You're actually dead wrong and this is spoken like someone with no experience in this space. What actually happened was not only log4j, but then multiple pre-au

You're actually dead wrong and this is spoken like someone with no experience in this space. What actually happened was not only log4j, but then multiple pre-auth CVEs in Atlassian suite products, effectively brought down DI2E, a collaboration and developer tooling platform that was open to the Internet and used by huge numbers of unclassified DoD and IC development projects. Since it was already sunsetting and had reduced staff, most programs still haven't gotten back data that was lost when the web fronts went offline suddenly to mitigate ongoing attacks. This wasn't catastrophic, but months of work were lost The reality is, the greatest vulnerability here isn't in government-procured software that uses OSS libraries directly. The DoD's own critical custom applications are largely as secure as secure gets. The much bigger problem is in proprietary software, like the Atlassian suite, that uses OSS libraries in its own supply chain. In fact, the DoD has had mandates from the highest level for years to use FOSS everywhere it is available, and to require all new contractors to open source anything they create for government use that isn't classified. The only reason something like the Atlassian suite is still used is a combination of institutional inertia and the lack of comparably feature-complete FOSS alternatives (the vast majority of this kind of space going to SaaS companies that don't allow you to self-host).