> Take the Many Worlds theory of Quantum Mechanics Some will say that, to be strictly correct about terminology, QM is a theory, but many worlds is an interpre

> Take the Many Worlds theory of Quantum Mechanics Some will say that, to be strictly correct about terminology, QM is a theory, but many worlds is an interpretation of it. The theory belongs to physics proper; the interpretation belongs, not to physics, but rather to its allied discipline, the philosophy of physics. (Many extra-philosophical disciplines have allied subfields of philosophy – philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of science, philosophy of biology, philosophy of law, philosophy of politics, philosophy of medicine, philosophy of psychiatry, philosophy of education, etc, etc, etc.) These interpretaions belong in "philosophy of physics" rather than "physics proper", because (1) they are (at least for now) untestable in practice; (2) the mathematics is (largely) the same. Something like string theory is more "physics proper" than "philosophy of physics", because even though (1) is also true for it, (2) is false. But, not everyone is so careful about the boundary between "physics" and "philosophy of physics". Your example of physicists who say "philosophy has nothing to say to them" and then embrace many worlds is an example. > The same goes goes for logic's acceptance into philosophy, Russell argued that that logic was actually an aspect of mathematics and that basically it didn't belong in philosophy We can study logics as formal mathematical systems, and to that extent logic indeed forms part of mathematics (mathematical logic). However, while the mathematical study of logics is a vast topic – if we ask the question "does this mathematical logic accurately model how (some aspect of) human thought actually functions, or ought to function"? – that question is beyond the proper bounds of mathematics – and that's where the boundary lies between philosophical logical and mathematical logic. > After reading your reply, it's clear to me that we have somewhat different philosophical outlooks I get somewhat pedantic about precise conceptual distinctions (including trying to correctly deploy "the discipline's more formal nomenclature", as you put it), but I feel like you treat these distinctions in a more impressionistic way than I do. I think that's one difference between our approaches. > If perchance we ever managed to spend an afternoon together discussing philosophy then I'd reckon we'd get along just fine. Yes. Who knows, maybe some day we shall.