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What happened in Afghanistan has no bearing on what would happen in a war next door. We risked a hot war with the USSR over missiles in Cuba. Russia may be will

What happened in Afghanistan has no bearing on what would happen in a war next door. We risked a hot war with the USSR over missiles in Cuba. Russia may be willing to risk everything to secure some substantial victory in Ukraine. >If Russia dropped a tactical nuke, the U.S. would have to retaliate with one as well to make it clear that we are willing to. There is no reason that we must retaliate against Russia for a tactical nuke used in Ukraine. This in no way appears to undermine our willingness to defend NATO territories against such a strike. What this idea does, that Russia cannot use a tactical nuke in Ukraine because of the principle of a necessary retaliation by the U.S., is negate the strategic advantage of having nukes in the first place thus rendering Russia at the mercy of U.S. interests around the world. You may like this principle, but Russia may not. They may be motivated to assert their interests in Ukraine using the only remaining tools they have. They may see anything less as signaling permanent subjugation to U.S. interests. I personally have no interest in risking WW3 just to force Russia to signal subjugation to U.S. interests.

CamperBob2 4y ago
There is no reason that we must retaliate against Russia for a tactical nuke used in Ukraine. The Budapest Memorandum suggests otherwise.
mcv 4y ago
> What this idea does, that Russia cannot use a tactical nuke in Ukraine because of the principle of a necessary retaliation by the U.S., is negate the strategic advantage of having nukes in the first place thus rendering Russia at the mercy of U.S. interests around the world. But that's the thing: nuclear weapons cannot be allowed to provide a strategic advantage in a conventional war of conquest, or they would be used. Russia using a nuke in a war on conquest would set a terrible precedent that cannot be allowed to stand. If they can do it with Ukraine, they can do it with Moldova, and then they can do it with any other country they choose to attack. If they have no retaliation to fear, they have no reason to hold back anymore. I don't think NATO can afford not to retaliate in some manner. How, I don't know, but doing nothing will effectively reward the offensive use of nuclear weapons, which means it will happen more often.
- hackinthebochs 4y ago
  >But that's the thing: nuclear weapons cannot be allowed to provide a strategic advantage in a conventional war of conquest I don't know what this means other than we will fight a nuclear war to prevent other states from using the threat of nuclear weapons to secure their interests. But this is just unintelligible to me. > If they have no retaliation to fear, they have no reason to hold back anymore. We can demonstrate, and have, a massive increased cost to such incursions. But some nations may choose to pay that cost some of the time if they calculate the benefit is sufficient. The only way to prevent this is nuclear war. It is absolutely not worth it to maintain the stability of the current border configuration.
  - mcv 4y ago
    > I don't know what this means other than we will fight a nuclear war to prevent other states from using the threat of nuclear weapons to secure their interests. I don't really know either. There's definitely a point where nuclear escalation is going to require a nuclear response, but if a non-nuclear response is possible and proportional while still stopping Russia's ability to deploy nuclear weapons, that would of course be preferable. There's a good reason why nobody wanted to escalate to nuclear war during the Cold War: you put the opposition in the position of either having to accept one-sided nuclear aggression, or go to full nuclear war. Both are terrible.
- rtwrtwer54 4y ago
