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Because of 5 candidates, there are 3 I approve, and 2 I hate. But of the 3 I approve, I love one and only reluctantly accept the other two. People often have s
by crazygringo 4y ago
Because of 5 candidates, there are 3 I approve, and 2 I hate. But of the 3 I approve, I love one and only reluctantly accept the other two.
People often have strong feelings about their top preference, and approval rating destroys that.
And then in my example, the voter is tempted to approve just 1 in order to give them a better chance of winning. (Known as bullet voting.)
It's much more intuitive and less cognitive load to rank options by preference than to decide on an arbitrary threshold of approval. You already know your ranking; you have to strategically decide on an approval cutoff.
(Also, between the candidates you disapprove of, you still often think some would be better/worse than others, and want that to count too.)
- endisneigh 4y agoEven in your situation it doesn’t make sense to me to use ranked choice. Might as well use score voting so you can say how much more you prefer one candidate to another. All voting systems have drawbacks, but I think approval is best relative to effort and impact.
- naniwaduni 4y ago> And then in my example, the voter is tempted to approve just 1 in order to give them a better chance of winning. (Known as bullet voting.) This is fine. The probability with which a voter bullet votes vs votes three conveys the degree of preference for that candidates. This is not as informative as score voting on a wider range (because okay, degree of preference doesn't map perfectly linearly with probability of vote), but it's an perfectly adequate proxy. By comparison, ranked choice, despite feeling like it gives you the ability to choose relative ranks, doesn't actually convey more information because it says nothing about your degree of preference! "Candidate A is perfect in every way > Candidate B agrees with me on all policy decisions but is my ex > Candidate C literally wants to murder me" looks exactly the same on a ranked choice ballot as "Candidate A is perfect in every way > Candidate B literally wants to murder me > Candidate C literally wants to murder me and also kicked my dog". > It's much more intuitive and less cognitive load to rank options by preference than to decide on an arbitrary threshold of approval. You already know your ranking; you have to strategically decide on an approval cutoff. Spoken like someone who doesn't have intransitive preferences!
- crazygringo 4y agoRanked choice absolutely conveys more information than approval. It's not as much as score voting, but it's mathematically false to say it's the same amount as approval. Among five candidates, approval would be 2^5-2=30 possibilities (almost 5 bits of information, assuming you can't approve/disapprove all because that's the same as not voting), while ranked choice would be 5!=120 possibilities (almost 7 bits of information, assuming ties aren't permitted). It's only with 3 candidates that they have equal information in terms of possibilities (2^3-2=6=3!). And individuals don't have intransitive preferences, only populations can. (Assuming mental competence.) Yes score voting would be ideal if it were easy to convert preferences strength into numbers, but one person's 7 can be another person's 3. There's no objective way to do it. The same as approval voting isn't objective, because there's no objective threshold. Whereas ranked voting is purely objective, a person can always express an ordered preference in a consistent, repeatable way.
- wnoise 4y agoDo I contradict myself? Very well then I contradict myself, (I am large, I contain multitudes.)
- naniwaduni 4y ago> Ranked choice absolutely conveys more information than approval. It's not as much as score voting, but it's mathematically false to say it's the same amount as approval. Among five candidates, approval would be 2^5-2=30 possibilities (almost 5 bits of information, assuming you can't approve/disapprove all because that's the same as not voting), while ranked choice would be 5!=120 possibilities (almost 7 bits of information, assuming ties aren't permitted). It's only with 3 candidates that they have equal information in terms of possibilities (2^3-2=6=3!). This is a common intuition trap, but it's wrong. Consider the difference between score voting on a 16-point scale vs a million-point scale vs arbitrary-precision score voting. A ballot for the first conveys 4 bits per candidate; the second, about 20 bits per candidate; the last conveys infinite bits of information. You ... probably don't expect a substantial difference between election results with each option. The trick is that the aggregation rule destroys information, which is kind of the point of aggregation. Different aggregation rules destroy different information. The difference between aggregated approval voting and aggregated arbitrary-precision score voting eats LSBs, sure, but the obvious probabilistic constructions for extracting approval votes from arbitrary precision score votes actually approximate the arbitrary-precision votes quite well, which is not what your intuition predicts, because it turns out LSBs are, well, less significant. Also, the flat fact is that most single-victor elections in practice don't have more than three "top" candidates that you're practically interested in extracting information about. > And individuals don't have intransitive preferences, only populations can. (Assuming mental competence.) That's one hell of a bad assumption.