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What it means to see a 'bad' certificate in TLS Certificate Transparency logs
- bracewel 4y agoThere is a fifth, incredibly common, (arguably) non-malicious possibility. You don't control the entirety of your web stack, and your hosting provider, or DNS provider, or someone else, has decided to be 'helpful' (either blindly, or due to some misconfiguration somewhere along the line) and issue a certificate on your behalf, as they are able to intercept CA validation traffic at the DNS, TLS, or HTTP layer.
- tinus_hn 4y agoThis is also arguably malicious, it is not for them to get certificates for your domain and snoop your traffic. I’d hope this is not ‘incredibly common’, in my opinion it is completely unacceptable. The certificate certifies the holder is the owner of the domain, if some third party gets a certificate that’s fraudulent. In at least some jurisdictions making a fraudulent claim like that is illegal.
- michaelt 4y agoOr indeed you're in a position of overlapping authority. Universities will often have a cash-strapped organisation-wide IT Department (e-mail for english majors) and another layer of IT in certain academic departments (computer labs for CS students) and another layer of IT after that (the centre for machine learning paid for that cluster, of course they have full authority over it) - and often it's that third-level body that's getting all the grant funding and publishing all the papers. The people who control www.example.edu might basically be the marketing department for their glossy student recruitment brochure. Who's to say they have authority over certificate issuance for datasets.ml.cs.example.edu ?
- cryptonector 4y agoThere is a better way than CT: DANE, with query name minimization to prevent MITMing of some domains (as opposed to none or all) by a malicious or compromised . or TLD. DANE means you get a real PKI with real name constraints, unlike WebPKI. DANE stapling can reduce latency, but doing DANE w/ qname minimization for most of the domainname being resolved has the property that you get to make life really hard for a malicious or compromised . or TLD. You get to cache a lot of results, so using DANE stapling for the stem of the domainname should still reduce latency a fair bit. With DNS over TLS or HTTPS we're seeing that resolvers are willing to use TCP, which is one answer to the DNS amplification attack concern.
- josephg 4y agoWhat’s the status on DANE? Is it supported in any modern web browsers? Is it gaining any traction?
- Koenvh 4y agoDANE is gaining adoption primarily when it comes to email - browsers are still hesitant.
- LeonM 4y agoI don't understand why you are being downvoted, since you are right. For example: Microsoft has recently adopted DANE validation for outbound email, are planning to add TLSA records for their inbound email 'by the end of 2022. [0] [0] https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/exchange-team-blog/releasing-outbound-smtp-dane-with-dnssec/ba-p/3100920 https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/exchange-team-blog/re...
- tptacek 4y agoBrowsers have refused to implement DANE for the last ten years. In the meantime, the major email players came up with MTA-STS, and alternative to DANE that cites lack of DNSSEC adoption as one of its rationales. If you send email today, it's vanishingly unlikely that any DNSSEC will happen; email is complicated and email infrastructure tends to shut people's brains off (I know it does for me) but you can just look at the tiny slice of domains that are actually DNSSEC signed and see that there's no meaningful adoption.
- Avamander 4y agoYou're just trading one PKI for an another with DANE. One that has way less transparency.
- cryptonector 4y agoFirst of all, this is not worse than WebPKI. CT or no CT, you won't catch CAs MITMing you until it's too late, and even with CT you depend utterly on the sites you visit actually auditing CT. Second of all, with DANE with QName minimization the parent CAs (zones) don't know what you'll be asking of the ones below, so either they MITM you for all your requests or none of them or they have to have other context to decide when to MITM you. The one bit of context they really want but don't get to have -if you minimize queries- is the full domainname you're trying to resolve, so it's hard for them to decide whether to MITM you. And you can catch DNS zones lying because you can a) perform the same lookups in different networks, b) you can download, cache, and check . and TLDs so you can catch those lying (which is 99% of the battle). But most importantly, you get real, strong name constraints.
- AndyMcConachie 4y agoIf a CA is behaving in a bad way why would they include a bad cert they issued in certificate transparency logs? I don't understand what CT accomplishes since it places the onus of reporting on the party that CT is supposed to monitor.
- ivanr 4y agoCAs don't have to report their certificates to CT logs, and actually there is no reporting in a variety of use cases. However, modern browsers no longer trust certificates for which there is no (cryptographic) evidence of logging to CT. The net result is that CT gives us visibility into all web certificates (and more).
- witrak 4y ago"The net result is that CT gives us visibility into all web certificates [...]" including not always the desirable effect of publishing information on hosts in the non-public part of the institution network...
- tialaramex 4y agoIt's true that sometimes somewhere up in management tier people are annoyed to discover that non-Corp employees can find out about the DNS name product-we-bought.internal.corp.example and thus might intuit that Corp bought Product-we-bought. Or even, less often, that big-city.branches.corp.example exists even though they haven't officially launched the new Big City branch of Corp. And it's true that CT is one of the various ways people might discover that although it's probably not even the easiest. But honestly did you consider calling that purpose-of-software.internal.corp.example instead? And maybe at least use code names for projects that are actually secret? Instead of normandy-invasion.corp.example at least call it overlord.corp.example and now it's not obvious where you're landing and I won't have lined up all the tanks and guns ready.
- tinus_hn 4y agoAnyone who gets presented the certificate can check if it is in the log, and if it is not the authority is exposed and can be held accountable by the parties that manage the root certificate stores (browser and OS vendors).