  I think "NATO" will be rapidly be re-evaluated after the first nuke goes off in EU. Think it; US won't directly attack Russia mainland, neither Russia will attack US mainland. But EU continental territories will probably be fair game for NATO. So if a nuclear war begins nukes will only be deployed inside EU countries, that will probably lead a NATO disband and / or some countries with nukes or even conventional kinetic weaponry, just starting to directly attack Russia somehow, without US "ok". You can't predict at this point how it is going to be played, but almost certainly, EU elites won't be happy knowing / discovering their land / cities / territories are going to be - nuclearly - taken to tabula rasa once again, and that would lead to decisions.
dragonwriter 4y ago
> There is no reason that we must retaliate against Russia for a tactical nuke used in Ukraine. There is—security of the Eastern flank of NATO—though it doesn’t require a nuclear response. > What this idea does, that Russia cannot use a tactical nuke in Ukraine because of the principle of a necessary retaliation by the U.S. That’s not the principle. The principle is that Russia cannot prosecute an unprovoked war of aggression, in which it commits an appalling array of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Direct NATO response has not been withheld short of further escalation by Russia as a matter of right or because Russia has committed insufficient provocation (on either aggression, humanitarian risk, or regional security risk calculus, Russia has far exceeded that which led to NATO intervention against Serbia or Libya) but out of desire to reserve responsive options in the event of further escalation. > is negate the strategic advantage of having nukes in the first place thus rendering Russia at the mercy of U.S. interests around the world. The idea that other nuclear powers cannot respond militarily to aggressive use of nukes by Russia negates the strategic advantage of having nukes in the first place thus rendering those powers at the mercy of Russian aggressiom around the world. > You may like this principle, but Russia may not. Global concern for what the current Russian regime likes is not particularly high right now, nor should it be. > They may be motivated to assert their interests in Ukraine using the only remaining tools they have. That is, indeed, a danger of a regime ewuipped with WMD of any kind facing conventional defeat and without the perception of its own domestic political strength to just take the L. But unless the world is prepared to allow itself to be forced into abject surrender to any aggressor willing to wave around nonconventional weapons, there needs to be a clear expectation—and demonstrated follow through should someone decide ro challenge it—that using sich weapons to rescue failing aggression will only magnify the scope of failure.
- hackinthebochs 4y ago
  >There is—security of the Eastern flank of NATO—though it doesn’t require a nuclear response. The whole idea of "security of the Eastern flank of NATO" goes out the window when NATO engages in direct conflict with Russia. Your response is self-defeating. >The principle is that Russia cannot prosecute an unprovoked war of aggression, in which it commits an appalling array of war crimes and crimes against humanity. That's great for a tweet, but it doesn't actually outline NATO's policy towards Russia. If the goal is NATO security, our continued escalation of the proxy war is self-defeating. Moral indignation should not be the driver of foreign policy. >The idea that other nuclear powers cannot respond militarily to aggressive use of nukes by Russia negates the strategic advantage of having nukes in the first place No, the idea is that a nuclear power inserting itself into an engagement between two parties while expecting the other party not to escalate to nuclear capabilities is undermining the strategic value of nuclear deterrence. The U.S. sitting out an engagement it was not involved in does nothing to undermine nuclear deterrence. >But unless the world is prepared to allow itself to be forced into abject surrender to any aggressor willing to wave around nonconventional weapons This is patently false and extremely dangerous, as I've already argued in a sibling comment.

