3 ms·
Good comment, appreciated. > In other words, this sounds like a reasonably easily detectable bug that was allowed in to production due to insufficient system v
by defrost 4y ago
Good comment, appreciated.
> In other words, this sounds like a reasonably easily detectable bug that was allowed in to production due to insufficient system verification, the fault for which lies squarely on Airbus and approving regulators.
Indeed - cosmic rays capable of bitflips are expected in aircraft systems so it is disapointing to see a failure to sheild and|or correctly mitigate for the expected.
> It is also worth noting that the ADIRU units are designed to calculate, maintain and report inertial navigation state. Having this state, sensor errors may compound or persist over time.
A very particular bugbear of mine. I've come across several examples where stats accumulators for low frequency error events are poorly implemented .. leading to situations where "this looks like it's working" and being passed over for any closer examination; years later some threshold is crossed and Bam! something bites hard.
- contingencies 4y agoPeople should learn from the experts. Lamport is always the wizard: You're not going to come up with a simple design through any kind of coding techniques or any kind of programming language concepts. Simplicity has to be achieved above the code level before you get to the point which you worry about how you actually implement this thing in code. - Leslie Lamport Then there's Wiener's Eighth and Final Law: You can never be too careful about what you put into a digital flight-guidance system. - Earl Wiener, Professor of Engineering, University of Miami (1980) The corollary of this is to treat any and all state within subsystems as a red flashing lights level liability. .. via https://github.com/globalcitizen/taoup https://github.com/globalcitizen/taoup