6 ms·

Can you elaborate on why you think this is the case?

themoonisachees 4y ago
Stealing private keys (through whatever means) is considerably easier than stealing a comparable amount of mining hardware then running it. It's not that big of a risk in reality of course, but there is still a considerable amount of security provided by the fact that obtaining enough compute for a 50% attack is harder than obtaining enough eth to do the same.
wyager 4y ago
Key phrase to search - "nothing at stake problem"
- operator-name 4y ago
  For the most part ethereum doesn't suffer from this issue.
  - wyager 4y ago
    Eth's work-arounds all involve centralization. If you want decentralized security, you need real physical opex.
    - operator-name 4y ago
      Yes, I'm not denying that. The question was why "opex is the part that tethers on-chain security to reality", and opex specifically.
      - wyager 4y ago
        Opex specifically because we don't have a predicative algorithm for proving capex. The only predicative value-proof algorithm we have is PoW, which works on opex. PoS is completely impredicative.
    - exo762 4y ago
      What centralization? Adherence to protocol rules? How requirement of locking down 32ETH is different from requirement to run ASIC that does two rounds of SHA256? Please don't throw around buzzwords.
      - wyager 4y ago
        The slashing enforcement mechanism introduces centralization; it has to, to work around nothing-at-stake. I'm not throwing around buzzwords. Please don't accuse people of that without sufficient understanding to be reasonably confident you're correct. > locking down 32ETH is different from requirement to run ASIC This is precisely the opex-vs-capex distinction we are discussing in this thread. 32eth is strict capex. ASIC capex <<< power opex.
        exo762 4y ago
        > The slashing enforcement mechanism introduces centralization; it has to, to work around nothing-at-stake. It is other way around. Slashing is the solution for nothing-at-stake. By requiring multiple validators to sign each block height you prime them for being slashed if they ever double sign those heights (or sell key to someone who does). Where is centralization here? Are you speaking slashing condition detection? Or maybe about slashing tx inclusion into the chain?
        wyager 4y ago
        > Are you speaking slashing condition detection Correct - the decision about when to slash
        exo762 4y ago
        It is as easy as finding a duplicate signature. And while it takes some computational power (pennies comparing to PoW), you need just one watcher to guarantee that chain will remain honest. So, 1 honest person out of n. Almost as good as it gets. Whole spiel about "only EF will run those, whole thing is centralized" is just noise. You as an attacker can't distinguish between situation when I'm running a slasher from one when I'm not. Now go and risk the attack.

Stealing private keys (through whatever means) is considerably easier than stealing a comparable amount of mining hardware then running it. It's not that big of a risk in reality of course, but there is still a considerable amount of security provided by the fact that obtaining enough compute for a 50% attack is harder than obtaining enough eth to do the same.

wyager 4y ago

Key phrase to search - "nothing at stake problem"

operator-name 4y ago
For the most part ethereum doesn't suffer from this issue.
- wyager 4y ago
  Eth's work-arounds all involve centralization. If you want decentralized security, you need real physical opex.
  - operator-name 4y ago
    Yes, I'm not denying that. The question was why "opex is the part that tethers on-chain security to reality", and opex specifically.
    - wyager 4y ago
      Opex specifically because we don't have a predicative algorithm for proving capex. The only predicative value-proof algorithm we have is PoW, which works on opex. PoS is completely impredicative.
  - exo762 4y ago
    What centralization? Adherence to protocol rules? How requirement of locking down 32ETH is different from requirement to run ASIC that does two rounds of SHA256? Please don't throw around buzzwords.
    - wyager 4y ago
      The slashing enforcement mechanism introduces centralization; it has to, to work around nothing-at-stake. I'm not throwing around buzzwords. Please don't accuse people of that without sufficient understanding to be reasonably confident you're correct. > locking down 32ETH is different from requirement to run ASIC This is precisely the opex-vs-capex distinction we are discussing in this thread. 32eth is strict capex. ASIC capex <<< power opex.
      - exo762 4y ago
        > The slashing enforcement mechanism introduces centralization; it has to, to work around nothing-at-stake. It is other way around. Slashing is the solution for nothing-at-stake. By requiring multiple validators to sign each block height you prime them for being slashed if they ever double sign those heights (or sell key to someone who does). Where is centralization here? Are you speaking slashing condition detection? Or maybe about slashing tx inclusion into the chain?
        wyager 4y ago
        > Are you speaking slashing condition detection Correct - the decision about when to slash
        exo762 4y ago
        It is as easy as finding a duplicate signature. And while it takes some computational power (pennies comparing to PoW), you need just one watcher to guarantee that chain will remain honest. So, 1 honest person out of n. Almost as good as it gets. Whole spiel about "only EF will run those, whole thing is centralized" is just noise. You as an attacker can't distinguish between situation when I'm running a slasher from one when I'm not. Now go and risk the attack.