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The State of AWS Security
- wizwit999 4y ago> Only 40% of teams have more than 1 AWS account Wow didn't expect that. Separating accounts is probably one of the most important things to do in AWS, for security and performance/development.
- darkerside 4y agoThese figures should be interpreted as lower bounds, because organizations using Datadog may not monitor all of their AWS accounts, such as those used for testing or development purposes.
- Moissanite 4y agoAlternative interpretation: for large customers with thousands of accounts, Datadog is too expensive - so small shops are over-represented in their data.
- sylens 4y agoIt surprised me too, but then I wonder if many organizations are only giving DataDog access to one account and that’s how they are pulling their numbers for this
- wizwit999 4y agoOh, didn't catch that.
- yrgulation 4y agoAs someone that frequently criticises AWS i have to if there’s one thing it does right it’s security. Over-complex but way better than classic hosting.
- viraptor 4y agoThese are all interesting and worth looking at, but I found some metrics weird too. For example: > 40 percent of organizations have at least one IAM user that has AWS Console access and does not have multi-factor authentication Yeah, I hope your last resort, non-root account is locked in a safe place and has no multi-factor on it. Statistics are cool, but some context behind the findings is also useful. Similar story with the active root accounts. If they exist only on paper in a safe, that's fine.
- jffry 4y agoThe root user is not an IAM user and probably is not counted among those statistics. Enumerating IAM users won't include the root user, so it depends on how exactly they got that 40% metric (Root user ARN is arn:aws:iam::555555555555:root versus IAM users which have ARNs like arn:aws:iam::555555555555:user/USERNAME)
- christophetd 4y agoOne of the authors here - confirming that "40 percent of organizations have at least one IAM user that has AWS Console access and does not have multi-factor authentication" is about IAM users and does not include the root user.
- Pirate-of-SV 4y agoI think it's problematic that most security features (configurable by the user) are switched off by default and require some effort to set up. This is getting better though and for S3 buckets specifically a lot of additional features have showed up lately to "solve" this.
- Moissanite 4y agoCan you give an example? Everything I can think of is either default-deny or minimally scoped, and "system" IAM roles tend to just not exist until you need them for the first time.
- Pirate-of-SV 4y agoAh yeah for IAM the defaults seem sane, true! The things that I've come across recently is that encryption at rest is usually disabled ( EBS, SQS, S3, SNS, Kinesis, Cloudwatch log groups, Cloudtrail). Some of these have server side encryption and then it's easy to just check that box, other require you to set up KMS keys etc. Audit logs are in many cases disabled by default (RDS, S3, OpenSearch, ELB). S3 does not require TLS requests by default. ECR does not have image scanning enabled by default. Also new accounts almost all regions enabled and a default VPC in each (and subnets, route tables, security groups, internet gateway, dhcp option set). Unused VPCs are not recommended to keep around but I suppose it makes onboarding easier.
- Moissanite 4y agoGood points. Totally agree about encryption - I think S3 is a legacy case where SSE-S3 is implemented differently to SSE-KMS, but still I'd be on board with KMS encryption (using an AWS managed key) as the default. Audit logging costs money, so I'm on the fence about that. A default VPC is easy to disable in enterprise deployments, but for the rest of us it is necessary to do quick tests with EC2-adjacent services - I'd be in favour of it not existing until you try to launch something though.
- jamesfinlayson 4y ago
- traceroute66 4y agoThe trouble with blog posts like this is that they are effectively click-bait written to drive traffic to a blog (i.e. aiming to ensure high ranking on search). I say that because taking this blog post as an article, it makes one major false assumption: Credential Leakage = Compromise. In reality, anyone who knows AWS IAM knows that you can: - Activate/Deactivate credentials - Time-gate policies - IP-restrict policies - Use roles with STS temporary credentials - Use roles in conjunction with the externalId attribute - Many more things I've missed out.... Yes sure you probably should rotate your credentials yada yada (or perhaps use the "new" X.509 auth method instead). But that doesn't detract the fact that this blog is making a cheap-shot and not really taking into account the strengths of AWS IAM in terms of the security granularity that make it possible (with a correct, layered config) to comfortably say Credential Leakage DOES NOT equal Compromise. You just need to take a minute to RTFM and sit down and plan your IAM setup, instead of just doing it on a whim. AWS IAM is actually one of the best bits of AWS. Its one of the areas where AWS leads in comparison to its competitors (IMHO).
- uptownfunk 4y agoWhat’s a good guide to learn IAM?
- mdaniel 4y agoIt's still early access, but I bought a copy of https://awsiamguide.com/ https://awsiamguide.com/ and I think it has potential
- bagels 4y agoIt seems like a straw man to argue that leakage isn't the same as a compromise. Leakage of credentials sure has led to quite a few compromises.
- traceroute66 4y ago> Leakage of credentials sure has led to quite a few compromises. No. As per my post above, they "led to compromise" because lazy syadmins have been too inept to RTFM and make full use of IAM. I mean, I could post my IAM credentials right here. I've even been lazy and haven't rotated them for 5 years (yes I've already slapped myself on the wrist !). But they'll be naff all use to you because: - My credentials are deactivated when I'm not using them. - The STS policies they are linked to are IP-restricted - The Role policies they are linked to are also IP-restricted - The Role policies have minimal necessary privilege - The Role policies can only be invoked be an assumed role - The Roles have externalID attribute set using a UUID as value Thus even if I copy/pasted my credentials right here, you wouldn't even get past step 1 let alone any further. And that's just a simple example. You can go much more layered and granular than that. Its not rocket science, its not difficult, its just a case of the old PPPPPP (Prior Planning Prevents P* Poor Performance).
