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Platonic question: is it still a B-52 then? cf. the Ship of Theseus
by ofrzeta 4y ago
Platonic question: is it still a B-52 then? cf. the Ship of Theseus
- geodel 4y agoI mean in this case yes. Since it is a brand and not a single B-52 physical plane which is being improved all these years.
- runjake 4y agoTo eliminate confusion, the current operational B-52Hs were originally manufactured in 1960-1961. They have undergone significant upgrades over the years, on all systems, including the airframe itself, since then.
- djmips 4y agoI think it is but they do rev the sub model number it seems.
- hef19898 4y agoYes, it is. The current H generation has very little to do with the first build airframes so. Including certification. EDIT: Those upgrade programs, e.g. the F-15 is currently at "X", are complete development programs and involve a certain amount of certification and re-certification. That in the case of the B-52 those upgrades have been applied to existing, tremendously old, airframes, doesn't change that. It does make it quite impressive so, the B-52 turned out to be a very flexible and upgradeable design.
- jeffdn 4y agoThat's a little disingenuous, regarding the F-15 -- there is the A/B series, with A being single-seat and B being the two-seat trainer, and the C/D series, with the same distinction between the two models. Both the F-15A and the F-15C are air superiority fighters, with an exclusively air-to-air role. The F-15E is a multirole fighter-bomber, not an air superiority fighter. The F-15X is an F-15E repurposed as a beyond visual range (BVR) missile truck, with data links to AEWC planes that can provide targeting solutions for those missiles. All of the letters between E and X have not been used.
- coredog64 4y agoThe more useful identifier is the block number which identifies production changes.
- runjake 4y agoThe earlier models were manufactured in the 1950s. Most of the H models were manufactured in 1960 and 1961, but they have undergone significant airframe improvements, several engine improvements, and of course, avionics improvements. It's still a B-52, but it's a "B-52H Block $whatever_design_block_they_are_on_these_days" model.
- GuB-42 4y agoAt least in civilian aviation, it is a very relevant and practical question, and a major contributor to the Boeing 737-MAX fiasco. There is a thing called "type rating", that is qualification pilots need to have in order to fly a specific type of plane. For example, pilots need a type rating for the Boeing 737 in order to fly a Boeing 737. Manufacturers try to do everything they can not to require another type rating when they make changes to an existing aircraft, because type ratings require expensive and time-consuming training that pilots and their companies would rather avoid, and it influences purchase decisions. One of the root causes of the B737-MAX crashes is that Boeing tweaked some settings in order to make the B737-MAX behave like the original B737 when it was, in fact, a different plane, and they did it wrong.
- KennyBlanken 4y ago> One of the root causes of the B737-MAX crashes is that Boeing tweaked some settings in order to make the B737-MAX behave like the original B737 when it was, in fact, a different plane, and they did it wrong. This is wildly wrong. The only thing you got right is that the MAX was designed to avoid needing a new type certification. Boeing radically shifted the Cg to accommodate changing trends in the commercial airline industry which were resulting in Airbus's planes being more competitive. They shifted it well outside what would be considered prudent. This required flight control software bandaids to keep the plane stable (or perhaps better put, from entering a flight envelope where loss of control would happen), but they then also cheaped out of providing redundancy for some critical sensors... AND cockpit annunciators to alert on failures of the sensors. Boeing then passed off the Cg shift and additional systems as very minor changes in the filing for their airworthiness certifications, the FAA rubber-stamped everything because they didn't have the staff to review all these certificate filings so they largely trust manufacturers... ...and then making things even worse, Boeing did very little to disclose the additional stability system and sensors to the airline's chief pilots who develop the in-house training. To say they were furious to learn they hadn't been told of the new systems would be an understatement. The MAX crashes would have been substantially less likely if the pilots had benefitted from their airline's chief pilots knowing of the safety systems and having training on how to handle failurs, as well as warning annunciators for sensor failures....but Boeing wanted to save a thousand bucks or so per plane - or more likely, wanted to avoid drawing attention to the situation and having people ask "why is a critical flight control system dependent upon a single sensor?", which is likely why they also did little to inform airlines of the new systems, train the chief pilots on it, etc.