10 ms·
Some rules of thumb: All Windows passwords shorter than about 10 characters shouldn't be considered secure, as the NT Hash at this point is so easily reversibl
by jiggawatts 4y ago
Some rules of thumb:
All Windows passwords shorter than about 10 characters shouldn't be considered secure, as the NT Hash at this point is so easily reversible that it's basically a "light obfuscation" at best. A single GPU can crack all 8-character passwords in minutes. The single best security setting on a Windows network is to increase the minimum password length to something like 14 characters. Use 20+ for privileged or service accounts.
The second best thing to do is to scan password hashes against "top password" lists and reject any that are in the top-N, where its up to your business policy what 'N' is. I recommend at least the top 10,000 most common passwords being outright rejected.
The third thing is to match against specific leaks. E.g.: if you have john.smith@foo.com and there is a leak of his email and password where the password matches your records, force a password change immediately.
All of the above assumes that MFA is in place, your servers are patched, and there are extensive audit logs on all authentication attempts.
- paulryanrogers 4y agoIs this still true now that LM hash v1 support has been dropped?
- dijonman2 4y ago> The third thing is to match against specific leaks. E.g.: if you have john.smith@foo.com and there is a leak of his email and password where the password matches your records, force a password change immediately. I’ve wanted to do something similar but how would you do this without direct access to HIBP’s data? I don’t want to send customer email addresses to a third party, at least not without a contract.
- Scion9066 4y agoIf you don't want to send stuff to others, then you would generally need to either get the email address data another way (e.g. collecting the data from breaches yourself on behalf of your org) or download the Pwned Passwords data and setup a system to check against compromised passwords locally.
- jeroenhd 4y agoFor what it's worth RE: HIBP, the lookup is never actually done on an email address. If you use the API (https://haveibeenpwned.com/API/v2#SearchingPwnedPasswordsByRange https://haveibeenpwned.com/API/v2#SearchingPwnedPasswordsByR..., or https://api.pwnedpasswords.com/range/3E398 https://api.pwnedpasswords.com/range/3E398 to see the API result), you transmit 5 characters of the SHA1 hash of the email address and check if the full hash is in the list. This makes it possible to use the API without worrying about user privacy as long as you keep checking the email addresses, even after indicators of compromise. Suppose spam@jeroenhd.nl is in the list is the only email address with 0xABCDE as the start of the hash, and the full hash being 0xABCDE0000; now bizniz@dijonman2.com happens to have the hash 0xABCDE1234. You transmit ABCDE to the backend, but even with the unique five letters of spam@jeroenhd.nl, how can the server possibly know if you're checking spam@jeroenhd.nl (a listed entry) or your own address? The server provides the list of hashes (only 0xABCDE1234) and you verify on your end that 0xABCDE1234≠0xABCDE0000, proving that your email is unlisted. On average, the returned amount of hashes is claimed to be 381-584. That means that even if your customer is on the list, they're at best one of the ±478 hashes (on average) in the response if they're even listed at all! The full explanations is here: https://www.troyhunt.com/understanding-have-i-been-pwneds-use-of-sha-1-and-k-anonymity/ https://www.troyhunt.com/understanding-have-i-been-pwneds-us..., it's worth a read if you're interested. In practice, I wouldn't worry about your customers' data in this case, because you're not really sending anything identifiable to a third party. There are less privacy conscious APIs to HIBP, but the range search is probably the easiest and most private way to get the checks done. All of that said, I use random passwords for every service I use and I'd very much like to opt out of your auto reset system. I'm in favour of adding the feature (more websites should, in my opinion!) but I don't like to be forced to change my already unique password if I don't have to.
- macintux 4y agoSomething I’ve wished companies would do: publish (on an internal site) all of their employees’ previous passwords each time they’re rotated. Users would be compelled to create better passwords out of sheer embarrassment/competitive spirit.
- arjvik 4y agoPlus, it would mean people would stop just incrementing a number at the end if it revealed their pattern.
- exhilaration 4y agoIf companies want us to stop incrementing a number (guilty!) or writing our passwords on post-its stuck on our monitors, they should stop requiring us to change our passwords every freaking month. I think it was only in 2021 that NIST suggested the password change frequency should be yearly.
- amlozano 4y agoI think NIST has actually recommended against forced rotation of passwords (unless they are breached) since at least 2017. "Verifiers SHOULD NOT impose other composition rules (e.g., requiring mixtures of different character types or prohibiting consecutively repeated characters) for memorized secrets. Verifiers SHOULD NOT require memorized secrets to be changed arbitrarily (e.g., periodically). However, verifiers SHALL force a change if there is evidence of compromise of the authenticator." - NIST SP-800-63B Digital Identity Guidelines - Authentication and Lifecycle Management -- A large part of me wishes they made this a SHALL NOT. It would have caused chaos with other standards, but it would have been the right thing to do.
