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The only reason to design a system like Apple’s is so that it is impossible to opt out of once it is rolled out to non-iCloud photos. iCloud photos are not e2e
by hamandcheese 4y ago
The only reason to design a system like Apple’s is so that it is impossible to opt out of once it is rolled out to non-iCloud photos.
iCloud photos are not e2e encrypted. If only iCloud photos were the true final target, there is absolutely no need for on-device scanning.
- JimDabell 4y ago> The only reason to design a system like Apple’s is so that it is impossible to opt out of once it is rolled out to non-iCloud photos. This doesn’t make any sense because this system cannot be rolled out to non-iCloud photos. They would have to redesign how it worked. So the whole idea that Apple designed it this way for reasons that only kick in when it’s rolled out to non-iCloud photos is incoherent. If Apple were designing it for that purpose they would have picked a design that actually worked in those circumstances.
- hamandcheese 4y agoWhat about the design makes this only possible for iCloud? The scanning occurs on device. What limits it to only iCloud photos?
- JimDabell 4y agoWell it’s quite clearly integrated into the iCloud system. Why would you think that it works for local photos without iCloud? A known CSAM photo gets added to photos on an iPhone with iCloud disabled – what happens next? What do you think is the mechanism for that getting reported?