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The major political consideration of zeihan's is that us security overwatch is ending. The thesis is that the economic-political relationship in the US empire

The major political consideration of zeihan's is that us security overwatch is ending. The thesis is that the economic-political relationship in the US empire of the late 20th c is reversed: most empires used military power to be economically extractive (inclusive of the US in the early 20th c); during the cold war the US empire flipped: it used economic power in the opposite direction to 'bribe' countries into a political alliance against the USSR (evidenced by how the US has the lowest international trade to GDP ratio in the alliance); note how the us didn't have a mercantilist relationship with any of the countries it invaded (Korea exploits the US, Vietnam, Serbia, even Iraqi oil goes to a French company) If you believe this thesis then in the coming years, and you believe the US will decouples/is decoupling from internationalism (I have been convinced), then his prognostications seem reasonable. A lot of the arguments (demographics e.g.) are pretty hard to argue against.

petercooper 4y ago
I enjoy his work, though I occasionally find contradictions. He says the US has favorable demographics through having plenty of millennials and suggested the UK was not so lucky, but they look roughly the same to me? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demography_of_the_United_Kingdom#/media/File:UK_Population_Pyramid.svg https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demography_of_the_United_Kingd... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_the_United_States#/media/File:USA_Population_Pyramid.svg https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_the_United_Sta... Germany and China, on the other hand, both do have a huge drop off from the baby boomer generation onward and I wonder how they'll cope with that.
- StrangeDoctor 4y ago
- throwawaymaths 4y ago
  Not that I have a perfectly photographic memory, but I can't recall him ever presenting the UK pyramid chart in any of his presos.
- ncmncm 4y ago
  To me what stood out most starkly was how few black and hispanic people are found in older cohorts. It seems to imply they die much younger.
  - AtlasBarfed 4y ago
    Chris rock on social security: https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=190928444840463 https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=190928444840463
    - ncmncm 4y ago
      That doesn't play, for me. I tried to find it on YT, no luck.
      - DanBC 4y ago
        It's from this bit of one of his shows: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lq6Ez8oYDrU https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lq6Ez8oYDrU
        ncmncm 4y ago
        Thank you. Nobody can argue with Chris Rock.
windexh8er 4y ago
I recently read the book and have been rereading parts of it just to try to better grasp the big picture he describes. It's an impressively large number of moving parts that Zeihan tackles in the book. His latest was my first read of his, and going back to his older works - I now realize that the new book is not all new work. He talks about "the Order" (the security overwatch you refer to) that was a result of Bretton Woods system [0] in the mid-40s. He does weave a very compelling story about how the United States, under this system, basically competed against itself to open up a freely operating world trade market. Since we opened up these global trade routes to have no impediments, we lost a lot of market opportunities in the low technology manufacturing sectors because we created a system that allowed those things to be made cheaper elsewhere due to the open availability and dependability of said routes. But Zeihan indirectly talks about in the book how the US, through "the Order", leveled up and pushed these less desirable manufacturing out and elsewhere in the world which allowed the US to level up in the process. But the crux of the problem is that the last 60ish years, under this "Order" was only possible due to the US preserving this unimpeded open trade platform. And that the last 4+ Presidencies have mostly ignored the framework with which this financial golden age was built on - and now we're starting to see a number of things coalesce (aging / declining population, climate issues, resources availability, etc) which is giving us a glimpse of the system starting to falter - accelerated by the global pandemic. It does appear that the US is decoupling from internationalism after you read his work and start to see the news through these context of the ideas presented. An example might be the push for chips to come back to the United States, as of recent. While there are only a few regions in the world that can make bleeding edge chips today - the fact that the US is not capable of producing these in quantity and relies on other countries creates risk is Zeihan's "post-Order" world. While it's a fantastic read I don't think Zeihan, himself, thinks that he'll be right on all fronts - but the scary part is that he doesn't need to be to end up with very similar end results. This will mean many countries globally will end up in the horrible position of famine due to international trade and shipping being the core component that keeps some of these inhabited areas propped up. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bretton_Woods_system https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bretton_Woods_system
DubiousPusher 4y ago
