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I actually do have an economic technical solution to the issue of remote authentication of user’s physical presence using zero-trust systems that makes sharing

I actually do have an economic technical solution to the issue of remote authentication of user’s physical presence using zero-trust systems that makes sharing a one-time token impossible, but currently not motivated to share it, since it’s possible I might want to use it myself formally; super simple, very possible someone else has already used it before. Realize you have to take my word for it, but to me, that’s non-issue. Also, does appear Privacy Pass covers the other aspects, which is covered on this page, but still trying to work through if it covers all aspects of a system that at least for myself I would be agreeable to use for things like: age verification, citizenship, captchas, etc — basically anonymous verification of identity attributes.

LegionMammal978 4y ago
Huh, I read up on Privacy Pass, and it really does seem to have the properties I'm looking for. Taking the government as the issuer/attester, it seems like the endpoint (origin) gives a challenge to the user (client), the user requests a token from the government (which, critically, the government can verify without knowing the user's ID), and uses this token to respond to the endpoint's challenge. Thus, the government might learn that some user accessed that particular endpoint (depending on the exact setup used), but cannot learn who it was. And since it does not know the user's identity, it cannot censor a particular user, only potentially a particular endpoint. I also don't really see how present physical identity could be proven in a privacy-preserving manner, if you don't trust the government or endpoints not to abuse that physical data. Alas, even if I take your word for it, I doubt that governments would implement such an indirect system for age verification in practice, especially since they might want to revoke any erroneously-issued tokens. (And even if anonymous non-circumventable age gating were to become a reality, I still wouldn't be a fan of differential privacy regulations for minors, since many ordinary sites would become inaccessible to teenagers from following the path of least resistance. Either impose the regulations on all users, impose them gradually depending on age, or don't impose them at all.)
- rkagerer 4y ago
  which, critically, the government can verify without knowing the user's ID Wouldn't they know your IP address from which the request is coming? Or potentially use other browser tracking and fingerprinting tricks? Maybe I misunderstood but it didn't sound like you were describing blind tokens issued in advance. Thus, the government might learn that some user accessed that particular endpoint In my view the government knowing the endpoint associated with an individual request is a critical shortcoming. It's just too short a crevasse for them to jump to get that missing piece (identity). Even if the protocol is sound there are other means (eg. force an endpoint to hand over logs, associate with authentications via timing or other characteristics, and use other tracking metadata provided by the endpoint itself or other third parties or even ISP's to figure out who accessed what). No thank you. Also creates an easy, centralized chokepoint for more widespread censorship. Simply put, the government is not a choice actor I would trust with this type of capability. The technology is not mature enough to truly, in practice, provide the protections needed to do this right.

LegionMammal978 4y ago

Huh, I read up on Privacy Pass, and it really does seem to have the properties I'm looking for. Taking the government as the issuer/attester, it seems like the endpoint (origin) gives a challenge to the user (client), the user requests a token from the government (which, critically, the government can verify without knowing the user's ID), and uses this token to respond to the endpoint's challenge. Thus, the government might learn that some user accessed that particular endpoint (depending on the exact setup used), but cannot learn who it was. And since it does not know the user's identity, it cannot censor a particular user, only potentially a particular endpoint. I also don't really see how present physical identity could be proven in a privacy-preserving manner, if you don't trust the government or endpoints not to abuse that physical data. Alas, even if I take your word for it, I doubt that governments would implement such an indirect system for age verification in practice, especially since they might want to revoke any erroneously-issued tokens. (And even if anonymous non-circumventable age gating were to become a reality, I still wouldn't be a fan of differential privacy regulations for minors, since many ordinary sites would become inaccessible to teenagers from following the path of least resistance. Either impose the regulations on all users, impose them gradually depending on age, or don't impose them at all.)

rkagerer 4y ago
which, critically, the government can verify without knowing the user's ID Wouldn't they know your IP address from which the request is coming? Or potentially use other browser tracking and fingerprinting tricks? Maybe I misunderstood but it didn't sound like you were describing blind tokens issued in advance. Thus, the government might learn that some user accessed that particular endpoint In my view the government knowing the endpoint associated with an individual request is a critical shortcoming. It's just too short a crevasse for them to jump to get that missing piece (identity). Even if the protocol is sound there are other means (eg. force an endpoint to hand over logs, associate with authentications via timing or other characteristics, and use other tracking metadata provided by the endpoint itself or other third parties or even ISP's to figure out who accessed what). No thank you. Also creates an easy, centralized chokepoint for more widespread censorship. Simply put, the government is not a choice actor I would trust with this type of capability. The technology is not mature enough to truly, in practice, provide the protections needed to do this right.