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This adds too much distortion to people wanting to express their sincere preferences, which they can easily do in RCV: A > B > C RCV actually literally has the
by NickM 4y ago
This adds too much distortion to people wanting to express their sincere preferences, which they can easily do in RCV: A > B > C
RCV actually literally has the exact same problem you're describing with voting strategically, it's just subtler and harder to understand. The problem is, if you rank A > B > C, then your subsequent preferences after A only matter if A gets eliminated. If A comes in second place, then your "B > C" preference has no impact, and C may be elected whereas if you "dishonestly" voted for B first you might have allowed B to win.
- tim-- 4y agoThis is a feature, not a bug. The point of ranking is not to have your vote redistributed many times, but rather for your #1 preference to go to your preferred candidate. If your preferred candidate does not win, your vote gets a second chance (or more!) to get counted. In the case your describing here, the only way that C wins, is that he gets more votes than A or B.
- NickM 4y agoIf your preferred candidate does not win, your vote gets a second chance (or more!) to get counted. But that's not always the case; this is exactly the point I'm trying to make. The whole problem is that your vote only gets a second chance to be counted if your preferred candidate gets eliminated. If your preferred candidate loses because somebody else wins before your preferred candidate gets eliminated, then none of your later rankings affect the outcome whatsoever. This is why you can't actually vote honestly in IRV if you want your vote to count. Let me try to illustrate this with an example: Let’s imagine the US switched to RCV before the 2020 election, and Mitt Romney decides to run as an independent. Now let’s look at, say, West Virgina, which is a pretty red state, and went about 70% Trump 30% Biden in the 2020 election in real life WV Democrats are still going to vote for Biden, and they’d probably prefer Romney over Trump, so let’s say they all vote in that order, but imagine roughly a third of Republican voters in West Virgina like Romney better than Trump, so we end up with this: 45% vote Trump, Romney, Biden; 25% vote Romney, Trump, Biden; 30% vote Biden, Romney, Trump Romney gets eliminated first, his voters fall back to Trump, and Trump wins. The Democrats all wanted Romney over Trump, but Biden was never eliminated, so their second choice of Romney had no bearing on the outcome. But, what if they’d strategically voted for the “lesser of two evils”? now we have: 45% vote Trump, Romney, Biden; 25% vote Romney, Trump, Biden; 30% vote Romney, Biden, Trump Now Romney is a clear winner, he has the majority of first choice votes, so nobody’s second or third choice even matters. So basically in this example, Biden was a spoiler candidate for Romney, and all those Democrats are going to be super disillusioned when they realize that the “it fixes the spoiler effect" and "you can vote honestly” lines are both wrong, and they could’ve had a better outcome if they’d voted strategically, just like in the old system.
- godelski 4y agoThat's not quite right. In ranked systems you're saying that your preference of A over B is the same as your preference of B over C. This is often not the case. In fact, this is why ranked systems almost always fail the favorite betrayer and monotonicity criteria. I explain more with examples in a longer post below.
- aldonius 4y agoWhether later-no-harm is a feature or a bug is the biggest difference, I think, between people who like STV/IRV and people who dislike it.