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> I'm not sure what guarantees you require a voting system to provide. Just as´ examples of desirable properties are Unanimity, Independence of Irrelevant Alte

> I'm not sure what guarantees you require a voting system to provide. Just as´ examples of desirable properties are Unanimity, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. If you know enough to suggest asset voting, I suspected you know enough about social choose theory or electoral systems to have at least some of them in mind. Asset voting is just plurality voting that reverts into weighted electors. It allows any kind of surprises that voters did not want. >Any electoral change that requires an explanation of the form The simplest explanation for is 1. Each party gets representatives relative to the number of votes they received. 2. Party representatives are picked in the order they received votes (open list). small print: how it is done mathematically was explained by Thomas Jefferson, in a letter to George Washington in 1792. Belgian mathematician Victor D'Hondt found simpler method in 1878. The methods are equivalent.

dane-pgp 4y ago
> Just as´ examples of desirable properties are Unanimity, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. I'm aware of many desirable properties, such as the ones listed here[0], but "Unanimity" is not mentioned on that page. I struggle to even imagine what such a criterion would be. "If every voter votes for a given candidate, then that candidate should win"? That sounds like an obviously desirable property, but of course Asset Voting has that property, so I'm still not sure what the objection is. The other property you mention (IIA) is one I'm not actually convinced is desirable. It makes the analysis of voting systems easier if you can assume it as an axiom, but I think it only applies to spherical voters in a vacuum. People change their preferences due to minor "unrelated" pieces of information all the time, so it doesn't seem odd to me that a voter might see party C on a list and update their view of the world, such that they decide they were wrong to support party A over party B, for example. Anyway, you said "Asset voting gives no guarantees whatsoever", which I guess must be hyperbole, because Asset Voting is guaranteed to provide the desirable property of the Majority Criterion (MC), since a candidate with a majority of the (first round) vote cannot be beaten no matter the distribution of votes for other candidates. The best I can do at steelmanning your complaint is that some of these desirable properties are difficult to reason about in relation to Asset Voting, because its result-generating process takes as part of its input the decisions made by the candidates themselves, which these formalized properties don't consider. However, that seems like a failure of the properties themselves rather than the voting method, unless you can think of a way that Asset Voting fails in practice due to their inapplicability. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_electoral_systems#Criteria_for_single-winner_elections https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_electoral_system...

dane-pgp 4y ago

> Just as´ examples of desirable properties are Unanimity, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. I'm aware of many desirable properties, such as the ones listed here[0], but "Unanimity" is not mentioned on that page. I struggle to even imagine what such a criterion would be. "If every voter votes for a given candidate, then that candidate should win"? That sounds like an obviously desirable property, but of course Asset Voting has that property, so I'm still not sure what the objection is. The other property you mention (IIA) is one I'm not actually convinced is desirable. It makes the analysis of voting systems easier if you can assume it as an axiom, but I think it only applies to spherical voters in a vacuum. People change their preferences due to minor "unrelated" pieces of information all the time, so it doesn't seem odd to me that a voter might see party C on a list and update their view of the world, such that they decide they were wrong to support party A over party B, for example. Anyway, you said "Asset voting gives no guarantees whatsoever", which I guess must be hyperbole, because Asset Voting is guaranteed to provide the desirable property of the Majority Criterion (MC), since a candidate with a majority of the (first round) vote cannot be beaten no matter the distribution of votes for other candidates. The best I can do at steelmanning your complaint is that some of these desirable properties are difficult to reason about in relation to Asset Voting, because its result-generating process takes as part of its input the decisions made by the candidates themselves, which these formalized properties don't consider. However, that seems like a failure of the properties themselves rather than the voting method, unless you can think of a way that Asset Voting fails in practice due to their inapplicability. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_electoral_systems#Criteria_for_single-winner_elections https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_electoral_system...