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> That has many people rightfully concerned that the scanning could extend to local-only images next. Apple didn’t propose this, and the scheme that Apple did

> That has many people rightfully concerned that the scanning could extend to local-only images next. Apple didn’t propose this, and the scheme that Apple did propose was very inconvenient if they actually wanted to do this. They would have had to redesign how the system worked to do it, at which point most of the system would become completely useless. Nobody would come up with a system like Apple’s if they wanted to do what you describe. There are much simpler ways to do that which would have saved Apple a lot of time and effort. The only reason to design a system like Apple’s is to limit knowledge in all directions as much as possible. Nobody was rightfully concerned about this, they got outraged because they would rather jump to conclusions over headlines than take the time to read about how the scheme worked.

hamandcheese 4y ago
The only reason to design a system like Apple’s is so that it is impossible to opt out of once it is rolled out to non-iCloud photos. iCloud photos are not e2e encrypted. If only iCloud photos were the true final target, there is absolutely no need for on-device scanning.
- JimDabell 4y ago
  > The only reason to design a system like Apple’s is so that it is impossible to opt out of once it is rolled out to non-iCloud photos. This doesn’t make any sense because this system cannot be rolled out to non-iCloud photos. They would have to redesign how it worked. So the whole idea that Apple designed it this way for reasons that only kick in when it’s rolled out to non-iCloud photos is incoherent. If Apple were designing it for that purpose they would have picked a design that actually worked in those circumstances.
  - hamandcheese 4y ago
    What about the design makes this only possible for iCloud? The scanning occurs on device. What limits it to only iCloud photos?
    - JimDabell 4y ago
      Well it’s quite clearly integrated into the iCloud system. Why would you think that it works for local photos without iCloud? A known CSAM photo gets added to photos on an iPhone with iCloud disabled – what happens next? What do you think is the mechanism for that getting reported?

hamandcheese 4y ago

The only reason to design a system like Apple’s is so that it is impossible to opt out of once it is rolled out to non-iCloud photos. iCloud photos are not e2e encrypted. If only iCloud photos were the true final target, there is absolutely no need for on-device scanning.

JimDabell 4y ago
> The only reason to design a system like Apple’s is so that it is impossible to opt out of once it is rolled out to non-iCloud photos. This doesn’t make any sense because this system cannot be rolled out to non-iCloud photos. They would have to redesign how it worked. So the whole idea that Apple designed it this way for reasons that only kick in when it’s rolled out to non-iCloud photos is incoherent. If Apple were designing it for that purpose they would have picked a design that actually worked in those circumstances.
- hamandcheese 4y ago
  What about the design makes this only possible for iCloud? The scanning occurs on device. What limits it to only iCloud photos?
  - JimDabell 4y ago
    Well it’s quite clearly integrated into the iCloud system. Why would you think that it works for local photos without iCloud? A known CSAM photo gets added to photos on an iPhone with iCloud disabled – what happens next? What do you think is the mechanism for that getting reported?