Fully homomorphic encryption is a toolset, it's not a specific configuration. Your scenario has these parties, 1) a patient whose data we're discussing, 2) the

Fully homomorphic encryption is a toolset, it's not a specific configuration. Your scenario has these parties, 1) a patient whose data we're discussing, 2) the hospital they shared it with, and 3) a pharma company looking to use the data. The hospital wants to promote this use without leaking any PII. You're right that the hospital has no idea about the queries ("the code") but they control the server and which messages it will send in response. As you point out, the hospital wouldn't run a FHE database capable of full-text extraction specifically because that would amount to simply sending all the data to the pharma company. Instead they'd run a specialized FHE-DB server which would, for instance, return only row counts. The pharma company would run secret queries and if the hospital had one or more patients who matched the query the pharma company would know to the contact the hospital and then once paperwork is signed they could rerun the query with a signed token from the hospital and finally the query would return the actual PII.