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I think the only durable approach is to have recording hardware digitally sign any picture/audio/video with a unique per device key that can not be extracted fr
by alexvoda 4y ago
I think the only durable approach is to have recording hardware digitally sign any picture/audio/video with a unique per device key that can not be extracted from the chip.
AFAIK, this is already being developed.
- alexvoda 4y agoThe next step is easy verification of the signature and creating the expectation that important stuff should be signed. The UX should fell simmilar to HTTPS vs HTTP. Of course, this means no reencoding, no downscaling, and no editing in general. Other apps should be able to sign but with their own key and maybe a user key which is different than than the key of the camera. Here the UX of HTTPS offers no inspiration. We trust the tree of trust of CAs. If one private key is leaked or misused it will be eliminated in a browser update. With recording authenticity we will need a UX and a desire for people to distinguish different types of origins. I can trust that picture A is the direct output of a Nikon Z7 camera. And I can trust that picture B was edited in Photoshop by X. And these two are very different.