- thesuitonym 4y agoYou underestimate how much people care about a revealed password. I've definitely heard water cooler talk about how some have "beat the system" by using a certain password (That they just tell the person they're talking to!) and the year.
- 2Gkashmiri 4y agoi am forced to use windows machines in my own office. i know people and kids who use windows machines. with new installs, they are being taught to set a password, which is fine for a bank or a super secure machine that holds financial data but for kids and grannies and drone office workers, this gets tiring. Now you are saying to FORCE them to use 14+ characters. HOW? why? in linux there is a "auto login with this password" which i love to use because there is nothing so private in my machine so i can just go in and out
- vladvasiliu 4y agoBecause with more and more people having laptops, they probably don't want their pictures or what have you in the hands of some random thief who happened to steal it. Newer computers also usually come with a TPM, which allows you to not have to type the password every time. If the PC doesn't have a fingerprint reader [0], it can use a shorter PIN. --- [0] I know a fingerprint isn't a password, but for protecting low-profile individuals who aren't a target for actual data theft (as opposed to opportunistic old-fashioned property theft) it's likely good enough.
- 2Gkashmiri 4y agothe thief can just use a live cd and copy stuff, i mean that is what i do when i bork the windows install. i don't use bitlocker and i suspect many many people don't so this is merely an inconvenience
- MayeulC 4y agoI think windows encrypts more and more by default. TPMs are not unlocked if they can't validate the boot chain (live cd), so you'd need the disk password (and full user password).
- Nextgrid 4y agoDid a Windows 10 Pro install just a couple days ago and BitLocker still wasn't on by default.
- mr_mitm 4y agoNote that cracking the NT hash rarely results in escalation of privileges due to the pass-the-hash vulnerability. There is almost never any need to crack NT hashes. The attacks you need to defend against are: 1) online password guessing, 2) Kerberoast, 3) cracking NTLMv2 authentication handshakes, 4) cracking DCCs (Domain Cached Credentials). 1) is solved by applying a moderate list of banned passwords, a sensible lockout threshold and MFA for things on the internet. 2) and 4) are only against high privileged accounts, as they imply access to a low priv account already. (You need an account to request kerberos tickets and if you can read DCCs, you usually can compromise at least a computer account). High privilege accounts should never be accounts that you log on with before you can access a password manager, so they should simply use a 16 character randomly generated password. Make this a requirement in your org, perhaps crack passwords yourself regularly to confirm. So you're left with 3) which is effectively salted and orders of magnitudes harder to crack compared to NT hashes. I talked about this at Troopers; unfortunately the video is not yet available. http://troopers.de/downloads/troopers22/TR22_BetterPasswordsProject.pdf http://troopers.de/downloads/troopers22/TR22_BetterPasswords...
- GoblinSlayer 4y agoAnd guess what, in windows networks authentication is done with domain credentials, but those are bound to your physical console, so a password manager can't be used for remote authentication in this case.
- mr_mitm 4y agoWhat do you mean by "domain credentials are bound to your physical console"?
- yabones 4y agoWindows (in a domain environment) sends a Kerberos token for network auth which is generated on sign on and signed by a domain controller (authentication server). When the user authenticates to a network service, the token is sent to the service to validate without the need for an additional network hop to the domain controller. Each "console" is a "seat" sort of like a PTY emulating a serial connector. Whether you're hands on keyboard or using a remote desktop connection, your login session has one kerberos ticket which is used for authentication automatically. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kerberos_(protocol) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kerberos_(protocol)
- yrro 4y agoCan a Windows expert chime in here. Why is the NT hash even calculated any more? Is it still the default? Can group policy be configured to tell everything to not used to disable NTLM everywhere? And can't AD be configured to disable RC4 everywhere? Do MS ever plan to properly deprecate NTLM/RC4, disable it in new domains and start displaying prominent warnings when they're enabled?
- GoblinSlayer 4y agoIt's a GPGPU offline attack against a hash that can be recovered from a turned off system. So is only realistically useful to learn your password habits. I once cracked my forgotten password this way.
- mr_mitm 4y ago> Why is the NT hash even calculated any more? For legacy reasons, I assume. > Is it still the default? Yes > Can group policy be configured to tell everything to not used to disable NTLM everywhere? It can, at least for domain-joined Windows machines. Most environments can't afford to disable NTLM though, because some legacy systems rely on it. However, Microsoft recommends disabling it. > And can't AD be configured to disable RC4 everywhere? Yes > Do MS ever plan to properly deprecate NTLM/RC4, disable it in new domains and start displaying prominent warnings when they're enabled? I'm not aware of such plans. If I were to guess, then I'd reckon they want everyone to move to Azure and let onpremises AD die.