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If you are using Tor, seriously ask yourself if it's a good idea to install software that was developed by DARPA and has never solved the exit node problem.
by ravenstine 4y ago
If you are using Tor, seriously ask yourself if it's a good idea to install software that was developed by DARPA and has never solved the exit node problem.
- sirsinsalot 4y agoThis is such an odd comment. ARPANET and by extension DARPA are embedded in the origin story of the Internet and I'm sure DARPA will continue to fund fringe technologies that emerge to change the way we communicate into the future. It isn't, in and of itself a reason for suspicion on the level implied, nor would I argue above and beyond baseline healthy suspicion in anything.
- ravenstine 4y ago> ARPANET and by extension DARPA are embedded in the origin story of the Internet and I'm sure DARPA will continue to fund fringe technologies that emerge to change the way we communicate into the future. That doesn't matter at all. Tor is not proposing to accomplish the same thing the internet does. If we are to take Tor at its word, it is proposing the exact opposite of what is in the interest of government and law enforcement.
- wolfendin 4y agoThese two things are also properties of the Internet itself are they not?
- ravenstine 4y agoDo you really expect anonymity out of the internet or trust that your IP traffic isn't being analyzed and logged? It certainly is, and it being a government project isn't an argument in its favor. The internet isn't selling itself as a tool of anonymity, never has, and isn't software you're installing on your hardware.
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- prego_xo 4y agoI have really bad news: the internet was formulated by the government. But seriously, the exit node issue is a real sore thumb.
- schoen 4y agoWhich exit node issue in particular? That it's hard to get enough volunteer capacity, that exit node operators can sometimes get in trouble for things users did, that attackers can run exit nodes in order to look at traffic content, that attackers can run undisclosed families of relays in order to perform some traffic correlation attacks when a circuit uses multiple relays controlled by the same party, or that some sites may block or CAPTCHA exit nodes?
- Karrot_Kream 4y agoHow would you solve the various exit node issues? If anyone can run an exit node, it's bound to be as trustworthy as the "anyone" that runs it. Plus once your traffic is out of the onion-routed network, it's open to all the usual attacks on the public internet. I2P tries not to deal with non-I2P traffic at all because the problem is so difficult.
- ravenstine 4y ago> I2P tries not to deal with non-I2P traffic at all because the problem is so difficult. The problem is difficult because what I2P is doing is essentially the correct approach in this area. Designing an "anonymous" network around accessing an inherently non-anonymous network with a handful of dominant sites is how you run into limitations like needing exit nodes. Yet most people keep insisting upon Tor, as if it's a good idea for the "dark web" to be effectively a single application with an inherent flaw it may never overcome.
- Karrot_Kream 4y agoIt's because Tor does a much better job of being usable to general users, combined with the network effect of Tor Hidden Services, means that more people think of Tor as the "dark web" and more people will use Tor. I2P definitely takes the more secure-by-default state.