>Folding authentication into the correctness decryption phase is the only secure and misuse-resistant way to do authenticated encryption... Again, PGP does not

>Folding authentication into the correctness decryption phase is the only secure and misuse-resistant way to do authenticated encryption... Again, PGP does not do things the same way TLS does. I do not see how you can possibly prove that other approaches can not be secure. >We can nitpick about the factuality of the "16 bit" claim or the truncation attack (which I believe GPG has since fixed), but neither directly contradicts the above. There is no nitpicking involved here. The claim is straight up wrong. The author of The PGP Principle either misread the email thread or deliberately misrepresented it. GPG could not fix that which was not broken. >Okay, but you just pointed to this property as a "huge footgun" in age. Why is it a footgun there, and not in PGP? Please read this article to understand how PGP does things: * https://articles.59.ca/doku.php?id=pgpfan:authenticated https://articles.59.ca/doku.php?id=pgpfan:authenticated >PGP is used in all kinds of online channels and directly advertises itself as a "toolbox" for any purpose. I think I will have to ask for a reference here. I have never seen a claim that PGP is good for online types of media.