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The circuit you’re describing registers the external light impulses, but it doesn’t experience its own registering of those impulses. What I’m imagining is tha
by layer8 4y ago
The circuit you’re describing registers the external light impulses, but it doesn’t experience its own registering of those impulses.
What I’m imagining is that the registering mechanism would itself have sensors placed on its wires that measure the currency levels on those wires, and have the measurements of those sensors as additional inputs into the cognition automaton. And then have sensors on the gates and wires of that automaton, which again feed as additional inputs into that same automaton. Add memory and timing delays. And then multiply all that some million times to get to the level of complexity of our inner mind, of our sensory and movement apparatus, and of our mental models.
When introspecting myself, I don’t see or feel or think anything that couldn’t be explained by such a setup. The different textures (qualia, if you will) of what I perceive in my mind have a certain complexity, but that is merely quantitative and structural, not qualitative.
I therefore simply do not agree that there is a hard problem of consciousness to begin with, in the usually given sense. I don’t agree that there is a qualitative difference between the perception of “qualia” and other perceptions. “Qualia” are just a perception of representations and processes happening in my brain. I see no puzzling mystery that would require solving.
- PaulDavisThe1st 4y agoNo, this totally missing the point again. It is not a question of what the sensor detects. It is a question of how it is possible for there to be an experience when sensing occurs. Your introspection is simply pointing out the likely nature of what you experience, and I actually agree (tentatively) with the idea that most of our conscious experience is rooted in a self-reflecting system. But none of that has any bearing on how there can be ay experience at all.
- layer8 4y agoWhat you call “experience” for me is just sensing of internal information processing, of internal representations. This may need some dedicated introspection to fully realize. You’re making a distinction which I believe is a mirage. It’s just a special attributation we make in our minds to those inner perceptions. If you look closely, it vanishes. Think about it: How do you know that you have what you call an “experience”? It’s because you perceive the having of the experience. So, at some point, the perception of having an “experience” is something that enters as an input into your cognitive process, and you match it to some mental models you have about such inputs. I adjusted my mental model to think of those “qualia” perceptions as being the sensing of parts of the internal workings of my brain. It’s a side-effect of all the processing that is going on, if you will, and of the likely fact that the sensing of some subset of the processing steps is being feed back as inputs into the cognitive processing.
- PaulDavisThe1st 4y ago> "just sensing of ..." We know that physical systems can sense phenomena in the world. We doubt that they experience anything when they do so. Even if we create a Hofstadterian "strange loop" so that we sense our own sensing, that does not give rise to "experience". I concede that it could be a matter of scale, but a photosensor that knows that it glows yellow when it senses red does not have an experience.
- layer8 4y agoI dispute that "experience" is something that requires a special explanation. The feeling of what you call "experience" is just something that you sense inside your brain. It is just content, data, like thoughts and other perceptions are as well. You are thinking about it. You are thinking about how you feel about it. You have perceptions about your thinking of how you feel about it. Is your cognition able to process anything that isn't (mere) information/data? I don't believe mine is. What would that even mean? Yes, a photosensor doesn't have that kind of sensation, and that's because there is nothing going on inside of it that would correspond to that sensation (no neural correlate, so to speak). In the humain brain there is enough that is going on (the complexity and quantity is staggering) that our range of inner experience is easily representable by it. And "experiencing" merely means that we are processing those representations in a way that enters our cognition, like "mere" perceptions do as well. It seems that you are thinking that perceptions lead to experience, and then nothing else. My view is that perceptions lead to internal processing that in turn is itself perceived by our cognition, in addition to the original perceptions. And it's the texture of this perceived processing that we call "experiencing". That is, it doesn't stop at the "experience" step, because then we wouldn't know anything about it. Instead, the information about the experience then enters our cognitive processing as a subsequent step. And that's how we don't perceive just "red" full stop, but also an associated "experience" of the red. But again, we wouldn't know about that experience if that wasn't information that enters our mind. And I see no puzzle about such information entering our mind.
- JohnBooty 4y agoIt seems that you are thinking that perceptions lead to experience, and then nothing else. My view is that perceptions lead to internal processing that in turn is itself perceived by our cognition, in addition to the original perceptions By this definition, which I don't necessarily disagree with, wouldn't a single level of reflection/introspection have to qualify as consciousness? If we decide that a simple light sensor isn't "conscious" because it's a pure input/output machine with no machinery that could reasonably be described as "internal processing", then what about a Roomba?