- sylens 4y agoTwo basic principles will take you far with regards to AWS security: 1. Avoid long lived credentials (access key/secret key pairs) and IAM users whenever possible, and instead have everything assume roles for access to resources in the same as well as other accounts. Temporary credentials from STS are the way to go. 2. Turn on IMDSv2 by default for EC2 instances. v1 is susceptible to SSRF attacks so even if you’re attaching an instance profile to an instance and doing everything else right, you’ve got a problem if somebody finds a weakness in the app running on the instance. Also heavily recommend checking out Scott Piper’s SCP Best Practices (https://summitroute.com/blog/2020/03/25/aws_scp_best_practices/ https://summitroute.com/blog/2020/03/25/aws_scp_best_practic...) that still hold up even if being a few years old at this point.
- gray_-_wolf 4y agoI agree with 1, but still it is slightly annoying that role chaining is limited to 1h duration.
- technion 4y agoRegarding 1, my own cli runs aws-vault set-up such that I need to enter a totp code to assume a privileged role. It sounds like really basic security - my saved credential can't go delete servers. Absolutely everyone, from aws certified people to apparently renowned developers have gotten stuck into me over this, with complaints from "I'd quit anywhere that did that" to "bad setup, proper iam never requires mfa". I'm sure there's going to be some form of blow up where long term saved credentials eventually come out as problematic, and it will blow people's minds.
- sylens 4y agoaws-vault is an amazing tool that really simplifies working with lots of aws accounts in a secure fashion
- jffry 4y agoDo you get such pushback over the need for MFA, or more generally for the use of roles, or something else? MFA seems like an essential defense-in-depth measure to ensure that a compromise of the locally held IAM key is not enough on its own to compromise your AWS account.
- destroy-2A 4y agoLooks like one of the DD directors had a falling out with AWS because they just found out AWS is about to announce a new wizbang service that will eat their lunch at re-invent
- whirlwin 4y agoWe have started using wiz.io to detect these and many more problems with AWS infra. It uncovered several misconfigured (open) services and ancient access keys
- gw99 4y agoSomething I learned a few years back: Never read vendor or conference blogs. The number one cause of AWS security issues is human error or not understanding what you are doing. AWS provides a hell of a lot of tooling, documentation and guidance to manage those risks out of the box. What doesn't help is buying a vendor product first and assuming it's going to do magic unicorn farts and make everything ok. What it will do is cost you a ton of money and time to tick a box somewhere that seemed like a good idea. Someone selling a solution to those is selling you snake oil. All of the issues identified will be picked up by Trusted Advisor or complain loudly on the IAM dashboard. If you don't notice that or don't use it, then your funeral.
- staticassertion 4y agoI find this to be pretty unhelpful. "Do better" isn't useful or actionable otherwise everyone would already be doing it. "Trusted Advisor/ The Dashboard will tell you" is empirically unhelpful, as demonstrated by the post.
- gw99 4y agoNo - people are cheap and lazy. Pay for the support, do the work.
- fulafel 4y agoAll computer problems are human error or not understanding what you are doing.
- bdcravens 4y agoLet's talk about the state of Datadog sales. (spoiler: it's terrible and unethical)
- lr1970 4y ago> 40 percent of IAM users have not used their credentials in the past 90 days (access key or console password), affecting 70 percent of organizations. I am curious where the OP got this information. Cannot imagine AWS sharing this. Datadog or GitGuardian study mentioned in the article cannot track data for such a large fraction of AWS users either. Just curious ...
- christophetd 4y agoAuthor here - have a look at the methodology section at the bottom of the page. Feel free to ask if anything is unclear.
- simonebrunozzi 4y agoFrankly, I would expect something deeper and more accurate from a large company such as Datadog. This piece is clearly "content marketing", or even "technical content marketing". The purpose is to spread awareness about Datadog and possibly lure potential clients into looking at their product offerings. There's nothing bad with it per se; but I would take the bait if you provide some really insightful information. This piece doesn't seem to add much value. An example of something more useful, IMHO, is this report about cloud native threats [0]. (I think it's quite stupid to ask for name, company, etc, in order to be able to download the report. Anyway...) If I'm actively into security, it provides useful information. As an example, the report cites that "It costs $430,000 in cloud bills and resources for an attacker to generate $8,100 in cryptocurrency revenue.". This information tells me that these attackers can generate a lot of damage, and it suggests I should do something to control the spending in my cloud infra, in case one of these attacks is successful. [0]: https://sysdig.com/resources/reports/2022-cloud-native-threat-report/ https://sysdig.com/resources/reports/2022-cloud-native-threa...
- christophetd 4y agoAuthor here - sorry you feel like this is content marketing. I identify myself as a cloud security engineer, so that's a clear antigoal. The intent is to show what's the systematic adoption of cloud security controls _that matter_, based on real-world data breaches. We also published a follow-up post[1] with actionable advice for practitioners on how to turn on some of these mechanisms (such as S3 Public Access Block). Would love to hear your thoughts on how we can make it "deeper" and "more accurate" in the future! [1]: https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/state-of-aws-cloud-security-followup/ https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/state-of-aws-clo...