>Well, yes, anything where Russia perceives that using a nuke would be a viable option is a failure of regional–at least–security, which is why there has been s

>Well, yes, anything where Russia perceives that using a nuke would be a viable option is a failure of regional–at least–security, which is why there has been substantial effort to make it very clear that that option is not viable for them, both through messaging, deployment of forces, etc. Yes, that is the intent. The problem is one of ensuring the message results in our desired belief-state in Putin. In reality, all we can do is be clear regarding our responses to various scenarios, and Putin will decide how he evaluates the cost of the west's responses. Putin may not evaluate the cost landscape in the manner we hope. Thus our actions may only precipitate further escalations from both sides. >is why there must in that case be a substantial (though not necessarily nuclear, in response to a tactical nuke) response from NATO. Why think this action itself does not start us on the road that inevitably leads to a nuclear exchange? >Beyond that, Russia reaching the point that there only viable option is to retreat and abandon their aggression is not only a success scenario, it is the only success scenario. Everything else is some degree of failure. This just goes to the point I made upthread, whether the U.S. can come to accept a world order not entirely driven by U.S. interests without fighting a world war over it. The era of universal success for the U.S. on the world stage is over.