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> The advantage of CRLs isn't that they can be used offline, it's that it allows your security team to burn certificates rather than waiting for the CA to do so

> The advantage of CRLs isn't that they can be used offline, it's that it allows your security team to burn certificates rather than waiting for the CA to do so. You should always subscribe to your CA's CRL too, but you should have a CRL for your own internal use, too. This is incorrect conventionally CRLs are signed by the Originating CA in the conventional trust model. Most CAs won't give you a certificate with the ability to generate your own CRL sharing the same trust, because it can be weaponized to cause a denial of service. This then brings up non-conventional trust models, and Validation Authority as Co-equal to CA situations for validity which can be significantly more challenging, and requiring VA certificate insertion into every Relying Party, just to name a few things, not to mention all the security concerns.

GauntletWizard 4y ago
I'm aware. That trust model is inherently broken, and it's not followed anyway. In practice, any CA you trust can sign a revocation for any certificate (the serial numbers are all grouped together) - And that's the way it should be. You should not wait for the issuing CA to get it's act together, you should burn a certificate as soon as anyone distrusts it, and if you have a rogue CA that starts burning Google.com and other important sites, it's better that they burn them (and take you offline) than that they issue false certs (and leak all your data); It's also far more obvious. https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/04/19/revchecking.html https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/04/19/revchecking.html Revocation checking is useful for your security team to blacklist site. That's the only useful use.