3 ms·
I personally don't care much about the strong condorcet criteria as long as the weak one is met. Condorcet methods (RP and Schulze are most common) typically ge
by godelski 4y ago
I personally don't care much about the strong condorcet criteria as long as the weak one is met. Condorcet methods (RP and Schulze are most common) typically get higher voter satisfaction efficiency under ideal conditions (voters being completely honest) but not under strategic conditions. They also aren't winning my much. This[0] gets shared a lot but often people don't pay attention to the spread in VSE over different strategies, which is just as important as max VSE. Though, of course, voting requires much more than just getting a good VSE. If you're a VSE maximizer, than yeah, Condorcet methods make the most sense, but it is naive to approach it as the only criteria.
[0] https://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/ https://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/
- tunesmith 4y agoLet's say that 49% "strongly" support A, and 51% "weakly" support B. If VSE means A has a higher score, I think it's meaningless in terms of democratic elections that follow the one-person-one-vote principle, where B should definitely win. There's a whole field of "voter satisfaction" and "utility" that doesn't really apply to democratic elections where we have to worry about populations bullying other populations.
- godelski 4y ago> Let's say that 49% "strongly" support A, and 51% "weakly" support B. This example does not have enough information to have a optimal VSE solution or even a good guestimate. We don't know the distance between A and B nor percentages of A that are okay with B and vise versa. So essentially we don't know what our latent landscape even looks like. But if you can add to that and figure it out then we can actually capture information about population bullying. The issue with voting is that it appears simple but is rather complex. But complex problems also require nuanced solutions (not necessarily complex, but can't be solved by first order terms).
- tunesmith 4y agoDistance between A and B are subjective according to each voter. If you are (hypothetically) a binary thinker and think A and B are far apart and absolutely prefer A and hate B. And if I am (hypothetically) a nuanced thinker and can see plusses and minuses to both, and after careful consideration I choose B. Then should your vote matter more than mine?
- godelski 4y ago> Distance between A and B are subjective according to each voter. This is my entire point? > Then should your vote matter more than mine? No. But just because you view them differently doesn't mean there isn't a latent landscape that can't capture both these viewpoints within higher dimensions.
- tunesmith 4y agoYes, we are probably agreeing on some level. I've lost track. :) But back to the parent point, the "spread" between honest and strategic is probably smaller if restricted to election results that end in single-member smith sets.