> if this is true and the experiment can be explained away, this would not tell us anything about the world Actually, it would tell us something very important

> if this is true and the experiment can be explained away, this would not tell us anything about the world Actually, it would tell us something very important, namely that at the quantum level measurements are not statistically independent. > shift the question about ontological determinism back to metaphysics and outside of the reach of empirical knowledge Assuming by "ontological determinism", you mean to what extent we can truly discover natural laws, I don't know why anyone thinks this is a problem. Turing machines are simple and deterministic and yet have undecidable problems; and yet we can create a Turing machine that can enumerate the space of all possible programs. It trivially follows that humans obviously have enough degrees of freedom to enumerate all possible theories that can explain some set of observations, so this objection is a total nothingburger.