3 ms·

Another thing to note is that in cardinal voting systems the candidates have a big interest in strong negative advertising against the opposition. If the Republ

by yyyk 4y ago

Another thing to note is that in cardinal voting systems the candidates have a big interest in strong negative advertising against the opposition. If the Republican candidates want to avoid Biden getting 2 or 1 from Republicans expressing their ordinal preference between Democratic candidates, they need to loudly proclaim to Republican voters that Biden is equivalent to Sanders/Warren. You'll get an even more extremely polarized country that way. In general, the effects on _candidates_ are hugely underlooked in the voting system discussion which tends to look only at the effects on voters.

godelski 4y ago
> Another thing to note is that in cardinal voting systems the candidates have a big interest in strong negative advertising against the opposition. This is stronger than plurality or ranked? Ranked encourages you to run opposition ads against your in-party competition (see favorite betrayer) because ordinal systems do not account for the strong spoiler effect (only the weak spoiler effect). I'd also strongly encourage you to read up on the Monotonicity Criteria[0]. It seems your last two comments are acting under the assumption that IRV passes this criteria. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monotonicity_criterion https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monotonicity_criterion
- yyyk 4y ago
  >This is stronger than plurality or ranked? Much stronger and more damaging. In a non-score system, a candidate does not care if their supporter ranks the other side as a 1, 3, 5 or 9. They voted for the candidate and that's what's important. In score, it's critical for every candidate to demonize the other side completely to ensure they get a 0 from their supporters (yes, that happens anyway, but now there's a much greater incentive). Way more polarizing. [EDIT: Note that ads against your in-party opponent can only be so negative, because you'll need the opponent's supporters to vote for you in the general. This is true in general for wavering voters - they dislike too negative ads against people they also like, and that provides a limit of sorts. In score systems you have an incentive to demonize your opponents, even when talking to people who already support you] >It seems your last two comments are acting under the assumption that IRV passes this criteria. Actually, I prefer AV, but my considerations are... atypical. It's just I am very much against score/range methods, unless they are a thin disguise for a ranked system*, in which case it's slightly less bad. * e.g. STAR, highlighted in a different comment below, is a ranked system in disguise. It's clever but way too complicated for voters.
  - notriddle 4y ago
    Approval voting is a cardinal system, not a ranked choice system. That's why it's able to satisfy all of the Arrow's Theorem criteria.
    - yyyk 4y ago
      Technically yes, but it's doesn't force voters to get a nonexistent score out (I also don't mind the tactical voting implications). 0/1 is pretty close to a ranked choice which allows equality - which is a problem... but no perfect system exists. My problem with the cardinal systems is score/range systems which believe voters have a super-exact utility function and we just need to get it out. I strongly disagree with that assumption.

by yyyk 4y ago

godelski 4y ago

> Another thing to note is that in cardinal voting systems the candidates have a big interest in strong negative advertising against the opposition. This is stronger than plurality or ranked? Ranked encourages you to run opposition ads against your in-party competition (see favorite betrayer) because ordinal systems do not account for the strong spoiler effect (only the weak spoiler effect). I'd also strongly encourage you to read up on the Monotonicity Criteria[0]. It seems your last two comments are acting under the assumption that IRV passes this criteria. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monotonicity_criterion https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monotonicity_criterion

yyyk 4y ago
>This is stronger than plurality or ranked? Much stronger and more damaging. In a non-score system, a candidate does not care if their supporter ranks the other side as a 1, 3, 5 or 9. They voted for the candidate and that's what's important. In score, it's critical for every candidate to demonize the other side completely to ensure they get a 0 from their supporters (yes, that happens anyway, but now there's a much greater incentive). Way more polarizing. [EDIT: Note that ads against your in-party opponent can only be so negative, because you'll need the opponent's supporters to vote for you in the general. This is true in general for wavering voters - they dislike too negative ads against people they also like, and that provides a limit of sorts. In score systems you have an incentive to demonize your opponents, even when talking to people who already support you] >It seems your last two comments are acting under the assumption that IRV passes this criteria. Actually, I prefer AV, but my considerations are... atypical. It's just I am very much against score/range methods, unless they are a thin disguise for a ranked system*, in which case it's slightly less bad. * e.g. STAR, highlighted in a different comment below, is a ranked system in disguise. It's clever but way too complicated for voters.
- notriddle 4y ago
  Approval voting is a cardinal system, not a ranked choice system. That's why it's able to satisfy all of the Arrow's Theorem criteria.
  - yyyk 4y ago
    Technically yes, but it's doesn't force voters to get a nonexistent score out (I also don't mind the tactical voting implications). 0/1 is pretty close to a ranked choice which allows equality - which is a problem... but no perfect system exists. My problem with the cardinal systems is score/range systems which believe voters have a super-exact utility function and we just need to get it out. I strongly disagree with that assumption.