> If you believe this thesis then in the coming years, and you believe the US will decouples/is decoupling from internationalism (I have been convinced), This seems to be a popular notion but I don't see strong evidence for it. There is a visible anti-interventionist constituency in the US for the first time in decades but that doesn't mean it actually has any significant ability to sway foreign policy. In fact, if American history is any suggestion, this constituency is unlikely to have its way as there have been much larger and better organized pluralities in the past who again and again were ultimately overcome by the interventionists.
- throwawaymaths 4y ago
  Zeihan's argument is that the pinnacle of us engagement was Bush I. Clinton's international engagement was mostly superficial and the only deal he got done was NAFTA, which is regional, not internationalist. Bush II's major international engagement was fighting wars. Same with Obama (though a rapprochement with Russia was tried under HRC watch -- that is clearly out the window for the near term). Trump was definitely disengaged -- he spearheaded decoupling from China and withdrew from the military engagements of his predecessors. Biden is so far more or less continuing the trump foreign policy with the exceptions of Ukraine (duh) and returning to Kyoto -- though the US was well on its way to meeting Kyoto obligations organically, and much of Europe is very likely barely not going meet kyoto
  - DubiousPusher 4y ago
    To me this is an utterly superficial reading of American foreign policy. It's like saying Nixon was an isolationist because Vietnam ended on his watch. It's like saying McDonald's is going out of business when it closes one struggling location. Trump nor Biden wound down U.S. involvement around the globe other than the two highly visible deccenial quagmires in the middle east. Neither pushed for reforming the FISA system which has created a legal parallel legal pipeline for spying. Neither have discussed winding down the blacksite network for rendering foreign nationals around the globe. Neither have renounced the drone programs. Neither even ultimately renounced any of the mutual protection treaties the U.S. maintains. Neither have renounced intelligence sharing. Neither have renounced arms sales. Neither have announced any significant foreign policy stance changes other than some doubling down on positions that already existed. It's a red hot garbage thesis which sees open war and nation building as the only two pillars of power projection that matter.
somenameforme 4y ago
I find there's a much simpler argument that, incidentally, leads to a similar conclusion but without the necessity of any conditionals (such as internationalism). Our power was primarily derived from our economic superiority. Even in cases of hard power, our military was and is little more than a reflection of our economy. We're much smaller than other nations such as China and India, but an overwhelming technological and developmental edge largely nullified that difference in the past. But that technological edge has been shrinking for decades, and there's no need to think this trend won't continue indefinitely. And as technological differences shrink, economics starts to become more of just a function of population size. And 340 million will never be able to maintain a competitive balance against 1.4 billion. We can already see this happening in many ways today, most innocuously from "American" companies increasingly kowtowing [1] the line. Beyond the fun wordplay, the word has an appropriate etymology. When the next great economy is already able to casually influence the backbone of our economy - the backbone of our power, it largely signals the end of one hegemonic influence and the unfortunately probable advent of another. [1] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kowtow https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kowtow
- ericmay 4y ago
  Quantity is a quality all on its own. But I would hesitate to draw such a simple conclusion that #of people a country has simply translates into more success because there are numerous factors at play.
  - somenameforme 4y ago
    I agree there are many other factors in play, but the question is how do those factors compare with population? We can answer this objectively, or at least as objectively as equating GDP with economy, allows us to do. This [1] is a list of countries by their GDP per capita. It's quite surprising how closely all countries tend to fall together. The difference between Greece and the US in terms of economic output per person is less than a factor of 4. With China having well over 4x the population of the US, this sets a more visual benchmark: should China achieve the aggregate output/capita of Greece, they will have overcome the US economy. Of course the catch is we're speaking in nominal terms. Looking at something like the GDP per capita, in PPP terms [2], can help indicate how difficult a journey this will entail. A country like South Korea has a low GDP but is likely hitting closer to the tail end of their rapid growth phase. In spite of having a very low nominal GDP, they have a very strong domestic economy with an output/capita rivaling the West, in terms of local spending power. There is less low hanging fruit, for them to pick, than their GDP would suggest. But China is in a different bucket. Their economic output remains low per capita in both PPP and nominal terms. They have substantial room for rapid upward growth and continue to go in that direction. They will certainly overcome the US, and in the longer term picture they will likely end up with a larger economy than the US and EU combined. I'm anything but a cheerleader for this outcome, but I don't see any realistic scenario where this isn't the case. [1] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)_per_capita https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nomi... [2] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)_per_capita https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)...

