6 ms·
Am I right in thinking that this is basically like a yubikey except with openness as key differentiator? Or is it’s function something else ?
by Havoc 4y ago
Am I right in thinking that this is basically like a yubikey except with openness as key differentiator?
Or is it’s function something else ?
- kreetx 4y agoNot exactly sure, but the OSFC conference page has some extra info on what it can do: https://www.osfc.io/2022/talks/tillitis-key-a-usb-security-key-inspired-by-measured-boot-and-dice/ https://www.osfc.io/2022/talks/tillitis-key-a-usb-security-k... Maybe it will be ~YubiKey plus extras?
- LibertyBeta 4y agoSo Solokey V2. Not that I'm complaining by the way. Any open competition to yubikey is a win in my book.
- byyll 4y agoI really dislike how "Yubikey" is being used in many places as a name for U2F and FIDO2.
- riedel 4y agoThis is because the fido2 libraries follows a lot of defacto standardisation: either to match yubikey or windows hello as the only real implementations in the wild. Fido2 ctap extensions would support all the use cases of the new device except you won't be able to use them e.g. in windows because vendors are ignorant about all the openess to push their own agenda.
- jffry 4y agoIt's the same as "Google Authenticator" being used instead of TOTP. I think it's reasonable for apps' documentation to meet users on their turf to aid understanding.
- _8j50 4y agoProbably for use with something like secure enclave.
- ldng 4y agoIt is an FPGA, fully open both at software and hardware level. So quite a bit more futurproof, inspectable and upgradable than a yubikey.
- JoachimS 4y ago(For full disclosure I am the primary FPGA designer of TillitisKey.) It also perform a measurement of the application being loaded. And the measurement together with the Unique Device Secret (UDS) will generate the primary secret applications can use to derive keys etc it needs. This means that you can verify the application integrity. This is very close to, inspired by DICE: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/project/dice-device-identifier-composition-engine/ https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/project/dice-device...
- tinco 4y agoDid you design the board? It looks sick, such high density of components on the top layer.
- JoachimS 4y agoNo, the board design is done by the wizard Matt Mets at https://blinkinlabs.com/ https://blinkinlabs.com/
- layer8 4y agoWhat exactly is the “measurement”? A hash of the application code?
- michaelt 4y agoAccording to [1] > It offers both security and flexibility by being end-user programmable while also preventing applications loaded onto the device from knowing each other’s secrets. During use firmware on Tillitis Key derives a unique key for each application it runs by measuring it before execution. This is done by combining an application’s hash value with a unique per device secret. Applications are loaded onto the device from the host computer during use, and are not stored persistently on the device. So the idea here is: * General purpose, reprogrammable security coprocessor * If you save secrets with application A, then install evil application B, it can't access the secrets from A. * And if you revert back to A, those saved secrets will still be there. * Therefore, it's more practical to run two different applications - and safer to experiment with your own applications, because you won't lose all your website logins. [1] https://www.tillitis.se/ https://www.tillitis.se/
- xani_ 4y ago* If you save secrets with application A, then install evil application B, it can't access the secrets from A. * And if you revert back to A, those saved secrets will still be there. What stops app B from pretending it's an app A ?
- michaelt 4y agoSomething like 'Secure Boot' / 'Measured Boot' on modern PCs, I imagine. A bootloader will checksum the current application before running it, checking its digital signatures and version and whatnot, and deriving an encryption key based on that.
- kfreds 4y ago1. The hardware contains a UDS (unique per device secret) which can only be read once per boot cycle. 2. Firmware in ROM does unconditional measurement of the first mutable boot stage, which is loaded from the host, over USB. The KDF used for measurement is Blake2s(UDS, Blake2s(application), USS). Note that when I say hardware I mean FPGA hardware design.
- 4y ago
- kfreds 4y agoThe Tillitis Key is a new kind of USB security key inspired by measured boot and DICE. Tillitis Key’s design encourages developers to experiment with new security key applications and models in a way that makes adoption easier and less risky for end-users. It offers both security and flexibility by being end-user programmable while also preventing applications loaded onto the device from knowing each other’s secrets. During use firmware on Tillitis Key derives a unique key for each application it runs by measuring it before execution. This is done by combining an application’s hash value with a unique per device secret. Applications are loaded onto the device from the host computer during use, and are not stored persistently on the device. A user- or host-supplied secret can also be mixed into the key derivation function, providing further protection. A sophisticated physical attacker should be assumed to have knowledge of the target application’s hash, and will likely eventually succeed in extracting the UDS from the hardware. By adding a host-supplied secret, knowledge of the application used as well as the security key’s UDS is not sufficient to produce the application secret. This makes the security impact of a lost or stolen Tillitis Key less than for conventional security keys. Device applications can be chain-loaded where the first application stage hands off its secret to the second stage. This improves user experience as it makes it possible for the application secret (and its public key) to remain the same even if a device application is updated. It also enables developers to define their own software update trust policies. A simple first-stage application might do code signing verification of the second stage, whereas a more advanced one will require m-of-n code signatures, or a Sigsum inclusion proof. Sigsum was designed with embedded use cases in mind. Tillitis Key is and always will be open source hardware and software. Schematics, PCB design and FPGA design source as well as all software source code can be found on GitHub. https://www.tillitis.se https://www.tillitis.se https://github.com/tillitis/ https://github.com/tillitis/ (Full disclosure: I'm Fredrik Stromberg, cofounder of Mullvad VPN and co-designer of Tillitis Key)
- mwcampbell 4y agoIIUC, popular security key devices like the YubiKey securely store a private key, but only allow it to be used for specific authentication applications (e.g. OTP or U2F). Would the Tillitis Key be able to securely store a private key, then with appropriate authentication from the host, use that key for encryption and decryption?