It's interesting how wildly differently we can interpret the same information. >"Probably in this case the line employees are, on the most part, better informe

It's interesting how wildly differently we can interpret the same information. >"Probably in this case the line employees are, on the most part, better informed than the management: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33067293 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33067293" For instance, I would not consider 2 days of training "highly trained". I believe it's true that the LANL area has one of the highest concentrations of PhDs, but I don't necessarily think that translates to being informed about all the risks. A PhD often means a lot of knowledge, but in a very narrow field. Sometimes, that level of education can be a detriment if it fosters a false sense of general ability. I've had many experiences of Masters and PhD chemists and engineers who felt, "Hey, I'm smart. I've written some cool VBA macros. I'm sure I can program this thing. It's just software." Smash-cut to hazardous releases that cause people to have to shelter in place or firefighters being called. They were subject matter experts in one area, but not smart enough to recognize their own ignorance outside their specialty. It didn't matter that they were experts in their field or front-line workers. I also think it's wild to me that your takeaway from the article is that blatantly disregarding best practices is acceptable. It's a bit of a jump to look at the evidence in the article and assume it must be okay, 'cause, you know, they're first line employees so they must know what they're doing so best practices need not apply. As someone who used to work in safety-critical software, it scares me when I read about this same cavalier SV attitude pervading into safety-critical design like autonomous vehicles.[1] Which relates to, >"In general, line workers are the ones whose incentives are best aligned with safety" I think we agree that their incentives are aligned. I think where we disagree is that people on the front lines aren't always acting as rational agents. I don't think they are because of a host of competing incentives and cognitive biases. Major catastrophes bear this out. Good examples are the Challenger or Columbia disasters at NASA. To your point, there was disagreement between management and front-line employees regarding the risk. Both groups were wrong because of these biases. We just aren't wired to estimate low probability events well, especially when there are less abstract competing risks like budget and schedule. That's why NASA created a separate safety arm that was distinct from the production workers. They felt it was necessary to get an objective assessment. Note this lack of impartial judgement is also a finding in [1]. I don't disagree that there's a lot of unhelpful safety theater. But there's also an awful lot of push back against safety that's borne out of a combination of ignorance and arrogance. [1] https://spectrum.ieee.org/ntsb-investigation-into-deadly-uber-selfdriving-car-crash-reveals-lax-attitude-toward-safety#toggle-gdpr https://spectrum.ieee.org/ntsb-investigation-into-deadly-ube...