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Of course, the downside of DNSCurve is that you have to trust your upstream name server completely because they have the ability to arbitrarily tamper with the
by makomk 15y ago
Of course, the downside of DNSCurve is that you have to trust your upstream name server completely because they have the ability to arbitrarily tamper with the responses they send. This is quite convenient for OpenDNS - they do things like redirecting requests for non-existent domains to search pages with ads that make them money.
The other downside is that I don't think there's any way to securely implement the second stage of that process where your DNS server makes secure requests to other DNS servers, because the root name servers don't support DNSCurve and are unlikely to for the foreseeable future.
- tptacek 15y agoLast objection first: The same chicken-egg problem is even more deeply embedded into DNSSEC, where, in order to provide any security, every DNS record you care about requires administrative intervention to upgrade to DNSSEC. DNSCurve is far easier for service providers to adopt than DNSSEC; its security model holds even if you just have it proxy to BIND. Meanwhile, I think "trusting your upstream nameserver" is a bit of a red herring. The DNS security greybeard cabal absolutely does have stories to tell about poisoned servers, but the on-the-ground reality of DNS security attacks today isn't about compromised authority servers --- or, when it is, it's about attacks on authorities that no security protocol was ever going to address. Candidly, I don't believe securing the DNS is really a goal worthy of a lot of effort. The HTTPS/TLS CA model as implemented today is broken, but we're a peer-to-peer validation scheme away from fixing that. Given the choice between DNSCurve and DNSSEC, the one that costs the least to implement (DNSCurve, by miles and miles) is a no-brainer; the fact that it actually does something on day one is just icing on the cake.