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For the RNG to be backdoored there is no need for something as unlikely as "rewriting assembly instructions". It is enough for the supposedly random numbers to
by adrian_b 4y ago
For the RNG to be backdoored there is no need for something as unlikely as "rewriting assembly instructions".
It is enough for the supposedly random numbers to be non-random, i.e. deterministic, according to a function known only by the designers of the hardware RNG.
It is impossible to distinguish by testing a true RNG from a good pseudo-RNG.
Designing a hardware pseudo-RNG instead of the claimed true RNG is a trivial task.
Succeeding to exploit it to decrypt something, e.g. some HTTPS traffic, is however not very likely, because it is easy to avoid this by combining the output of RDSEED with other sources of random numbers and by processing it, e.g. by hashing.
So it can be hoped that the designers of a hardware RNG do not attempt to backdoor it, because the chances of that being used successfully are low and the penalty if that would ever be discovered is high.