5 ms·

First off, way to sensationalize. Due to the writing style and title I don't think this should be e number one story right now. But anyway, published or not "b

First off, way to sensationalize. Due to the writing style and title I don't think this should be e number one story right now. But anyway, published or not "bio terrorists" are not the kind of people the article wants you to picture. The only likely way such an attack could be carried out would be with massive support of some unfriendly government. There's no bio-weapon Al Quaeda working group or anything like that and if there were the worst they could do is try to infect us by releasing some infected animal loose somewhere in the hopes it would infect someone. I wish this post didn't have "fluff piece" written all over it and focused in a far more detailed way about the merits of publishing scientific studies that could be used for nefarious purposes. Unfortunately, the post gives us so little facts on that subject that none of us could really build a good argument for or against it without doing a fair amount of research first or resorting to uneducated guesses and opinions. It's too bad, really.

DanBC 15y ago
> There's no bio-weapon Al Quaeda working group or anything like that You're aware that Aum Shinrikyo released aerosolised anthrax spores for a week in Japan before they stopped, and that it's only because they used the wrong anthrax that there wasn't widespread infection? That was in 1993; I imagine it's technologically much easier and cheaper to do it now, but that there are tighter controls over chemicals etc. The article is sensationalist. Bio-terrorists don't need to kill anyone, they just need to cause economic harm. They can do this by releasing blue-tongue or foot&mouth or whatever in a few farms. That costs billions and long lasting damage. (http://www.fmd.brass.cf.ac.uk/ http://www.fmd.brass.cf.ac.uk/)
- learc83 15y ago
  Yeah, they released the wrong Anthrax spores. An amateur move, they weren't a hard core group of bioengineers--just some guys who happened to get hold of some anthrax spores. The issue here is creating this strain, sure some crazy death cult would use a weaponized flu, but the OP is arguing they wouldn't be able to create it in the first place.
  - DanBC 15y ago
    > they weren't a hard core group of bioengineers--just some guys who happened to get hold of some anthrax spores. They aerosolised the spores, and released them for over a week. That's not as simple as putting powder in an envelope and putting it in the mail. (http://jama.ama-assn.org/content/281/18/1735.full http://jama.ama-assn.org/content/281/18/1735.full) > Most experts concur that the manufacture of a lethal anthrax aerosol is beyond the capacity of individuals or groups without access to advanced biotechnology. However, autonomous groups with substantial funding and contacts may be able to acquire the required materials for a successful attack. One terrorist group, Aum Shinrikyo, responsible for the release of sarin in a Tokyo, Japan, subway station in 1995,6 dispersed aerosols of anthrax and botulism throughout Tokyo on at least 8 occasions. For unclear reasons, the attacks failed to produce illness. > * the OP is arguing they wouldn't be able to create it in the first place.* The point I'm responding to is this:- >The only likely way such an attack could be carried out would be with massive support of some unfriendly government. I disagree that "massive support of some unfriendly government" is needed; the example I give is Aum Shinrikyo weaponising anthrax spores (albeit the wrong anthrax spores.) AS successfully recruited undergraduates and graduates; getting access to suitably stocked labs wouldn't be that hard for them.
    - learc83 15y ago
      > Most experts concur that the manufacture of a lethal anthrax aerosol They didn't make a lethal anthrax aerosol, they used a completely harmless vaccine strain of anthrax, I would say that classifies them as amateurs. If it really required vast bioengineering expertise to make an anthrax aerosol, one would think they wouldn't make such a ridiculous mistake.
      - DanBC 15y ago
        The hard part is aerosolising the anthrax. As to using the wrong anthrax - Identifying anthrax is hard. PDF: (http://jcm.asm.org/content/39/12/4566.full.pdf http://jcm.asm.org/content/39/12/4566.full.pdf) >Strain identiﬁcation in Bacillus anthracis has been problematic due to a lack of distinguishing features, both phenotypic and molecular (1). With the identiﬁcation of variable-number tandem repeats (VNTRs), identiﬁcation of strains (unique genotypes) by multiple-locus VNTR analysis (MLVA) is now possible, and worldwide clone-based diversity patterns have been demonstrated (2). The VNTR loci are hypervariable and have multiple allelic states that provide high discrimination capacity for differentiating among strains and for identifying evolutionary relationships. That's from 2001. Aum Shinrikyo incident was in 1993.
Tichy 15y ago
And why is there no such terror group (and how do you know)? How much did it cost to create that killer virus in a lab - did it cost trillions, so that only rich governments could afford to do so? I don't understand why terrorists shouldn't be capable of doing such a thing. Maybe the rationale is that they wouldn't be able to set up sterile lab environments, because we all know that terrorists live in dirty third world countries without hygiene?

