I see little point in forcing a separate run-off of Smith Set candidates if there are multiple (i.e. there is no Condorcet winner). After all, we just had every

I see little point in forcing a separate run-off of Smith Set candidates if there are multiple (i.e. there is no Condorcet winner). After all, we just had everybody indicate their preferences in a ranked list. A runoff could only give new useful information if: 1. one or more voters change their minds. 2. one or more voter gave misleading preference information. 3. The voter's true preferences are not representable as a ranked list (e.g. they Prefer Mr Rock to Ms Scissors, prefer Ms Scissors to Mx Paper, and prefer Mx Paper to Mr Rock.) So i think the tiebreaking methods are reasonable. It is probably also worth noting that for some Condorcet methods, attempting to vote dishonestly to exploit some flaw in the system is has great risk of backfiring. The impact that the dishonest vote will have when a Condorcet winner does exist can differ from the impact it will have if a tiebreaking method come into play, such that it is only safe to try to strategically vote like that if you already know there will be no Condorcet winner. (Which would be very hard to know. Polling can't even reliably predict who will win with single vote elections. Existing polling methodology would be way too under-powered to detect if there will be a Condorcet winner or not).