petercooper 4y ago

I enjoy his work, though I occasionally find contradictions. He says the US has favorable demographics through having plenty of millennials and suggested the UK was not so lucky, but they look roughly the same to me? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demography_of_the_United_Kingdom#/media/File:UK_Population_Pyramid.svg https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demography_of_the_United_Kingd... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_the_United_States#/media/File:USA_Population_Pyramid.svg https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_the_United_Sta... Germany and China, on the other hand, both do have a huge drop off from the baby boomer generation onward and I wonder how they'll cope with that.

StrangeDoctor 4y ago
throwawaymaths 4y ago
Not that I have a perfectly photographic memory, but I can't recall him ever presenting the UK pyramid chart in any of his presos.
ncmncm 4y ago
To me what stood out most starkly was how few black and hispanic people are found in older cohorts. It seems to imply they die much younger.
- AtlasBarfed 4y ago
  Chris rock on social security: https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=190928444840463 https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=190928444840463
  - ncmncm 4y ago
    That doesn't play, for me. I tried to find it on YT, no luck.
    - DanBC 4y ago
      It's from this bit of one of his shows: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lq6Ez8oYDrU https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lq6Ez8oYDrU
      - ncmncm 4y ago
        Thank you. Nobody can argue with Chris Rock.

windexh8er 4y ago

I recently read the book and have been rereading parts of it just to try to better grasp the big picture he describes. It's an impressively large number of moving parts that Zeihan tackles in the book. His latest was my first read of his, and going back to his older works - I now realize that the new book is not all new work. He talks about "the Order" (the security overwatch you refer to) that was a result of Bretton Woods system [0] in the mid-40s. He does weave a very compelling story about how the United States, under this system, basically competed against itself to open up a freely operating world trade market. Since we opened up these global trade routes to have no impediments, we lost a lot of market opportunities in the low technology manufacturing sectors because we created a system that allowed those things to be made cheaper elsewhere due to the open availability and dependability of said routes. But Zeihan indirectly talks about in the book how the US, through "the Order", leveled up and pushed these less desirable manufacturing out and elsewhere in the world which allowed the US to level up in the process. But the crux of the problem is that the last 60ish years, under this "Order" was only possible due to the US preserving this unimpeded open trade platform. And that the last 4+ Presidencies have mostly ignored the framework with which this financial golden age was built on - and now we're starting to see a number of things coalesce (aging / declining population, climate issues, resources availability, etc) which is giving us a glimpse of the system starting to falter - accelerated by the global pandemic. It does appear that the US is decoupling from internationalism after you read his work and start to see the news through these context of the ideas presented. An example might be the push for chips to come back to the United States, as of recent. While there are only a few regions in the world that can make bleeding edge chips today - the fact that the US is not capable of producing these in quantity and relies on other countries creates risk is Zeihan's "post-Order" world. While it's a fantastic read I don't think Zeihan, himself, thinks that he'll be right on all fronts - but the scary part is that he doesn't need to be to end up with very similar end results. This will mean many countries globally will end up in the horrible position of famine due to international trade and shipping being the core component that keeps some of these inhabited areas propped up. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bretton_Woods_system https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bretton_Woods_system

DubiousPusher 4y ago

> If you believe this thesis then in the coming years, and you believe the US will decouples/is decoupling from internationalism (I have been convinced), This seems to be a popular notion but I don't see strong evidence for it. There is a visible anti-interventionist constituency in the US for the first time in decades but that doesn't mean it actually has any significant ability to sway foreign policy. In fact, if American history is any suggestion, this constituency is unlikely to have its way as there have been much larger and better organized pluralities in the past who again and again were ultimately overcome by the interventionists.

