3 ms·
Yes, under normal circumstances (you trust the coordinator) its a really elegant system. I've not enumerated it all, but there's a _lot_ that a compromised coor
by operator-name 4y ago
Yes, under normal circumstances (you trust the coordinator) its a really elegant system. I've not enumerated it all, but there's a _lot_ that a compromised coordinator can do.
> You can absolutely monitor that encrypted traffic to ensure that it is not being sent somewhere unexpected.
By the point that you do this at scale with your whole fleet, you'd almost be better off just setting up the tunnels yourself. This is also assuming your devices don't need to do NAT traversal (which is honestly one of my favourite parts of Tailscale).
There's a lot more a malicious actor in control of the coordinator could do, even for preexisting connections.
- db48x 4y ago> By the point that you do this at scale with your whole fleet, you'd almost be better off just setting up the tunnels yourself. I suppose you are correct, if you regularly have traffic between every pair of nodes in the network. But I suspect that most companies have a lot of laptops that only talk to some datacenter/office via the VPN plus Gmail/O365/whatever via HTTPS. Monitoring in that situation is very easy.
- chipsa 4y agoIf you're paranoid enough to think about the coordinator getting hijacked, you can also have each of the clients send up their logs to your splunk or whatever server, and correlate them together (double entry logging, anything that doesn't have a match is probably wrong). Should be able to do the same for DNS: anything that's not a ts.net domain getting queried against the tailscale coordinator server isn't right, etc.