4 ms·
> So you give Biden 10.0, Trump 0.0, and for Romney, say 1.0. It's possible your 1.0 vote gives Romney the election. Now, if only Biden and Romney ran, you'd ha
by godelski 4y ago
> So you give Biden 10.0, Trump 0.0, and for Romney, say 1.0. It's possible your 1.0 vote gives Romney the election. Now, if only Biden and Romney ran, you'd have given 10.0 and 0.0 respectively. So Romney gains by having Trump run despite no change in the ordinal preference.
In an ordinal perspective Romney would have a larger edge because you've given a higher weight to him. You have to think about the embedding process and how much information is lost through that embedding.
You're also only looking from the democratic viewpoint. Flipping this matters too because you have a potential favorite betrayer (Romney v Trump). Something Ordinal systems aren't good at handling. In a plurality voting those three could make an advantage for Biden because Romeny takes votes from Trump (and vise versa). In ordinal we have a similar but less severe problem because people will be placing their order strategically rather than preferentially. Even preferentially you are still embedding a decently high preference for Biden despite the fact you'd give him a 0 in Cardinal.
See it this way. You could vote Trump 10, Romney 9, Biden 0. (or any variation). This indicates a strong preference of republicans over democrats. In an ordinal system you'd have to preference Trump > Romney > Biden for the same ballot. This does not express this large preferential difference. You've lost a lot of information through this embedding process. You maintain the order but you lost the degree of preference. There's no reason to drop this information.
- yyyk 4y ago>In an ordinal perspective Romney would have a larger edge because you've given a higher weight to him. Perhaps. Is that a necessity of ordinal voting? I'm not so sure. Trump could have been dropped in the initial round, and then you'd have gotten a straight Biden > Romney vote. >You maintain the order but you lost the degree of preference. There's no reason to drop this information. The reason to drop this information is because it's often garbage (there's no real score, at most an hidden ordinal preference), and its very existence gets voters to create even more garbage in order to get their actual preferences. In our example, the strongly Republican voter probably actually wants something like this: Trump 10.0 > Romney 0.0, Trump 10.0 > Biden 0.0, Romney 10.0 > Biden 0.0. However, Romney has to get only 9.0 because our Republican voter can only give a global score and wants Trump > Romney. Now Biden may win because Romney got 1.0 less. By forcing a global preference score, you got garbage info. Another point is that we shouldn't conceive of candidates as passive observers. They can also create tactical manipulations, and that's much much worse than when voters 'lie'. Say in 2024 the country has more Republican voters than Democrats. Biden now gets Warren and Sanders to run. Most Republicans have Biden > Sanders > Warren (or Biden > Warren > Sanders, it doesn't matter). So they may wish to give Biden 2, Sanders 1. Or Biden 2, Warren 1. Biden gains the more radical Democrats run, since Republicans have to give him a higher score to express their ordinal preference! (They could vote Biden 1 and give 0 to the others, but then their ordinal preference between the other democrats disappears).
- yyyk 4y agoAnother thing to note is that in cardinal voting systems the candidates have a big interest in strong negative advertising against the opposition. If the Republican candidates want to avoid Biden getting 2 or 1 from Republicans expressing their ordinal preference between Democratic candidates, they need to loudly proclaim to Republican voters that Biden is equivalent to Sanders/Warren. You'll get an even more extremely polarized country that way. In general, the effects on _candidates_ are hugely underlooked in the voting system discussion which tends to look only at the effects on voters.
- godelski 4y ago> Another thing to note is that in cardinal voting systems the candidates have a big interest in strong negative advertising against the opposition. This is stronger than plurality or ranked? Ranked encourages you to run opposition ads against your in-party competition (see favorite betrayer) because ordinal systems do not account for the strong spoiler effect (only the weak spoiler effect). I'd also strongly encourage you to read up on the Monotonicity Criteria[0]. It seems your last two comments are acting under the assumption that IRV passes this criteria. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monotonicity_criterion https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monotonicity_criterion
- yyyk 4y ago>This is stronger than plurality or ranked? Much stronger and more damaging. In a non-score system, a candidate does not care if their supporter ranks the other side as a 1, 3, 5 or 9. They voted for the candidate and that's what's important. In score, it's critical for every candidate to demonize the other side completely to ensure they get a 0 from their supporters (yes, that happens anyway, but now there's a much greater incentive). Way more polarizing. [EDIT: Note that ads against your in-party opponent can only be so negative, because you'll need the opponent's supporters to vote for you in the general. This is true in general for wavering voters - they dislike too negative ads against people they also like, and that provides a limit of sorts. In score systems you have an incentive to demonize your opponents, even when talking to people who already support you] >It seems your last two comments are acting under the assumption that IRV passes this criteria. Actually, I prefer AV, but my considerations are... atypical. It's just I am very much against score/range methods, unless they are a thin disguise for a ranked system*, in which case it's slightly less bad. * e.g. STAR, highlighted in a different comment below, is a ranked system in disguise. It's clever but way too complicated for voters.