CamperBob2 4y ago

There is no reason that we must retaliate against Russia for a tactical nuke used in Ukraine. The Budapest Memorandum suggests otherwise.

mcv 4y ago

> What this idea does, that Russia cannot use a tactical nuke in Ukraine because of the principle of a necessary retaliation by the U.S., is negate the strategic advantage of having nukes in the first place thus rendering Russia at the mercy of U.S. interests around the world. But that's the thing: nuclear weapons cannot be allowed to provide a strategic advantage in a conventional war of conquest, or they would be used. Russia using a nuke in a war on conquest would set a terrible precedent that cannot be allowed to stand. If they can do it with Ukraine, they can do it with Moldova, and then they can do it with any other country they choose to attack. If they have no retaliation to fear, they have no reason to hold back anymore. I don't think NATO can afford not to retaliate in some manner. How, I don't know, but doing nothing will effectively reward the offensive use of nuclear weapons, which means it will happen more often.

hackinthebochs 4y ago
>But that's the thing: nuclear weapons cannot be allowed to provide a strategic advantage in a conventional war of conquest I don't know what this means other than we will fight a nuclear war to prevent other states from using the threat of nuclear weapons to secure their interests. But this is just unintelligible to me. > If they have no retaliation to fear, they have no reason to hold back anymore. We can demonstrate, and have, a massive increased cost to such incursions. But some nations may choose to pay that cost some of the time if they calculate the benefit is sufficient. The only way to prevent this is nuclear war. It is absolutely not worth it to maintain the stability of the current border configuration.
- mcv 4y ago
  > I don't know what this means other than we will fight a nuclear war to prevent other states from using the threat of nuclear weapons to secure their interests. I don't really know either. There's definitely a point where nuclear escalation is going to require a nuclear response, but if a non-nuclear response is possible and proportional while still stopping Russia's ability to deploy nuclear weapons, that would of course be preferable. There's a good reason why nobody wanted to escalate to nuclear war during the Cold War: you put the opposition in the position of either having to accept one-sided nuclear aggression, or go to full nuclear war. Both are terrible.
rtwrtwer54 4y ago
I think "NATO" will be rapidly be re-evaluated after the first nuke goes off in EU. Think it; US won't directly attack Russia mainland, neither Russia will attack US mainland. But EU continental territories will probably be fair game for NATO. So if a nuclear war begins nukes will only be deployed inside EU countries, that will probably lead a NATO disband and / or some countries with nukes or even conventional kinetic weaponry, just starting to directly attack Russia somehow, without US "ok". You can't predict at this point how it is going to be played, but almost certainly, EU elites won't be happy knowing / discovering their land / cities / territories are going to be - nuclearly - taken to tabula rasa once again, and that would lead to decisions.

dragonwriter 4y ago

> There is no reason that we must retaliate against Russia for a tactical nuke used in Ukraine. There is—security of the Eastern flank of NATO—though it doesn’t require a nuclear response. > What this idea does, that Russia cannot use a tactical nuke in Ukraine because of the principle of a necessary retaliation by the U.S. That’s not the principle. The principle is that Russia cannot prosecute an unprovoked war of aggression, in which it commits an appalling array of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Direct NATO response has not been withheld short of further escalation by Russia as a matter of right or because Russia has committed insufficient provocation (on either aggression, humanitarian risk, or regional security risk calculus, Russia has far exceeded that which led to NATO intervention against Serbia or Libya) but out of desire to reserve responsive options in the event of further escalation. > is negate the strategic advantage of having nukes in the first place thus rendering Russia at the mercy of U.S. interests around the world. The idea that other nuclear powers cannot respond militarily to aggressive use of nukes by Russia negates the strategic advantage of having nukes in the first place thus rendering those powers at the mercy of Russian aggressiom around the world. > You may like this principle, but Russia may not. Global concern for what the current Russian regime likes is not particularly high right now, nor should it be. > They may be motivated to assert their interests in Ukraine using the only remaining tools they have. That is, indeed, a danger of a regime ewuipped with WMD of any kind facing conventional defeat and without the perception of its own domestic political strength to just take the L. But unless the world is prepared to allow itself to be forced into abject surrender to any aggressor willing to wave around nonconventional weapons, there needs to be a clear expectation—and demonstrated follow through should someone decide ro challenge it—that using sich weapons to rescue failing aggression will only magnify the scope of failure.

hackinthebochs 4y ago
>There is—security of the Eastern flank of NATO—though it doesn’t require a nuclear response. The whole idea of "security of the Eastern flank of NATO" goes out the window when NATO engages in direct conflict with Russia. Your response is self-defeating. >The principle is that Russia cannot prosecute an unprovoked war of aggression, in which it commits an appalling array of war crimes and crimes against humanity. That's great for a tweet, but it doesn't actually outline NATO's policy towards Russia. If the goal is NATO security, our continued escalation of the proxy war is self-defeating. Moral indignation should not be the driver of foreign policy. >The idea that other nuclear powers cannot respond militarily to aggressive use of nukes by Russia negates the strategic advantage of having nukes in the first place No, the idea is that a nuclear power inserting itself into an engagement between two parties while expecting the other party not to escalate to nuclear capabilities is undermining the strategic value of nuclear deterrence. The U.S. sitting out an engagement it was not involved in does nothing to undermine nuclear deterrence. >But unless the world is prepared to allow itself to be forced into abject surrender to any aggressor willing to wave around nonconventional weapons This is patently false and extremely dangerous, as I've already argued in a sibling comment.