If this practice is generally true, it suggests an obvious gender arbitrage strategy: 1. Hire women instead of men. 2. ??? 3. Profit. Unlike the u

If this practice is generally true, it suggests an obvious gender arbitrage strategy: 1. Hire women instead of men. 2. ??? 3. Profit. Unlike the usual case, here ??? actually has a value: ??? = Save massively on labor costs vs. your competitors. As other companies discover the same strategy, demand increases for a fixed supply, thereby bidding up the equilibrium wage and hence dramatically improving the negotiating position of women. (Nothing improves the results of your negotiation faster than a better negotiating position.) In a competitive market for labor, the equilibrium is for everyone to be paid based on their productivity and their risk profile. Whether the latter factor favors women or men isn't a priori obvious; for example, men are more likely to die in a fight or a car accident, whereas women are more likely to take time off to have kids (and so on). Unfortunately, market interventions typically have the opposite of their intended effect. Rules that punish companies for paying women less than men increase the risk of hiring women; rules that punish companies for not hiring enough women increase the risk of interviewing women; rules that punish not interviewing enough women increase the risk of recruiting women. All of these factors, ceteris paribus, lower the wages of women. (Those who depend on the gender rage industry, on the other hand, make off like bandits.)