5G SA networks are only becoming more common in the past year. 5G NSA does not benefit from the same enhanced privacy. At the same time SA is starting to get de

5G SA networks are only becoming more common in the past year. 5G NSA does not benefit from the same enhanced privacy. At the same time SA is starting to get deployed legacy networks are being shut down. One of the reasons it took so long was necessity for user equipment to support NR carrier aggregation, and we're there now. But we are derailing. All the slides you've linked acknowledge the attempts made in 5G to improve privacy and most of the practical attacks rely on implementation mistakes or downgrade attacks (which should be less possible as legacy networks disappear). I originally responded on the topic to note that for the first time on a global standard there was an attempt to encrypt subscriber identifying data. Earlier standards made no such attempt and were broken in other ways. (For example GSM had two replaced cracked/backdoored encryption standards A5/1 and A5/2 which were replaced by A5/3 and the standard never made any attempt to authenticate towers)