throwawaymaths 4y ago
Zeihan's argument is that the pinnacle of us engagement was Bush I. Clinton's international engagement was mostly superficial and the only deal he got done was NAFTA, which is regional, not internationalist. Bush II's major international engagement was fighting wars. Same with Obama (though a rapprochement with Russia was tried under HRC watch -- that is clearly out the window for the near term). Trump was definitely disengaged -- he spearheaded decoupling from China and withdrew from the military engagements of his predecessors. Biden is so far more or less continuing the trump foreign policy with the exceptions of Ukraine (duh) and returning to Kyoto -- though the US was well on its way to meeting Kyoto obligations organically, and much of Europe is very likely barely not going meet kyoto
- DubiousPusher 4y ago
  To me this is an utterly superficial reading of American foreign policy. It's like saying Nixon was an isolationist because Vietnam ended on his watch. It's like saying McDonald's is going out of business when it closes one struggling location. Trump nor Biden wound down U.S. involvement around the globe other than the two highly visible deccenial quagmires in the middle east. Neither pushed for reforming the FISA system which has created a legal parallel legal pipeline for spying. Neither have discussed winding down the blacksite network for rendering foreign nationals around the globe. Neither have renounced the drone programs. Neither even ultimately renounced any of the mutual protection treaties the U.S. maintains. Neither have renounced intelligence sharing. Neither have renounced arms sales. Neither have announced any significant foreign policy stance changes other than some doubling down on positions that already existed. It's a red hot garbage thesis which sees open war and nation building as the only two pillars of power projection that matter.

somenameforme 4y ago

I find there's a much simpler argument that, incidentally, leads to a similar conclusion but without the necessity of any conditionals (such as internationalism). Our power was primarily derived from our economic superiority. Even in cases of hard power, our military was and is little more than a reflection of our economy. We're much smaller than other nations such as China and India, but an overwhelming technological and developmental edge largely nullified that difference in the past. But that technological edge has been shrinking for decades, and there's no need to think this trend won't continue indefinitely. And as technological differences shrink, economics starts to become more of just a function of population size. And 340 million will never be able to maintain a competitive balance against 1.4 billion. We can already see this happening in many ways today, most innocuously from "American" companies increasingly kowtowing [1] the line. Beyond the fun wordplay, the word has an appropriate etymology. When the next great economy is already able to casually influence the backbone of our economy - the backbone of our power, it largely signals the end of one hegemonic influence and the unfortunately probable advent of another. [1] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kowtow https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kowtow

ericmay 4y ago
Quantity is a quality all on its own. But I would hesitate to draw such a simple conclusion that #of people a country has simply translates into more success because there are numerous factors at play.
- somenameforme 4y ago
  I agree there are many other factors in play, but the question is how do those factors compare with population? We can answer this objectively, or at least as objectively as equating GDP with economy, allows us to do. This [1] is a list of countries by their GDP per capita. It's quite surprising how closely all countries tend to fall together. The difference between Greece and the US in terms of economic output per person is less than a factor of 4. With China having well over 4x the population of the US, this sets a more visual benchmark: should China achieve the aggregate output/capita of Greece, they will have overcome the US economy. Of course the catch is we're speaking in nominal terms. Looking at something like the GDP per capita, in PPP terms [2], can help indicate how difficult a journey this will entail. A country like South Korea has a low GDP but is likely hitting closer to the tail end of their rapid growth phase. In spite of having a very low nominal GDP, they have a very strong domestic economy with an output/capita rivaling the West, in terms of local spending power. There is less low hanging fruit, for them to pick, than their GDP would suggest. But China is in a different bucket. Their economic output remains low per capita in both PPP and nominal terms. They have substantial room for rapid upward growth and continue to go in that direction. They will certainly overcome the US, and in the longer term picture they will likely end up with a larger economy than the US and EU combined. I'm anything but a cheerleader for this outcome, but I don't see any realistic scenario where this isn't the case. [1] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)_per_capita https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nomi... [2] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)_per_capita https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)...