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If people in Iran could find themselves in trouble for using Signal I'd strongly advise they avoid it and look for some other solution. Ever since Signal start

If people in Iran could find themselves in trouble for using Signal I'd strongly advise they avoid it and look for some other solution. Ever since Signal started collecting and permanently storing sensitive user data in the cloud (your name, photo, number, a list of everyone you contact using Signal) it's become much more dangerous for people who want to protect themselves and the people they are in contact with. Because Signal insists on keeping your contacts in the cloud it's possible in some cases for someone to collect a list of your contacts simply by brute forcing a 4 digit pin. It would be horrible to end up in trouble or see your friends and family hurt because Signal wasn't forthcoming about the fact that they were collecting your info and keeping it on their servers.

croes 4y ago
>Ever since Signal started collecting and permanently storing sensitive user data in the cloud (your name, photo, number, a list of everyone you contact using Signal. Since when?
- autoexec 4y ago
  It was a long time ago. If you're a signal user and you're only hearing about this now, that should tell you all you need to know about how trustworthy the service is. There were a lot of users upset about it at the time (myself included), but their protests went largely ignored. Tellingly, they've refused to update their privacy policy to reflect their new data collection practices. Personally, I take that as a huge dead canary. https://community.signalusers.org/t/proper-secure-value-security-pins-are-too-easy-to-brute-force-sgx-is-not-reliable-enough/15096 https://community.signalusers.org/t/proper-secure-value-secu... https://community.signalusers.org/t/sgx-cacheout-sgaxe-attack-signals-cloud-storage-and-contact-discovery-vulnerable/14892 https://community.signalusers.org/t/sgx-cacheout-sgaxe-attac... https://community.signalusers.org/t/dont-want-pin-dont-want-anything-stored-in-cloud/14057 https://community.signalusers.org/t/dont-want-pin-dont-want-...
chekibreki 4y ago
That’s some lazy FUD. But even if that were true and the contacts weren’t encrypted and PIN entry not rate limited: What do you propose as an alternative?
- autoexec 4y ago
  It's true. I've provided some relevant links elsewhere in this discussion. As for alternatives, I really don't know enough about the situation in Iran to say what would be safe. After they stated collecting data I personally switched to Jami for secure communications, but I'm not a whistleblower or a journalist or a freedom fighter or anything and to be honest, I haven't found anything as polished as Signal that handles both secure messaging and plain old SMS/MMS. I was a fan. It's been years and I'm still hugely disappointed.
kijiki 4y ago
> Ever since Signal started collecting and permanently storing sensitive user data in the cloud (your name, photo, number, a list of everyone you contact using Signal) None of this FUD is true. None of the information you listed is collected or stored by Signal. You can verify this yourself by looking at the various government warrants and subpoenas, and Signal's responses: https://signal.org/bigbrother/ https://signal.org/bigbrother/
- autoexec 4y ago
  > None of the information you listed is collected or stored by Signal. That's a lie. I don't blame you for not knowing the truth though, Signal has gone to some trouble to make things unclear, but reality is reality. Signal has the data, but they've set up their system in a way that would require either an exploit (we've already seen examples of these) or a brute force attack to get the data requested and it's doubtful that a standard subpoena would compel them to use those methods. That said, it does leave the data vulnerable to the NSA or any other three letter agency who is willing to employ those types of methods. Signal would surely not be posting about any national security letters they were handed on their website. Similarly anyone who can guess or brute force a four digit pin could also get the data of some users. I've posted other links with more information on all of this further down, you can check my recent comments for them, but here's this to get you started. https://www.vice.com/en/article/pkyzek/signal-new-pin-feature-worries-cybersecurity-experts https://www.vice.com/en/article/pkyzek/signal-new-pin-featur...
  - 7v3x3n3sem9vv 4y ago
    if you're paranoid don't use a 4 digit PIN. use a passphrase. problem solved
    - autoexec 4y ago
      Problem solved as long as you're threat model doesn't include three letter agencies within in the US and you don't mind that a company you're supposed to trust. and which promotes themselves to people whose freedom and or lives are on the line, isn't honest with their users about the risks of using their service. The very first line of their privacy policy reads: "Signal is designed to never collect or store any sensitive information." which is demonstrable false. They've ignored requests to update it. (https://community.signalusers.org/t/can-signal-please-update-its-privacy-policy/15323 https://community.signalusers.org/t/can-signal-please-update...) I don't think you need to be "paranoid" to suspect it's probably better not to use their software when your privacy/security is critical to safety of yourself or your loved ones.
egberts1 4y ago
Whoa! In Signal, Contacts’ multiple phone numbers are strictly computed each into its hashed value before only hashes of contacts being store on Signal. You can always turn that off via “Settings->Chat->Share Contact with iOS/Android” option (and it is recommended but it puts the onus of adding contacts on you, which is fine for OpSec mode). Failure to turn that off and you also get that “surprise” User just joined Signal message. Metadata of you being stored on Signal server can be just a single user ID and heavily-ratchet encrypted before sent over network. But you would have to clear/omit your primary self contact info at OS level also. Avatar Photo of you is problematic. Easiest not to use it in the first place. Turn off “Settings->Chat->Use System Contact Photos” option as well. once settings are done, relevancy of PIN is reduced to (rubber-hose) OpSec and remaining forensic footprint (outside of User ID) to just within your Phone and others’ phone (and not the server, much less over network). Turn everything off under “Settings->Privacy->Advanced” except “Circumvention” and only this one under extreme Internet duress. What is painfully clear is while the cleartext content of your message is never stored on Signal server in any form at most states and never has your key to these content (a good thing), the association with other User ID remains forensically extractable, which is why burner phones are most helpful there there. This is where “timer” for deleting message can protect you even further (less the phone falls into the hand of an adversary within that period before timed message deletion). If you do not mind the obtuse associativity with others, this app is excellent in keeping the actual content of your conservation off of and away from servers, network, and nation-states outside of said phones involved. Which is just fine for me and my family and close friends. If you are striving for absolute anonymous in the area of association with others, I weakly recommended Telegram but the message is plain as day and can be read by nation-state simply because Telegram holds the encryption keys of yours. In short, you have only one choice: - near-absolute anonymity of message content - near-absolute anonymity of association It remains a hard problem.
- autoexec 4y ago
  > Contacts are strictly computed into a hashed value before only hashes of contacts being store on Signal. Wait, are you saying only a hash is ever sent to signal's servers and stored there? How then are you able to install signal on a totally new device and have your contacts downloaded to it? You seem to think this is about contact discovery, but the data collection was about contact recovery. I've got links in other comments that describe this usage. Data is uploaded as soon as you set a pin or opt out of setting one. If you do disable "everything" under “Settings->Privacy->Advanced” is all of the data that has been uploaded to the cloud then deleted?