DanBC 15y ago

> There's no bio-weapon Al Quaeda working group or anything like that You're aware that Aum Shinrikyo released aerosolised anthrax spores for a week in Japan before they stopped, and that it's only because they used the wrong anthrax that there wasn't widespread infection? That was in 1993; I imagine it's technologically much easier and cheaper to do it now, but that there are tighter controls over chemicals etc. The article is sensationalist. Bio-terrorists don't need to kill anyone, they just need to cause economic harm. They can do this by releasing blue-tongue or foot&mouth or whatever in a few farms. That costs billions and long lasting damage. (http://www.fmd.brass.cf.ac.uk/ http://www.fmd.brass.cf.ac.uk/)

learc83 15y ago
Yeah, they released the wrong Anthrax spores. An amateur move, they weren't a hard core group of bioengineers--just some guys who happened to get hold of some anthrax spores. The issue here is creating this strain, sure some crazy death cult would use a weaponized flu, but the OP is arguing they wouldn't be able to create it in the first place.
- DanBC 15y ago
  > they weren't a hard core group of bioengineers--just some guys who happened to get hold of some anthrax spores. They aerosolised the spores, and released them for over a week. That's not as simple as putting powder in an envelope and putting it in the mail. (http://jama.ama-assn.org/content/281/18/1735.full http://jama.ama-assn.org/content/281/18/1735.full) > Most experts concur that the manufacture of a lethal anthrax aerosol is beyond the capacity of individuals or groups without access to advanced biotechnology. However, autonomous groups with substantial funding and contacts may be able to acquire the required materials for a successful attack. One terrorist group, Aum Shinrikyo, responsible for the release of sarin in a Tokyo, Japan, subway station in 1995,6 dispersed aerosols of anthrax and botulism throughout Tokyo on at least 8 occasions. For unclear reasons, the attacks failed to produce illness. > * the OP is arguing they wouldn't be able to create it in the first place.* The point I'm responding to is this:- >The only likely way such an attack could be carried out would be with massive support of some unfriendly government. I disagree that "massive support of some unfriendly government" is needed; the example I give is Aum Shinrikyo weaponising anthrax spores (albeit the wrong anthrax spores.) AS successfully recruited undergraduates and graduates; getting access to suitably stocked labs wouldn't be that hard for them.
  - learc83 15y ago
    > Most experts concur that the manufacture of a lethal anthrax aerosol They didn't make a lethal anthrax aerosol, they used a completely harmless vaccine strain of anthrax, I would say that classifies them as amateurs. If it really required vast bioengineering expertise to make an anthrax aerosol, one would think they wouldn't make such a ridiculous mistake.
    - DanBC 15y ago
      The hard part is aerosolising the anthrax. As to using the wrong anthrax - Identifying anthrax is hard. PDF: (http://jcm.asm.org/content/39/12/4566.full.pdf http://jcm.asm.org/content/39/12/4566.full.pdf) >Strain identiﬁcation in Bacillus anthracis has been problematic due to a lack of distinguishing features, both phenotypic and molecular (1). With the identiﬁcation of variable-number tandem repeats (VNTRs), identiﬁcation of strains (unique genotypes) by multiple-locus VNTR analysis (MLVA) is now possible, and worldwide clone-based diversity patterns have been demonstrated (2). The VNTR loci are hypervariable and have multiple allelic states that provide high discrimination capacity for differentiating among strains and for identifying evolutionary relationships. That's from 2001. Aum Shinrikyo incident was in 1993.

Tichy 15y ago

And why is there no such terror group (and how do you know)? How much did it cost to create that killer virus in a lab - did it cost trillions, so that only rich governments could afford to do so? I don't understand why terrorists shouldn't be capable of doing such a thing. Maybe the rationale is that they wouldn't be able to set up sterile lab environments, because we all know that terrorists live in dirty third world countries without hygiene?