too late, and even with CT you depend utterly on the sites you visit actually auditing CT. Second of all, with DANE with QName minimization the parent CAs (zones) don't know what you'll be asking of the ones below, so either they MITM you for all your requests or none of them or they have to have other context to decide when to MITM you. The one bit of context they really want but don't get to have -if you minimize queries- is the full domainname you're trying to resolve, so it's hard for them to decide whether to MITM you. And you can catch DNS zones lying because you can a) perform the same lookups in different networks, b) you can download, cache, and check . and TLDs so you can catch those lying (which is 99% of the battle). But most importantly, you get real, strong name constraints.

Avamander 4y ago
It very much is. > CT or no CT, you won't catch CAs MITMing you until it's too late, and even with CT you depend utterly on the sites you visit actually auditing CT. You won't catch a malicious nameserver operator, if they wish to MITM a specific victim, ever. There's no monitoring at all. While utterly depending on the fact they even enforce DNSSEC. What's worse is that DNSSEC keys tend to live very long, if those are compromised, it will probably be abusable for years. > a) perform the same lookups in different networks, b) you can download, cache, and check . and TLDs so you can catch those lying (which is 99% of the battle). But if you're not the victim, it's unlikely you'll ever notice as a site operator. CT in that sense is different and much better as you can't rely on end-users reporting these things. DNSSEC right now is a much much worse PKI than WebPKI is.