croes 4y ago

>Ever since Signal started collecting and permanently storing sensitive user data in the cloud (your name, photo, number, a list of everyone you contact using Signal. Since when?

autoexec 4y ago
It was a long time ago. If you're a signal user and you're only hearing about this now, that should tell you all you need to know about how trustworthy the service is. There were a lot of users upset about it at the time (myself included), but their protests went largely ignored. Tellingly, they've refused to update their privacy policy to reflect their new data collection practices. Personally, I take that as a huge dead canary. https://community.signalusers.org/t/proper-secure-value-security-pins-are-too-easy-to-brute-force-sgx-is-not-reliable-enough/15096 https://community.signalusers.org/t/proper-secure-value-secu... https://community.signalusers.org/t/sgx-cacheout-sgaxe-attack-signals-cloud-storage-and-contact-discovery-vulnerable/14892 https://community.signalusers.org/t/sgx-cacheout-sgaxe-attac... https://community.signalusers.org/t/dont-want-pin-dont-want-anything-stored-in-cloud/14057 https://community.signalusers.org/t/dont-want-pin-dont-want-...

chekibreki 4y ago

That’s some lazy FUD. But even if that were true and the contacts weren’t encrypted and PIN entry not rate limited: What do you propose as an alternative?

autoexec 4y ago
It's true. I've provided some relevant links elsewhere in this discussion. As for alternatives, I really don't know enough about the situation in Iran to say what would be safe. After they stated collecting data I personally switched to Jami for secure communications, but I'm not a whistleblower or a journalist or a freedom fighter or anything and to be honest, I haven't found anything as polished as Signal that handles both secure messaging and plain old SMS/MMS. I was a fan. It's been years and I'm still hugely disappointed.

