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> Each party has delegates present during vote counting [..] the system would be better if physical counting could be performed as well If there's no physical

> Each party has delegates present during vote counting [..] the system would be better if physical counting could be performed as well If there's no physical counting, then what are the delegates observing? If the machines were compromised, how could they tell?

Matheus28 4y ago
I believe they also have a button to spit out current vote count for each candidate, obviously still possible for the code to detect when that button is being used a lot to check if it's counting properly. It's tricky because votes are meant to be secret (and voters aren't allowed to have proof of who they voted for, so they can't be coerced into revealing it), while at the same time you want the system to be secure.
frozenlettuce 4y ago
You have the total of votes per machine. In looking at these locations local candidates have a good notion on how well their party is going to perform. Things that call their attention are the "bumps" like the one by the end of last US election. When that happens, they can signal the voting machine to be isolated and call in an electoral judge.
- tarakat 4y ago
  Sounds easy to evade. Once a machine has recorded 10+ votes since the last time it outputted a count, it could start giving a small probabilistic advantage to a preferred candidate, at the expense of other candidates. There would be no bumps, and the results would never differ by more than, say, relative 20% from the real count. E.g. if preferred candidate got 10% on one voting machine, it would give him 12%, taking the other 2% from all other candidates. No bumps or disproportionate popularity in traditionally unpopular regions to raise suspicion.
  - cassianoleal 4y ago
    You're suggesting large scale compromise of millions of voting machines. These machines are heavily guarded and secure. They are audited by members of parties and the civil society. I'm not saying such a thing is impossible but it more or less is.
    - tarakat 4y ago
      Or the compromise (or cooperation) of a few of the software supply chain components used to program the chipset of the voting machines. Or the development machines used to write and upload the voting software. Or the foundry used to cast the chips. You think if e.g. China devoted ~5 years of their best hacking group's time to this, they couldn't do it? Because that's a very low price to pay to sway the election of a country such as Brazil. > They are audited by members of parties and the civil society. Audited how? Do they plug in a USB, download the software, and verify that it matches the (hopefully open-source, ideally formally verified) code it's supposed to be running? Let's say it matches - how can they trust that the code the USB port emitted, is what is actually running?
      - tiagobraw 4y ago
        they seize random voting machines from polling sessions and input a known amount of votes for each candidate and match them with the ending totals. (just one kind of audit they do)
        tarakat 4y ago
        VW was able to detect when an emissions test was being done, so there may be ways to detect this as well. E.g. by the unusually fast rate at which votes are being cast, or if this "seizure" involves moving the machine, reconnecting power to it, or any other kind of abnormal interaction. Why make things so complicated when manual counting works perfectly well?? With auditing being so difficult, you're not even saving any labor.
        cassianoleal 4y ago

Matheus28 4y ago

I believe they also have a button to spit out current vote count for each candidate, obviously still possible for the code to detect when that button is being used a lot to check if it's counting properly. It's tricky because votes are meant to be secret (and voters aren't allowed to have proof of who they voted for, so they can't be coerced into revealing it), while at the same time you want the system to be secure.

frozenlettuce 4y ago

You have the total of votes per machine. In looking at these locations local candidates have a good notion on how well their party is going to perform. Things that call their attention are the "bumps" like the one by the end of last US election. When that happens, they can signal the voting machine to be isolated and call in an electoral judge.

tarakat 4y ago
Sounds easy to evade. Once a machine has recorded 10+ votes since the last time it outputted a count, it could start giving a small probabilistic advantage to a preferred candidate, at the expense of other candidates. There would be no bumps, and the results would never differ by more than, say, relative 20% from the real count. E.g. if preferred candidate got 10% on one voting machine, it would give him 12%, taking the other 2% from all other candidates. No bumps or disproportionate popularity in traditionally unpopular regions to raise suspicion.
- cassianoleal 4y ago
  You're suggesting large scale compromise of millions of voting machines. These machines are heavily guarded and secure. They are audited by members of parties and the civil society. I'm not saying such a thing is impossible but it more or less is.
  - tarakat 4y ago
    Or the compromise (or cooperation) of a few of the software supply chain components used to program the chipset of the voting machines. Or the development machines used to write and upload the voting software. Or the foundry used to cast the chips. You think if e.g. China devoted ~5 years of their best hacking group's time to this, they couldn't do it? Because that's a very low price to pay to sway the election of a country such as Brazil. > They are audited by members of parties and the civil society. Audited how? Do they plug in a USB, download the software, and verify that it matches the (hopefully open-source, ideally formally verified) code it's supposed to be running? Let's say it matches - how can they trust that the code the USB port emitted, is what is actually running?
    - tiagobraw 4y ago
      they seize random voting machines from polling sessions and input a known amount of votes for each candidate and match them with the ending totals. (just one kind of audit they do)
      - tarakat 4y ago
        VW was able to detect when an emissions test was being done, so there may be ways to detect this as well. E.g. by the unusually fast rate at which votes are being cast, or if this "seizure" involves moving the machine, reconnecting power to it, or any other kind of abnormal interaction. Why make things so complicated when manual counting works perfectly well?? With auditing being so difficult, you're not even saving any labor.
        cassianoleal 4y ago