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> There is no reason that we must retaliate against Russia for a tactical nuke used in Ukraine. There is—security of the Eastern flank of NATO—though it doesn’
by dragonwriter 4y ago
> There is no reason that we must retaliate against Russia for a tactical nuke used in Ukraine.
There is—security of the Eastern flank of NATO—though it doesn’t require a nuclear response.
> What this idea does, that Russia cannot use a tactical nuke in Ukraine because of the principle of a necessary retaliation by the U.S.
That’s not the principle. The principle is that Russia cannot prosecute an unprovoked war of aggression, in which it commits an appalling array of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Direct NATO response has not been withheld short of further escalation by Russia as a matter of right or because Russia has committed insufficient provocation (on either aggression, humanitarian risk, or regional security risk calculus, Russia has far exceeded that which led to NATO intervention against Serbia or Libya) but out of desire to reserve responsive options in the event of further escalation.
> is negate the strategic advantage of having nukes in the first place thus rendering Russia at the mercy of U.S. interests around the world.
The idea that other nuclear powers cannot respond militarily to aggressive use of nukes by Russia negates the strategic advantage of having nukes in the first place thus rendering those powers at the mercy of Russian aggressiom around the world.
> You may like this principle, but Russia may not.
Global concern for what the current Russian regime likes is not particularly high right now, nor should it be.
> They may be motivated to assert their interests in Ukraine using the only remaining tools they have.
That is, indeed, a danger of a regime ewuipped with WMD of any kind facing conventional defeat and without the perception of its own domestic political strength to just take the L. But unless the world is prepared to allow itself to be forced into abject surrender to any aggressor willing to wave around nonconventional weapons, there needs to be a clear expectation—and demonstrated follow through should someone decide ro challenge it—that using sich weapons to rescue failing aggression will only magnify the scope of failure.
- hackinthebochs 4y ago>There is—security of the Eastern flank of NATO—though it doesn’t require a nuclear response. The whole idea of "security of the Eastern flank of NATO" goes out the window when NATO engages in direct conflict with Russia. Your response is self-defeating. >The principle is that Russia cannot prosecute an unprovoked war of aggression, in which it commits an appalling array of war crimes and crimes against humanity. That's great for a tweet, but it doesn't actually outline NATO's policy towards Russia. If the goal is NATO security, our continued escalation of the proxy war is self-defeating. Moral indignation should not be the driver of foreign policy. >The idea that other nuclear powers cannot respond militarily to aggressive use of nukes by Russia negates the strategic advantage of having nukes in the first place No, the idea is that a nuclear power inserting itself into an engagement between two parties while expecting the other party not to escalate to nuclear capabilities is undermining the strategic value of nuclear deterrence. The U.S. sitting out an engagement it was not involved in does nothing to undermine nuclear deterrence. >But unless the world is prepared to allow itself to be forced into abject surrender to any aggressor willing to wave around nonconventional weapons This is patently false and extremely dangerous, as I've already argued in a sibling comment.
- dragonwriter 4y ago> The whole idea of “security of the Eastern flank of NATO” goes out the window when NATO engages in direct conflict with Russia. No, actually, the whole reason collective self-defense and regional is a thing is that once someone is attacked, not fighting the aggressor can be worse for your own security than fighting them. THere’s a reason NATO Article 4 exists alongside Article 5 and has led to NATO action more than Article 5 has. > That’s great for a tweet, but it doesn’t actually outline NATO’s policy towards Russia. If the goal is NATO security, our continued escalation of the proxy war is self-defeating. No, the whole reason for NATO qua NATO support for Ukraine is that Russian aggression in the region is a regional security threat. Checking that aggression is by far the most important current security concern of NATO.
- hackinthebochs 4y ago>No, the whole reason for NATO qua NATO support for Ukraine is that Russian aggression in the region is a regional security threat. Checking that aggression is by far the most important current security concern of NATO. And what are the limits to this support? At some point, the support for Ukraine creates a greater security threat to NATO than no support. Escalating the proxy war to the point where Russia's only options are to nuke or retreat is a total failure of protecting regional security. Escalating even further to direct warfare with Russia is just to dissolve any idea of NATO security. There is no rational policy here, only policy driven by moral indignation.
- _kbh_ 4y ago> Escalating the proxy war to the point where Russia's only options are to nuke or retreat is a total failure of protecting regional security. So your trying to tell me, letting Ukraine force Russia out of its territories and showing them and the world that they aren’t the military ““super power”” everyone thought is _bad_ for regional security?. What is your solution? To let Russia annex whatever territories it wants?.
- hackinthebochs 4y ago