kijiki 4y ago

> Ever since Signal started collecting and permanently storing sensitive user data in the cloud (your name, photo, number, a list of everyone you contact using Signal) None of this FUD is true. None of the information you listed is collected or stored by Signal. You can verify this yourself by looking at the various government warrants and subpoenas, and Signal's responses: https://signal.org/bigbrother/ https://signal.org/bigbrother/

autoexec 4y ago
> None of the information you listed is collected or stored by Signal. That's a lie. I don't blame you for not knowing the truth though, Signal has gone to some trouble to make things unclear, but reality is reality. Signal has the data, but they've set up their system in a way that would require either an exploit (we've already seen examples of these) or a brute force attack to get the data requested and it's doubtful that a standard subpoena would compel them to use those methods. That said, it does leave the data vulnerable to the NSA or any other three letter agency who is willing to employ those types of methods. Signal would surely not be posting about any national security letters they were handed on their website. Similarly anyone who can guess or brute force a four digit pin could also get the data of some users. I've posted other links with more information on all of this further down, you can check my recent comments for them, but here's this to get you started. https://www.vice.com/en/article/pkyzek/signal-new-pin-feature-worries-cybersecurity-experts https://www.vice.com/en/article/pkyzek/signal-new-pin-featur...
- 7v3x3n3sem9vv 4y ago
  if you're paranoid don't use a 4 digit PIN. use a passphrase. problem solved
  - autoexec 4y ago
    Problem solved as long as you're threat model doesn't include three letter agencies within in the US and you don't mind that a company you're supposed to trust. and which promotes themselves to people whose freedom and or lives are on the line, isn't honest with their users about the risks of using their service. The very first line of their privacy policy reads: "Signal is designed to never collect or store any sensitive information." which is demonstrable false. They've ignored requests to update it. (https://community.signalusers.org/t/can-signal-please-update-its-privacy-policy/15323 https://community.signalusers.org/t/can-signal-please-update...) I don't think you need to be "paranoid" to suspect it's probably better not to use their software when your privacy/security is critical to safety of yourself or your loved ones.

egberts1 4y ago

Whoa! In Signal, Contacts’ multiple phone numbers are strictly computed each into its hashed value before only hashes of contacts being store on Signal. You can always turn that off via “Settings->Chat->Share Contact with iOS/Android” option (and it is recommended but it puts the onus of adding contacts on you, which is fine for OpSec mode). Failure to turn that off and you also get that “surprise” User just joined Signal message. Metadata of you being stored on Signal server can be just a single user ID and heavily-ratchet encrypted before sent over network. But you would have to clear/omit your primary self contact info at OS level also. Avatar Photo of you is problematic. Easiest not to use it in the first place. Turn off “Settings->Chat->Use System Contact Photos” option as well. once settings are done, relevancy of PIN is reduced to (rubber-hose) OpSec and remaining forensic footprint (outside of User ID) to just within your Phone and others’ phone (and not the server, much less over network). Turn everything off under “Settings->Privacy->Advanced” except “Circumvention” and only this one under extreme Internet duress. What is painfully clear is while the cleartext content of your message is never stored on Signal server in any form at most states and never has your key to these content (a good thing), the association with other User ID remains forensically extractable, which is why burner phones are most helpful there there. This is where “timer” for deleting message can protect you even further (less the phone falls into the hand of an adversary within that period before timed message deletion). If you do not mind the obtuse associativity with others, this app is excellent in keeping the actual content of your conservation off of and away from servers, network, and nation-states outside of said phones involved. Which is just fine for me and my family and close friends. If you are striving for absolute anonymous in the area of association with others, I weakly recommended Telegram but the message is plain as day and can be read by nation-state simply because Telegram holds the encryption keys of yours. In short, you have only one choice: - near-absolute anonymity of message content - near-absolute anonymity of association It remains a hard problem.

autoexec 4y ago
> Contacts are strictly computed into a hashed value before only hashes of contacts being store on Signal. Wait, are you saying only a hash is ever sent to signal's servers and stored there? How then are you able to install signal on a totally new device and have your contacts downloaded to it? You seem to think this is about contact discovery, but the data collection was about contact recovery. I've got links in other comments that describe this usage. Data is uploaded as soon as you set a pin or opt out of setting one. If you do disable "everything" under “Settings->Privacy->Advanced” is all of the data that has been uploaded to the cloud then deleted?