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As far as I can tell he's taking "qualia" as a given, asserting that the room doesn't have it, and then taking that as proof that qualia are a real thing. That
by jfengel 4y ago
As far as I can tell he's taking "qualia" as a given, asserting that the room doesn't have it, and then taking that as proof that qualia are a real thing.
That doesn't seem like a very useful argument to me, and I can't imagine why anybody would spend a moment on it were it not coming out of the mouth of a (deservedly) famous philosopher. But since it is, they try to make it talk about something not-pointless, i.e. the nature of a General Artificial Intelligence.
- boole1854 4y agoI should have perhaps left the word "qualia" out of my summary, as Searle does not use it in his paper. (There are different concepts of qualia available, some of which are complex and dubious, and those complications can be left out by avoiding the word.) To use his terminology to summarize the point of his argument: there is a logical difference between syntax and semantics. Importantly, contrary to popular view, he was not trying to argue that building a "thinking machine" was not possible or that an instantiation of a computer program could not think; au contraire, he explicitly said it was possible to build a "thinking machine" and that some instantiations of computer programs could think.